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The cumulative dissertation at hand comprises four empirical studies on the impact of the 
Swiss federal reform 2008 and the federalisation in Belgium in 1993 on subnational fiscal 
resources. All studies have been published in scientific journals ranked in the Social Sci-
ence Citation Index (SSCI), namely in Regional & Federal Studies (chapter 2), in the 
Swiss Political Science Review (chapter 3), in the Journal of Public Policy (chapter 4), 
and in the European Journal of Political Research (chapter 5). Each article has undergone 
a double-blind review process. At the beginning of each chapter, I present information on 
co-authors and references to the published articles. 
The four empirical studies are part of the overall analytical framework presented in Chap-
ter 1. Chapters 1 (Introduction) and 6 (Conclusion) place the studies in the context of this 
framework. The empirical studies are independent contributions in individual journals, 
which inevitably leads to similarities, redundancies and differences regarding methodo-
logical approaches. In addition, given the different author guidelines of the journals, there 
are slight differences in language.1 
  
                                                 
1 Generally, all research articles have been written in British English using the “-ise” spelling. An exception 





The dissertation deals with the research question of how the Swiss federal reform 2008 
(NFA) has changed vertical fiscal power relations in Switzerland and what can be learned 
from these findings for institutional design in federations in general. The main part of this 
cumulative dissertation is composed of four empirical studies, each of them contributing 
to the overall research question. The first study in chapter 2 takes a macro-perspective 
and focuses on the impact of the NFA on subnational fiscal autonomy. In the second study 
in chapter 3, I extend the perspective by taking into account the role of municipalities. 
Using a cross-cantonal comparison and focusing on the policy area of special schools, I 
assess the impact of local authorities sitting in the cantonal parliament on the cost distri-
bution formula between the cantons and the municipalities. In the third study in chapter 
4, I examine whether the effects found for the particular policy area examined in chapter 
3 can be identified throughout all policy areas in Switzerland. Finally, in a fourth empir-
ical study in chapter 5, I include the 1993 Belgian federalisation as a second case to allow 
for a systematic comparison of the empirical findings.  
The findings can be summarised as follows: First, there is indeed an effect of the NFA on 
subnational fiscal power, albeit rather negative, given that the increase of subnational 
expenditure is not matched by a corresponding increase of revenue. Second, chapters 3 
and 4 point to the phenomenon of “state capture from below”, i.e. the efforts of munici-
palities to shift expenditure to the cantonal level. As chapter 3 shows, the effect of the 
NFA in the policy area of special schools is contingent on the number of local authorities 
sitting in the cantonal parliament. Chapter 4 finds empirical evidence for the “state cap-
ture from below” beyond individual policy areas. Finally, the comparison with Belgium 
in chapter 5 leads to the conclusion that the de/centralization of the tax system is an im-
portant moderating variable: While a centralised tax system in Belgium allows top-down 
steering of expenditure through intergovernmental grants, the reform capacity in Switzer-
land is lower, at least if the principle of cantonal tax autonomy should not be weakened.  
All in all, the findings of the dissertation contribute to both the current public discussion 







A federal state is characterised by the existence of multiple state layers among whom 
political power is shared. How power is shared can vary from federation to federation. In 
literature, the terms decentralisation and centralisation mark the endpoints of a continuum 
of the vertical power distribution. While the former refers to the shift of power to subna-
tional governments, the latter entails the accumulation of power at the centre. Even though 
federalism is known to strongly correlate with decentralisation, it is not a given that these 
two concepts go hand in hand. According to Wheare (1963: 10), federalism is “the method 
of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, 
co-ordinate and independent”. However, this "method" only addresses the institutional 
framework within which the concentration of power in the centre (centralisation) or the 
shift of power to the decentralised units (decentralisation) are equally possible. Hence, 
even though, according to Hueglin (2013: 44), “[a]ll federal systems must provide exis-
tential safeguards against involuntary power transfers from one order of government to 
another”, power relations within federal states may still shift between the centre and the 
periphery. Indeed, one of the most frequently discussed challenges in federations nowa-
days is the extensive accumulation of power at the central level (Bednar 2004, 2009; 
Braun 2011).  
The Swiss federal system is a model example of this. Although Switzerland is considered 
to be one of the most decentralised systems in the world, there has been increasing criti-
cism about a creeping accumulation of power at the centre in recent decades (Mueller and 
Vatter 2016; Vatter 2018: 169ff.). This criticism arose during the Swiss federal reform 
2008, called the NFA (short for Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und der Aufgaben-
teilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen). How has this reform changed vertical power rela-
tions in Switzerland and what can we learn from this reform for institutional design in 
federations in general? In this dissertation, I focus on this overall research question. Start-
ing from previous research that has focused on the decision making process and the legal 
outputs of the NFA, I go one step further and look at the fiscal effects of the reform. In 




three empirical studies. Additionally, in a fourth empirical study, I include the 1993 Bel-
gian federalisation as a second case to allow for a systematic comparison of the empirical 
findings. 
In this introduction, I first lay out the theoretical background of federal reforms and pre-
sent the cornerstones of the NFA (section 1.1). In section 1.2, I present the dependent 
variable of my dissertation – the vertical power sharing in federal Switzerland measured 
in terms of fiscal power. In section 1.3, I outline the research design of my dissertation 
and provide an outlook on the empirical studies in chapters 2 to 5.  
1.1 The NFA as a model example of a federal reform 
Benz und Colino (2011: 389) define a reform as “deliberate change” which “refers to the 
occasional conscious redesign of the basic rules of the system affecting its structure or 
general configuration in terms of powers, representation and resources.” As such, a re-
form is an action of political authorities that goes beyond implicit changes, e.g. by re-
interpreting existing institutional rules (Bednar 2013; Benz and Colino 2011; Benz and 
Broschek 2013: 11; Benz 2013a: 728). Applied to federal states, reforms can be used to 
alter basic rules of the system, which themselves help to counterbalance destabilizing 
dynamics (Banting and Simeon 1985; Benz and Colino 2011: 385). One motivation may 
be to re-stabilize the vertical power structure by reversing trends of power accumulation 
at the centre and giving authority back to decentralised units (Behnke and Benz 2008: 
215). 
From a historical institutionalist perspective, federal reforms occur in times of “critical 
junctures” which set out an existing path and open up a new pathway (Broschek 2013: 
97). Capoccia und Kelemen (2007: 348) define critical junctures as “relatively short pe-
riods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ 
choices will affect the outcome of interest” (emphasis in original). Considering federal 
reforms, it is the entire process of the reform – from agenda-setting through negotiation 
to final ratification – which suspends developments of the precedent path and provides 
new opportunities for actors to change the direction of the federal system (Benz and Co-
lino 2011: 392). In this view, federal reforms can be distinguished from path-dependent, 
gradual changes of individual parts of the system, which can have important long-term 




Theoretically, federal systems can be destabilised both by concentration and fragmenta-
tion of power (Gerber and Kollman 2004: 397). While the latter is relevant in federal 
states with strong provinces that oppose the federal state, a concentration of power is 
often a challenge in established federal systems where the national coherence is not ques-
tioned (Braun 2011). In the latter case, deliberate political choices such as federal reforms 
can aim to curb these tendencies.  
With these theoretical backgrounds in mind, we may consider the NFA as a model exam-
ple of a federal reform. The entire reform process marked the end of a long-running dis-
cussion on the adequate distribution of policy competences in the Swiss federal system. 
In their systematic measurement of centralisation from 1848 to 2010, Dardanelli und 
Mueller (2019) point out that legislative power in the Swiss federal system has been con-
stantly concentrated at the centre. Important developments in this respect were the new 
constitutional article on economic matters in 1947 and the increase of federal compe-
tences in the welfare sector in the second half of the 20th century (Fagagnini 1991: 48f.; 
Wälti 1996: 16; Mueller and Vatter 2017: 44f.). While policy competences have increas-
ingly shifted upwards, fiscal and administrative centralisation has weakened (Dardanelli 
and Mueller 2019). As a result, while decisional power has been gradually centralised, 
cantons continue to play an important role in the implementation of policies.  
With increased awareness of this creeping centralisation (Freiburghaus and Buchli 2003; 
Mueller and Vatter 2016), initial reform efforts to reverse this trend were initiated in the 
second half of the 20th century. While the first reform attempts in the 1970s and 1980s 
failed (Braun 2009: 322f.; Freiburghaus 2012: 54), the reform process progressed in the 
1990s. After more than ten years of negotiations, the Swiss electorate approved the reform 
proposal in 2004 with a large majority of 64 percent. The reform package entered into 
force in 2008. It is composed of two pillars which, as a whole, point to a vertical re-
organisation of the policy competences and as such of the vertical political power relation.  
Within the first pillar, the NFA has re-allocated competences in various policy areas. Four 
groups of policy areas can be distinguished. In the first group, seven policy areas have 
been centralised, i.e. the federal government has taken over full responsibility (e.g. na-
tional road network or defence). A second group of ten policy areas have been canton-




schools, educational grants up until secondary schools, and support for housing and work-
ing/day care facilities for disabled people). Third, the reform has named nine policy tasks 
where inter-cantonal cooperation should be given preference over centralised solutions. 
In these policy areas, the federal state has been granted the competence to declare inter-
cantonal cooperation (institutionalised by so-called concordats) generally binding under 
certain conditions2 and to force cantons to participate. Finally, 17 policy areas have been 
identified for which both the federal state and the cantons remain responsible. However, 
the instrument of programme conventions has been introduced to give the cantons more 
leeway in implementing national laws (Mathys 2015, 2016; Ladner and Mathys 2018: 
85ff.). Table A 1 in the Appendix provides an overview over all four groups of policy 
areas that have been reformed in the course of the NFA.   
Within the second pillar, the reform has entailed a complete overhaul of the fiscal equal-
isation system. In addition to horizontal equalisation payments from richer to poorer can-
tons, the federal government participates in financial equalisation through vertical pay-
ments. Generally, the NFA is budget neutral for the federal government, as the cantons' 
share of direct federal taxes has been reduced correspondingly (Federal Council 2014: 
34). One exception, however, exists: In the course of the final negotiations, the cantons 
succeeded in ensuring that the federal government paid the majority of the so-called 
“hardship fund” – a fund to facilitate the transition into the new system for cantons with 
less resources (Wasserfallen 2015: 544; Federal Council 2014: 34).  
While the reform did not have the explicit goal of decentralizing political power in the 
system, one general objective was to re-empower the subnational governments, namely 
the cantons. The principle that guided the re-allocation was subsidiarity, evident through 
the number of cantonal competences – that outnumbered federal competences – and the 
strengthening of inter-cantonal cooperation (Braun 2008b, 2009; Wasserfallen 2015: 543; 
Mueller and Vatter 2017). A further indication can be found in the votes of the actors 
involved. In its official statement on the reform in November 2001, the Federal Council 
acknowledged the problem of creeping centralisation and advocated the reform as a pro-
ject to strengthen and develop Switzerland's federal structures (Federal Council 2001). In 
                                                 
2 At the request of 18 cantons, a concordat can be declared generally binding by the two national parlia-




2002, the official project manager from the Swiss Federal Finance Administration high-
lighted the positive involvement of the cantons and attributed this, among others, to the 
fact that the reform further strengthened the principle of subsidiarity in the constitution 
(Wettstein 2002). In the literature, this view is shared: Braun (2008a: 7), for example, 
argues that decentralisation has been one of the “main thrust[s]” of the reform. Was-
serfallen (2015) notes that “subsidiarity” has been the “general principle of the reform of 
the vertical competence allocation”. Cappelletti et al. (2014) emphasize the self-interest 
of the actors, but come to a similar conclusion by arguing that the federal government 
was forced to make major concessions to the cantons in order to obtain a majority for the 
reform.  
The aim of this dissertation is to assess the extent to which this “strengthening” of the 
cantons has been achieved in terms of fiscal power. So far, studies on the NFA have been 
primarily based on qualitative assessments on the reform content and process. In general, 
the reform is praised for its “very detailed agenda” of reform measures (Behnke et al. 
2011: 458) and for the broad recognition of its success (Benz 2013a). Without questioning 
these findings, this dissertation goes one step further and analyses the “effectiveness” of 
the reform by looking at the quantifiable effect on the vertical power structure in fiscal 
terms. As such, the dissertation follows the recommendations of Behnke et al. (2011) to 
distinguish between “formal” and “substantive” success of constitutional changes. While 
the former simply refers to the legislative amendment of the constitution, the latter takes 
into account a reforms’ problem solving capacity. 
In the next section I discuss in detail the possibilities to measure vertical power relations 
and present the rationale behind the choice to focus on fiscal data.  
 1.2 Vertical power sharing in federations 
In literature, the overall concept for vertical power sharing is “de/centralisation”. Even 
though sometimes used interchangeably, it is once again important to note the difference 
between federalism and decentralisation. Federalism, one the one hand, refers to a state’s 
institutional structure, while decentralisation, on the other, implies the distribution of 
power among different layers. In the words of Rodden (2004: 482): „Decentralisation is 
often viewed as a shift of authority towards local governments and away from central 




fixed.“ Hence, decentralisation – as it is conceptualised in this dissertation – is a feature 
within a political system that may occur independently of a federal polity. What is more, 
decentralisation is understood as a dynamic concept, always subject to both internal po-
litical disputes and exogenous factors to which a political systems needs to adapt (Erk 
2007; Erk and Koning 2010).  
However, distribution of power in federal states usually does not change abruptly, rather 
it follows an already adopted path with gradual changes over time (Broschek 2013). The-
oretically, gradual changes may occur both in the direction of centralisation and decen-
tralisation. Existing literature pays much attention to centralizing trends. In her seminal 
work on “The Robust Federation”, Jenna Bednar (Bednar 2009: 9) refers to the threats of 
power accumulation at the central level by an opportunistic federal government which 
“encroach[es] on the authority of the states” (see also Bednar 2004). Similarly, Braun 
(2011) uses the term “over-centralisation” to describe the process of power concentration 
at the centre, resulting in a federal government with almost unlimited power and sub-
national governments being degraded to “mere administrative agents”. According to 
Braun (2011: 42), tendencies towards over-centralisation are especially strong in co-op-
erative federations, while they are weaker in dual systems. While centralisation of power 
can be appropriate in some policy areas, an over-centralisation is an undesired situation 
for most federations as it hollows out the fundamental idea of subsidiarity – i.e. to give 
as much autonomy as possible to decentralised units. 
Having identified over-centralisation as one of the current challenges in federal systems, 
the question arises of how to measure “de/centralisation”. In political economy literature, 
de/centralisation is typically measured by examining fiscal data, namely the distribution 
of expenditure and revenue. In this reading, decentralisation of a federal state increases 
with the share of expenditure and revenue of subnational governments on total expendi-
ture and revenue in a state (see for example Blöchliger and King 2006; Castles 1999). 




by analysing a federal state’s constitution.3 However, what empirical research was lack-
ing for a long time was a third operationalisation of decentralisation with a more political 
science approach focussing on procedural factors and the role of actors.  
In a study of the 26 Swiss cantons, Mueller (2015) provides a useful three-dimensional 
conceptualisation of de/centralisation, referring to all three approaches of measurement:  
− The first dimension, policy-decentralisation, covers the de/centralisation of re-
sources in a political system (state expenditure and state revenue as well as ad-
ministrative expenditure and wages for public personnel). This measurement can 
be assigned to the operationalisations described in the literature as fiscal or func-
tional decentralisation. 
− The second dimension, polity-decentralisation, refers to the institutional anchor-
ing of decentralisation in a political system. It can be assigned to the approaches 
that look at decentralisation from a purely institutional and constitutional perspec-
tive. 
− The third dimension relates to the procedural factors and the power of the different 
actors in a decentralised system. Mueller labels this dimension politics-decentral-
isation. For the measurement, he applies an additive index that consists of differ-
ent indicators of political power of decentralised units, such as a favourable elec-
toral system, the presence and strength of local parties and municipal associations, 
and the number of mayors in the cantonal parliament.4  
Mueller (2015) applies the three dimensions to the political systems of the cantons. They 
can, however, be applied to any multilevel system. In this dissertation, the three-dimen-
sional conceptualisation of decentralisation serves as the basis for the analytical frame-
work. In concrete terms, I will focus on policy decentralisation as my dependent variable 
and add relevant moderating variables from the polity- and the politics-dimension. In the 
next section, I outline in more detail the framework before presenting the empirical stud-
ies of the dissertation.  
                                                 
3 For the 26 Swiss cantons, see for example: Giacometti (1941) or Auer (2016). For the Swiss federal system 
as a whole see for example Vatter (2018) or Ladner and Mathys (2018). 




1.3 Analytical framework and structure of the dissertation 
As stated above, the main question of this dissertation is how the NFA has changed ver-
tical power relations in terms of the distribution of fiscal resources. Referring to Mueller’s 
(2015) three-dimensional approach, the dependent variable is thus equivalent with the 
policy dimension of decentralisation. Even though it seems straightforward to assess the 
degree of de/centralisation by examining fiscal resources, we find a huge variety of ap-
proaches in existing empirical studies. The default option is to study expenditure and 
revenue and to assess the subnational share of each of them (Blöchliger and King 2006; 
Castles 1999). The two datasets most often used are the General Finance Statistics (GFS) 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (e.g. Rodden 2004; Stegarescu 2005) and the 
Fiscal Decentralisation Database of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) (e.g. Blöchliger and King 2006). The former dataset is often preferred 
since it is based on the official statistics of the national accounting administrations, while 
the latter is based on surveys.  
Expenditure and revenue statistics can offer an initial impression of the vertical resource 
distribution, it is, however, criticised for not providing a complete picture of the fiscal 
power relations. The main problem is that the mere numbers say nothing about the deci-
sion-making powers of subnational states in the use of these resources (Blöchliger and 
King 2006; Rodden et al. 2003; Rodden 2004; Stegarescu 2005). Stegarescu (2005) points 
out that this question is often not considered in quantitative studies, resulting in an over-
estimation of subnational fiscal power.  
While the question of effective policy competencies can never be conclusively assessed 
on the basis of purely quantitative approaches, there are at least approaches to measure 
the distribution of fiscal power more realistically. To this end, we need to take into ac-
count intergovernmental grants. Figure 1 provides a simplified example of a federal state 
with two levels – the federal government and the subnational governments – and depicts 
three approaches to measure subnational fiscal power. The first approach corresponds to 
the classical measurement explained above of examining the effective expenditure of both 
levels without taking into account the expenditure sources. The second approach consid-
ers intergovernmental transfers. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that in our federal 
state, there are only transfer payments from the federal government to the subnational 




consider expenditure financed by own sources – we find that fiscal power of subnational 
governments decreases. As a third approach, we can assess the transfers in a more differ-
entiated way and distinguish between earmarked and non-earmarked grants. Earmarked 
grants are transfer payments whose use is prescribed (e.g. by national law), while the 
receiving authorities can freely dispose of the non-earmarked transfers. If we only want 
to examine subnational expenditure not dependent by superior law, we assign the ear-
marked transfers to the federal government and the non-earmarked transfers to the sub-
national governments. This allows to assess subnational fiscal power in a more nuanced 
way by considering only expenditure whose use can be determined by the subnational 
states themselves.  
Figure 1: Different approaches to measure the vertical distribution of expenditure 
 
 
While the dependent variable of the dissertation refers to Mueller’s understanding of pol-
icy decentralisation and is consistent with the tradition of political economy literature, I 
will extend my analytical framework by taking into account polity- and politics-variables. 
First, regarding the polity-dimension, I will take into account the institutional context 
within which the NFA took place. By “institutions”, I mean “interpersonal, formal or 
informal rules and norms” (Schmidt 1993: 378, own translation). Following the tradition 
of neo-institutional scholars, I use an institutional term that goes beyond constitutional 
articles (Schmidt 1993: 379; Schmidt 2000: 28). Hence, even though the NFA is consid-























a certain context that is marked by the constitution, unwritten conventions, and the polit-
ical culture.  
Second, the analytical framework is extended with the inclusion of the communal level. 
At first glance, the NFA focuses solely on the federal and the cantonal level. On closer 
inspection, however, it becomes clear that the municipalities are also important actors in 
the whole process. If, for example, a policy competence is transferred from the federal to 
the cantonal level, the cantons, together with the municipalities, must find solutions as to 
how this policy area should be organised. Will the cantons retain full authority? Will 
certain competences (e.g. concerning the implementation) be transferred to the munici-
palities or is the policy area transferred entirely to the communal level? Starting from 
these questions, it proves necessary to include the politics dimension in order to assess 
the relevance and the role of municipal actors regarding the fiscal effects of the NFA.  
Figure 2 summarizes the analytical framework and presents its elements – independent 
variable, dependent variable, and two moderating variables – which lay out the basis for 
the empirical analyses in the following chapters. The three arrows relate to the chapters 2 
to 5 in this dissertation, all entailing empirical studies focusing on the overall question of 
the fiscal effects of the NFA.  











Chapter 3 & 4
Chapter 5
Politics dimension




Chapter 2 takes a macro-perspective and focuses on the key question of the dissertation, 
namely the impact of the independent variable – the NFA – on the dependent variable – 
subnational fiscal power. Using a counterfactual logic, the Swiss case is compared to 
other federal states where no equivalent reforms have been taken. The effect is quantified 
using the concept of fiscal autonomy; a self-constructed set of indicators that measures 
the change in cantonal fiscal autonomy on the basis of available revenue and expenditure 
data. 
Chapter 3 extends the perspective by taking into account the role of municipalities. Zoom-
ing into one specific policy area – the financing of special schools – I assess the role of 
local authorities sitting in the Swiss cantonal parliaments on the “cantonalisation” of this 
policy. Using a cross-cantonal comparison, I assess the impact of these “cumul des man-
dats” on the cost distribution formula between the cantons and the municipalities.  
Chapter 4 follows on from Chapter 3 and examines the impact of local actors beyond 
individual policy areas. As such, it allows to test whether the effects found in Chapter 3 
can be generalised to the Swiss federal system and how relevant the “power from below” 
is.  
Chapter 5 broadens the perspective and examines – in the sense of a case comparison –
the effects of a federal reform in another state. In 1993, Belgium became officially fed-
eral. This constitutional change was preceded by several previous reform steps. The year 
1993, however, marked an important turning point, as the reform brought not only insti-
tutional changes but also a decentralisation of competences in the welfare state area. As 
such, it resembles to some extent the NFA, given that both reforms entailed a relocation 
of competences. Some key institutional factors, however, remained unchanged and are 
therefore still relatively different from the Swiss system. Above all, the competence for 
tax revenue in Belgium remains at the level of the federal state, while Switzerland can 
look back on a long tradition of cantonal tax autonomy. In this sense, the study on Bel-
gium can be used to set the results of the NFA in relation to the institutional framework 
and thus to consider the third dimension according to Mueller - polity decentralisation - 
as an important moderating variable. 
 
  
2 Reforming autonomy? The fiscal impact of the Swiss federal reform 
12 
 




The Swiss federal reform 2008 (NFA) has been a major undertaking in the recent history 
of the Swiss federation, with the re-allocation of policy tasks being a key component of 
the reform. So far, research has focused in particular on the decision-making process of 
the reform. This paper focuses on the fiscal impacts by asking whether the re-allocation 
of tasks has changed the vertical distribution of fiscal resources and whether these 
changes have increased fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. The paper shows 
that subnational government expenditure as well as non-earmarked federal government 
grants have increased slightly. At the same time, however, revenue has not increased cor-
respondingly. This has imposed strong limitations on subnational fiscal autonomy and 
has led to a deterioration rather than an improvement of the situation of subnational gov-
ernments in federal Switzerland. The paper concludes with suggestions for further re-
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In recent years, federal reforms have been research subjects of both theoretical and em-
pirical literature. Given the context-sensitivity of institutional changes in federal systems, 
most studies apply a case-study approach by examining changes of federal institutions 
either as dependent or as independent variable. Among others, there is much research on 
the German reforms in 2006 and 2009 (to which Regional & Federal Studies devoted the 
Special Issue 26/5, see e.g. Behnke and Kropp 2016; Benz 2016; Kropp and Behnke 
2016), the many reform steps towards a federal state in Belgium (e.g. Arnold and 
Stadelmann-Steffen 2017; Deschouwer and Reuchamps 2013; Goossens and Cannoot 
2015; Swenden and Jans 2006; Verdonck and Deschouwer 2003), and constitutional 
changes in multi-level systems in general (Hooghe et al. 2010; see also Marks et al. 2008; 
Hooghe et al. 2008, and the country-specific analyses in the Regional & Federal Studies 
Special Issue 18/2–3). Generally, scholars have focused on the decision-making pro-
cesses, the scope of the final reform contents, and the “success” of the reforms from an 
institutional point of view (for the latter see especially Behnke et al. 2011). Only recently 
have scholars of comparative federalism focused their attention on the fiscal impacts of 
institutional changes in federal systems, such as the effects of the reorganization of fiscal 
equalization in Canada (Béland et al. 2017) or the federalization in Belgium (Béland and 
Lecours 2018; Arnold and Stadelmann-Steffen 2017).  
In general, we expect federal reforms to decentralize resources rather than centralize 
them. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that fiscal impacts may still vary. Theoretically, 
we can imagine a 2 × 2 matrix of possible impacts on the fiscal structure. First, fiscal 
autonomy of subnational governments increases most strongly if a federal reform in-
creases both subnational expenditure and revenue. Second, fiscal autonomy is only par-
tially increased if a federal reform increases subnational expenditure but not revenue (e.g. 
by the transfer of policy competences), or vice versa (e.g. by increasing subnational tax 
sources). While the former refers to an increase of policy competences at the subnational 
level without the corresponding revenue, the second refers to an increase of revenue with-
out the corresponding policy competences. Finally, federal reforms can have no fiscal 
impact at all if legal amendments do not materialize in fiscal figures, neither for expendi-
ture nor for revenue.  
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Starting from these multiple facets of fiscal effects, this paper investigates the fiscal im-
pacts of the Swiss federal reform 2008 (NFA). The NFA was accepted on 28 November 
2004 by a majority of the voters (64.4%) and by 18 cantons and 5 half-cantons (of 20 
cantons and 6 half-cantons in total). Four years later, the reform became applicable. The 
reform package contained a redesign of the Swiss federal system (the letter “N” stands 
for the German word “Neugestaltung” [redesign]) within two pillars: On the one hand, 
the NFA aimed at re-organizing the system of fiscal equalization between the cantons 
(the letter “F” stands for the German word “Finanzausgleich” [fiscal equalization]). On 
the other hand, the reform aimed at re-allocating policy competences between the federal 
and cantonal level in order to increase subnational fiscal autonomy and fiscal equivalence 
(the letter “A” stands for the German word “Aufgabenteilung” [division of tasks]). While 
the former element has already been subject to several – mainly economical – analyses 
(Brülhart and Schmidheiny 2013; Dafflon 2004; Frey and Wettstein 2008; Schaltegger et 
al. 2015) there is far less research on the latter. This paper takes a novel approach, using 
fiscal data for the pre- and post-NFA period to analyse whether and how subnational fiscal 
autonomy has changed with the reform coming into force. In doing that, the paper goes 
beyond a mere consideration of the constitutional amendments – which has been the dom-
inant perspective in most studies so far – and examines the fiscal impacts of the re-allo-
cation of policy tasks. While the reorganization of financial equalization (first pillar) has 
had an impact on the fiscal relations in the horizontal dimension, the re-allocation of tasks 
(second pillar) is expected to have changed the vertical relationship between the federal 
government and subnational governments (SNGs).5 The key question of this paper is thus 
whether the re-allocation of tasks has affected the vertical distribution of expenditure and 
revenue and, if yes, whether these changes have increased fiscal autonomy of SNGs. 
To answer this question, I will examine three indicators. A first indicator shows whether 
the NFA has increased self-financed SNG expenditure (excluding expenditure financed 
by vertical transfers). As a second indicator, I consider federal government grants and 
                                                 
5 Although the NFA primarily regulated the relationship between the central government and the cantons, 
this paper generally refers to “subnational governments”, which encompasses both cantons and municipal-
ities. The reason for this is twofold: First, it builds on literature on subnational fiscal autonomy or decen-
tralization in general, which usually distinguishes between the federal government on the one hand and 
regional and local governments on the other. Second, empirically, cantons and municipalities should be 
considered together since the cantons have a great deal of freedom to regulate their relations with the mu-
nicipalities. As a result, vertical relations between cantons and municipalities can vary significantly be-
tween cantons. 
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assess whether there has been a shift from earmarked to non-earmarked transfers since 
the NFA. Finally, as a third indicator, I compare the development of SNG expenditure 
and revenue to determine whether subnational fiscal autonomy is threatened by fiscal 
imbalances. The analysis relies on data from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Fiscal Decentralisation Database of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Methodologically, 
I combine descriptive statistics with the synthetic control method as an innovative ap-
proach to cross-compare Switzerland with other federal OECD states (Abadie et al. 2010, 
2011, 2015). The method allows building a synthetic comparison case (a kind of “twin 
case”) for Switzerland which shows how fiscal autonomy would have changed if the NFA 
had not been implemented in 2008. The method is especially suited for the analysis at 
hand, since single case studies always bear the risk of spurious findings that are rather 
connected to a third, unobserved variable (such as for instance the economic crisis which 
took place at the same time as the federal reform) than the variable of interest. 
The analyses of the three indicators yield the following findings: First, there is an increase 
of subnational government expenditure, albeit to a very limited extent. Second, we ob-
serve an increase of non-earmarked federal government grants at the expense of ear-
marked grants. These grants, however, account for only a small part of general govern-
ment expenditure. Finally, a comparison of subnational expenditure and revenue reveals 
a tendency towards surpluses in expenditure. Hence, while previous research has high-
lighted the exemplary decision-making process and the system’s ability to reform, the 
study at hand urges caution when it comes to the substantial fiscal impacts of the reform. 
The motivation for this empirical case-study is twofold. First, it aims at extending 
knowledge about the effects of a reform that came into force more than ten years ago. So 
far, scholars have analysed the ratification of the reform (Behnke 2010; Braun 2008b, 
2009; Broschek 2014; Cappelletti et al. 2014; Wasserfallen 2015), the relevance of the 
institutional amendments (Behnke et al. 2011; Benz 2013a), and the impacts on the hori-
zontal dimension of Swiss federalism with regard to fiscal equalization (Federal Council 
2010, 2014) and inter-cantonal cooperation (Mathys 2015). What is lacking is a system-
atic analysis of the fiscal impacts on the vertical dimension, taking into account the fed-
eral government and the SNGs. Second, this case study aims to stimulate new avenues of 
research on federal reforms. Vertical fiscal relations – and especially the question of fiscal 
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autonomy of SNGs – are a key characteristic of multi-level systems, which, however, has 
so far hardly been considered in conjunction with state reforms. Being aware of the limi-
tations of a single case study, the NFA is a prime example of a federal reform aimed at 
re-balancing power between centre and periphery. As such, it allows me to derive sug-
gestions for future research on federal reforms and constitutional change in federal sys-
tems. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides an overview of the NFA and 
findings of previous research on the reform. The research design is set out in the third 
section and the findings are presented in the fourth section. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the main findings and an outlook on future research. 
2.2 The Swiss federal reform 2008 
Using the definition of Benz and Colino (2011: 389), a reform is a “deliberate change” 
which “refers to the occasional conscious redesign of the basic rules of the system affect-
ing its structure or general configuration in terms of powers, representation and re-
sources”. As such, it can be distinguished from informal and implicit changes caused by 
a re-interpretation of existing institutional rules (Bednar 2013; Benz 2013a: 728; Benz 
and Broschek 2013: 11; Benz and Colino 2011). The Swiss federal reform 2008, the NFA, 
can be seen as a prime example of deliberate change. After more than 10 years of elabo-
ration, the reform was accepted on 28 November 2004 by a majority of the voters (64.4%) 
and by 18 cantons and 5 half-cantons (of 20 cantons and 6 half-cantons in total). Four 
years later, the reform entered into force. The NFA was composed as a reform package 
with two pillars: The first pillar entailed a complete overhaul of the fiscal equalization 
system. In addition to horizontal equalization payments from richer to poorer cantons, the 
federal government is to participate in financial equalization through vertical payments. 
Generally, this first pillar impacts on the relative distribution of resources among cantons 
but has almost no impact on the vertical distribution of resources between cantons and 
the federal government. Even though parts of the equalization payments to the “poorer” 
cantons are financed by the federal government, the NFA is budget neutral for the federal 
level as the cantons’ share of direct federal taxes was reduced correspondingly (Federal 
Council 2014: 34). A small exception is the so-called “hardship fund”: In the course of 
the final reform negotiations, the cantons succeeded in ensuring that the federal govern-
ment paid the majority of this fund which aimed at facilitating the transition into the new 
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system for cantons with less resources (Federal Council 2014: 34; Wasserfallen 2015: 
544).  
What matters for the vertical distribution, though, is the second pillar of the reform, 
namely the re-allocation of competences in various policy areas. In the light of the general 
goal of “task disentanglement”, the reform transferred seven policy areas – among others 
the national road network (highways) and defence – to the federal level. The cantons were 
given full responsibility in ten policy areas, among others special schools, educational 
grants up until secondary schools, and support for housing and working/day care facilities 
for people with disabilities (see Table A 1 in the Appendix). Furthermore, the reform 
named nine policy tasks where inter-cantonal cooperation should be preferred to central-
ized solutions.6 Finally, 17 policy areas are still considered to be joined tasks, applying, 
however, a new concept of vertical cooperation: While the strategy in these policy areas 
continues to be decided on the federal level, the cantons have the operational responsibil-
ity. Instead of prescribing the use of each grant, the cantons now receive a global budget 
which they can freely dispose of, as long as they fulfil the goals set by contracts between 
the federal government and each canton (so-called convention programmes) (Federal 
Council 2001: 2299; Mathys 2015). 
Generally, the goals of the reform can be summarized as follows (Vatter 2018: 196ff.): 
The redesign of the fiscal equalization system (first pillar) aimed at diminishing fiscal 
imbalance between the cantons, maintaining cantonal tax competitiveness, and providing 
compensation for geo-topographic burdens and socio-demographic conditions. The re-
allocation of tasks (second pillar), in turn, focused on the vertical dimension and aimed 
at strengthening inter-cantonal cooperation and subnational fiscal autonomy.  
So far, research on the NFA can broadly be separated into two groups. In the first group, 
we find both ex-ante and ex-post evaluations of the new fiscal equalization system, con-
ducted by economists (Brülhart and Schmidheiny 2013; Dafflon 2004; Frey and Wettstein 
2008; Schaltegger et al. 2015) and by the federal government itself (Federal Council 2010, 
2014). Generally, the evaluations conclude that the new system has remedied old defi-
                                                 
6 In the course of the NFA, a new constitutional article was introduced giving the federal government the 
possibility to declare inter-cantonal contracts to be generally applicable, meaning that individual cantons 
could – theoretically – be forced to join the contract (Vatter 2018: 191f.). 
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ciencies, although there is still room for improvement. In the second group, political sci-
ence literature has looked at the decision-making process and the final ratification of the 
reform package, praising the NFA as a particularly successful reform, especially when 
compared to similar reform attempts in other federal states such as Germany or Austria 
(Behnke 2010; Behnke et al. 2011; Benz 2013a; Braun 2008b, 2009; Broschek 2014; 
Wasserfallen 2015). Behnke et al. (2011: 458), for instance, praise the reform for its “very 
detailed agenda” and Benz (2013a) concludes that the reform is viewed as a success by a 
broad audience. 
What research is missing so far is a profound analysis of the vertical fiscal impacts of the 
reform. While the economic literature has focused on fiscal data on a horizontal dimen-
sion (inter-cantonal fiscal equalization), it lacks a systematic assessment of the monetary 
effects on the vertical dimension.7 Political science literature, in turn, provides instructive 
insights into the relevance of the reform for the vertical federal structure from an institu-
tional point of view. However, it lacks a systematic assessment of the policy impacts 
beyond the ratification of laws and constitutional articles. This paper fills these research 
gaps and investigates the impact of the reform on subnational fiscal autonomy, one of the 
key goals of the re-allocation of policy tasks (second pillar). The next section illustrates 
the operationalization and the methods used to answer this question. 
2.3 Research design 
In the empirical literature, the general approach to assess vertical fiscal relations in a fed-
eral system is to use the concept of fiscal decentralization, hence taking the share of SNG 
expenditure and/or revenue of total expenditure/revenue of all state levels. The problem 
with this rather crude measurement is that it is not clear whether SNGs have autonomy 
over the use of their expenditure or whether they just act as administrative agents to im-
plement national law (Blöchliger and King 2006; Rodden et al. 2003; Rodden 2004; Ste-
garescu 2005). Without being able to solve this problem completely, there are approaches 
to consider fiscal decentralization in a more nuanced way. Subnational expenditure can 
be subdivided by asking how much leeway SNGs have over their use. Instead of simply 
looking at the share of subnational expenditure, we can thus ask for the degree of fiscal 
                                                 
7 Exceptions are two evaluation reports of the Federal Council which looked at the development of the type 
of federal government grants (earmarked vs. non-earmarked) (Federal Council 2010, 2014). However, as 
argued in this paper, this is only one element of fiscal autonomy. 
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autonomy that SNGs have. Taking subnational fiscal autonomy as a dependent variable, 
we can identify three factors which constitute this variable and translate them into three 
indicators.  
First, subnational fiscal autonomy increases with the share of self-financed SNG expendi-
ture. SNGs have most autonomy over expenditure which is financed by own taxes or 
shared taxes. Even though national law can still affect decisions about the use of this 
expenditure, SNGs have substantial autonomy in setting priorities for individual policy 
areas. Hence, as a first indicator, I look at the impact of the NFA on the decentralization 
of self-financed expenditure, which is measured as follows: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
 
I use data from the GFS of the IMF which lists expenditure and revenue for every state 
level on an annual basis (IMF 2017).  
While SNGs have autonomy over self-financed expenditure, subnational fiscal autonomy 
can also be increased by federal government grants, namely if earmarked grants are out-
weighed by non-earmarked grants. While SNGs can use earmarked grants only for spe-
cific purposes, they have leeway in the use of non-earmarked grants (Blöchliger and King 
2006: 21). Hence, a second indicator for subnational fiscal autonomy is the share of non-
earmarked grants of total federal government grants, which is measured as follows: 
=
Non-earmarked federal government grants
Non-earmarked federal government grants + 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 
Unfortunately, the GFS provide no information on the type of grants. Thus, for the anal-
ysis, I rely on the OECD Fiscal Decentralisation Database. The database informs about 
the share of earmarked and non-earmarked transfers from 2000 to 2010, at least for a 
small sample of countries, among others Switzerland. 
Third, fiscal autonomy is only guaranteed when revenue is available. As a third indicator, 
I therefore look at the subnational mismatch between revenue and expenditure after in-
tergovernmental transfers.8 Formally, the indicator is measured as follows: 
                                                 
8 Essentially, my third indicator is what Hueglin and Fenna (2015, 170) refer to as the “vertical fiscal im-
balance” – namely “the mismatch between available revenue and expenditure needs that remains at the 
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= 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔, 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔,𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)  − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
For revenue, I refer to the official statistics of the IMF, which includes all revenue by 
taxes, social contributions, grants, and other revenue but excluding borrowing. 
Figure 3 summarizes the research design with the three indicators of subnational fiscal 
autonomy.  
Figure 3: Research design: overview 
 
Source: own illustration.   
Notes: The graphic is for illustrative purposes only. The ratios of the areas do not correspond to the actual 
figures. FG = Federal government; SNG = Subnational government. 
For the empirical analysis for all three indicators, I use descriptive statistics from 1996 to 
2014 to study whether there are changes attributable to the year 2008 – when the NFA 
became applicable.9 By using descriptive statistics, however, one must be cautious, since 
it cannot be ruled out that observed changes in the dependent variable are the result of 
other unobserved variables. Given that the NFA coincided with the economic crisis 2007–
                                                 
subnational level after transfer” – in distinction from what they call the “vertical fiscal gap”, which refers 
to the mismatch before transfers (Hueglin and Fenna 2015: 170; Shah 2007: 28). However, in literature, 
there exist a number of different definitions of the term. Sharma (2012: 100) provides an overview of no 
less than 16 authors who all define “vertical fiscal imbalances” slightly different (some refer to the mis-
match between revenue and expenditure at the subnational level before transfers, others, in turn, refer to 
both levels of government when assessing the degree of imbalances). To avoid misunderstandings, I use 
the term “mismatch between revenue and expenditure after transfer”, which gives a more precise definition 
of indicator 3. 
9 For all countries in the sample, GFS data is available since 1995, for Switzerland since 1990. A look at 
the GFS data for Switzerland before 1995 reveals that the value for 1995 was an outlier, which is why I 
choose 1996–2004 as time period for the analyses. 
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08, one needs to make sure that it was the reform and not the crisis that led to the observed 
changes. If possible, I will thus supplement the descriptive analysis with a comparison 
with other federal OECD states, namely Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, and the 
United States.10 I use the synthetic control method as an innovative tool to counterfactu-
ally assess how subnational fiscal autonomy in the Swiss federal system would have 
evolved without the entry into force of the NFA in 2008.11 The synthetic control method 
creates a “synthetic” comparative case – called “synthetic Switzerland” – from a pool of 
five comparison countries – called “donor pool”. Both Switzerland and the cases from the 
donor pool are characterized by the outcome variable (i.e. indicators of subnational fiscal 
autonomy).12 The method then creates a synthetic case that matches as closely as possible 
the characteristics of real Switzerland with the cases in the donor pool for the time period 
prior to 2008 (the year in which the NFA became applicable). In concrete terms, the al-
gorithm weights the donor pool cases to minimize the difference in the outcome variable 
between the real and the synthetic case (measured as “mean squared prediction error” 
[MSPE]) prior to 2008.13 If the method is able to create a synthetic Switzerland with a 
similar trajectory of the outcome variable over an extended period until 2007, a discrep-
ancy in the outcome variable after the introduction of the NFA can be interpreted as a 
result of the federal reform itself (Abadie et al. 2015: 498). 
The donor pool is deliberately limited to OECD states with a federal structure. Although 
the question of de/centralization is also relevant for unitary states, the logic of vertical 
relations is different. In contrast to federal states, subnational units in unitary states do 
not have their own policy competences (self-rule), which per se strongly limits their au-
tonomy and makes a comparison with Switzerland difficult. Hence, I choose Austria, 
                                                 
10 The donor pool comprises federal OECD countries for which data for expenditure and revenue on the 
different state levels is available for the period from 1996 to 2014. 
11 The following explanations on the method are based on Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2015). A 
detailed description of the mathematical foundations can be found in Abadie et al. (2010: 494ff.) and Abadie 
et al. (2015: 497ff.). The estimations presented in this study are calculated by using the package synth in R 
(Abadie et al. 2011). 
12 The synthetic control method was also carried out including the two predictors GDP per capita and un-
employment rate. The inclusion of these predictors did not change the findings. Given that Switzerland is 
an outlier among OECD countries for both variables, the model assigned weights of zero to both variables, 
meaning that they are irrelevant for the creation of the synthetic case. 
13 For the mathematical foundations of the method, see Abadie et al. (2015). 
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Belgium, Canada, Germany, and the United States as comparative cases, referring to ex-
isting categorisations (Huber et al. 2004; Lijphart 2012). I assess the robustness of my 
findings by re-running the model and excluding individual countries from the donor pool 
(see Figures A 1, A 2, and A 3 in the Appendix). 
The key motivation for using the synthetic control method (instead of more frequent al-
ternatives of regression techniques) is twofold: First, the synthetic control method allows 
the quantification of effects despite a small N, which normally does not allow quantitative 
analyses. Second, even if one considers regression methods, a valid estimation is still 
difficult due to the skewed distribution of the independent variable, i.e. the federal reform. 
The synthetic control method is thus particularly suitable as a quantitative method for 
analyses of rare events with data covering only a small N. 
2.4 Empirical findings 
This section presents the empirical findings of the effect of the NFA on subnational fiscal 
autonomy along the three indicators presented above. 
2.4.1 Indictor 1: Decentralization of self-financed expenditure 
Figure 4 shows both the annual share of total and self-financed SNG expenditure from 
1996 to 2014 compared to the average of five federal OECD states (Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, and the United States). We see that the share of SNG expenditure has 
on average constantly increased in the six federal OECD states from approximately 43% 
in 1996 to more than 46% in 2014. In Switzerland, SNG expenditure accounted for 
slightly more than the half of total government expenditure over the entire period. While 
there was a constant increase from 1996 to 2014, the increase was indeed strongest from 
2007 (54%) to 2008 (56.5%), the year in which the NFA became applicable. In the entire 
sample, we find no such increase for this year. However, how does it look like if we 
exclude expenditure financed by federal government grants and only consider self-fi-
nanced expenditure? First, decentralization values obviously decrease, both for Switzer-
land as well as for the entire sample. The findings, however, remain the same: In Swit-
zerland, we find an increase of the share of self-financed SNG expenditure from 44.9% 
in 2007 to 47.3% in 2008, while there is no equivalent increase in the entire sample. 
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Figure 4: Decentralization of (self-financed) SNG expenditure, 1996–2014 
 
Source: IMF (2017).   
Notes: Federal OECD states include Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, and the United States. SNG = 
Subnational government. 
Looking at the descriptive statistics, there thus seems to be at least some evidence for a 
decentralizing effect of the NFA, since the year 2008 marked the biggest change of ex-
penditure decentralization in Switzerland while decentralization rates in the other federal 
states remained constant. However, this finding must be interpreted with caution. The 
NFA was implemented during the financial crisis, which is why the descriptive statistics 
alone do not allow clear conclusions to be drawn about the effect of the NFA. To 
strengthen the analysis, I use the synthetic control method, which allows me to compare 
the development of Switzerland with a mathematically constructed synthetic case (syn-
thetic Switzerland). The findings are presented in Figure 5. Again, I first consider total 
SNG expenditure (upper graph) before focussing on self-financed expenditure (lower 
graph), introduced above as the first indicator to measure SNG fiscal autonomy. 
The compositions of the two synthetic cases are presented in Table A 2 in the Appendix. 
Looking at the trajectories of Switzerland and its synthetic counterparts, the NFA effects 
prevail for both measurements of decentralization. Here, too, the effect persists when only 
self-financed expenditure is considered: Decentralization hardly differs between Switzer-
land and synthetic Switzerland from 1996 to 2007. Since 2008, however, the difference 
is always at least 1.5 percentage points and above 2 percentage points on Average.14 
                                                 
14 The effect is statistically significant in a times-series cross-sectional regression with the two dummies 
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Hence, even when Switzerland is compared to a more sophisticated comparison case that 
controls for possible economic impacts of the financial crisis, we find an effect clearly 
attributable to the year 2008. 
Figure 5: Synthetic control method for the NFA: effect on decentralization of (self-fi-
nanced) SNG expenditure, 1996–2014 
 
Source: IMF (2017).   
Notes: Own calculations using the R package synth (Abadie et al. 2011). For information on the data and a 
detailed description of the synthetic case, see Table A 2 in the Appendix. SNG = Subnational government. 
  
                                                 
for the construction of synthetic Switzerland): The coefficients are as follows (std. errors in brackets): post 
NFA years: 0.02 (0.16); Switzerland: 35.67 (1.41); post NFA years * Switzerland: 2.43 (0.54); Intercept 
8.83 (0.41). 
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The robustness checks reveal that synthetic Switzerland strongly depends on the inclusion 
of Canada into the donor pool (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). This is not surprising 
given that Canada and Switzerland are the two fiscally most decentralized federal states. 
However, even the exclusion of Canada from the donor pool does not change the main 
finding: When the NFA became applicable in 2008, expenditure decentralization in Swit-
zerland increased. In synthetic Switzerland, built out of a donor pool of Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, and the United States, it decreased. 
Hence, summarizing the findings of indicator 1, we can state that the NFA indeed has led 
to a decentralization of self-financed expenditure. The effect, though, is rather modest. 
The share of SNG expenditure of total government expenditure has only slightly in-
creased by around 2–3 percentage points. 
2.4.2 Indictor 2: Share of non-earmarked grants 
So far, federal government grants have been excluded from the analysis. For the second 
indicator, I extend the analysis to SNG expenditure financed by federal government 
grants. The key question here is whether we observe a change of the shares of earmarked 
and non-earmarked grants. An increase of the latter would signify an increase of subna-
tional fiscal autonomy. Figure 6 depicts the development of federal government grants in 
Switzerland from 2000 to 2010 – measured in percent of total government expenditure 
(upper graph) – and the shares of non-earmarked grants (lower graph). From 2000 to 
2007, federal government grants accounted for around 14–15% of total government ex-
penditure in Switzerland. This share did not change significantly in the year 2008, when 
the NFA became applicable. However, the picture changes when looking at the type of 
grants. Until 2007, earmarked grants made up 76% of all grants on average. In 2008, this 
share decreased to 65% and remained more or less on that level in the following years. 
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Figure 6: Share of non-earmarked federal government grants in Switzerland, 2000–
2010 
 
Source: IMF (2017). 
Unfortunately, no data are available for the other federal countries in the donor pool for 
the entire period. In the lower graph, however, I extrapolate the trend from 2000 to 2007 
(before the NFA) to the years 2008–2010 (after the NFA). The gap between the two lines 
clearly indicates an effect attributable to the reform. According to this, the NFA has led 
to a decrease of earmarked grants by around 6–8 percentage points. Two reasons speak 
in favour of an effect despite the lack of comparable data from other federal countries. 
First, decreasing the conditionality of grants has been a key goal of the reform, especially 
regarding the policy areas defined as joint tasks with a system change from conditional 
payments to unconditional global budgets. Second, it is unlikely that the increase of non-
earmarked grants was due to the economic crisis in 2007–08. In order to respond to a 
crisis by means of anti-cyclical fiscal policy, an increase of earmarked grants would be 
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much more obvious, as there is otherwise a risk that SNGs will use the revenue for other 
measures not aimed at stimulating the economy. Hence, we find a second effect clearly 
attributable to the NFA: While there was no increase of federal government grants in 
total, their composition changed in favour of non-earmarked grants and thus in favour of 
greater freedom in the use of federal government transfers. Again, however, the extent of 
this effect should not be overestimated. Given that federal government grants, on average, 
only made up around 14% of total government expenditure, the 6–8% increase of non-
earmarked grants corresponds to around 1% of total government expenditure. 
2.4.2 Indictor 3: Mismatch between revenue and expenditure after intergovernmental 
transfers 
Expenditure statistics reveal only part of the truth about subnational fiscal autonomy. 
Even though subnational expenditure has increased slightly, the question remains whether 
this increase is covered by revenue. As can be seen in Figure 7, it is rather difficult to 
create a synthetic equivalent for Switzerland due to the cyclical development of revenue 
in relation to expenditure. Nevertheless, it can be seen that the ratio of revenue and ex-
penditure has constantly declined in Switzerland since the introduction of the NFA, while 
in the other states, it started to increase after 2010.15 It therefore seems plausible that this 
long-term deterioration of subnational budgets is not due to the economic crisis (which 
was faced by all states of the sample), but due to the introduction of the federal reform in 
2008. 
This interpretation is confirmed when looking at the absolute values of the subnational 
mismatch of revenue and expenditure in comparison to the federal government from 1996 
to 2014 (see Figure A4 in the Appendix).16 Until 2005, federal government expenditure 
                                                 
15 The negative effect on the ratio of revenue and expenditure in Switzerland is – at least as a tendency – 
confirmed when estimating a times-series cross-sectional regression with the two dummies “Switzerland” 
and “post NFA years” (countries in the donor pool are weighted according to their weights for the construc-
tion of synthetic Switzerland). The coefficients are as follows (std. errors in brackets): post NFA years: 
−0.001 (0.004); Switzerland: 0.758 (0.039); post NFA years * Switzerland: −0.027 (0.017); Intercept: 0.254 
(0.010). Hence, the interaction term is only just not significant at the 90% level. However, it should be 
borne in mind that regression is particularly difficult in this case, as synthetic Switzerland consists largely 
of Austria, which means that practically only the annual figures of two cases are included in the analysis. 
16 The comparison of expenditure and revenue is based on internationally comparable GFS data from the 
IMF. For comparisons within the country (e.g. between cantons), the Swiss Federal Finance Administration 
also reports expenditure and revenue of the different state levels on the basis of the so-called “FS-Modell”. 
However, due to a methodological change in the recording of expenditure and revenue in 2008, the figures 
before and after this year are not comparable. 
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exceeded revenue in most years. Since 2006, however, federal government revenue al-
ways exceeded expenditure. The development is different for the SNGs: Looking at the 
period from 1996 to 2007, just before the NFA came into force, subnational expenditure 
exceeded revenue only once (in the year 2003). Since 2008, however, after a decrease of 
the revenue surplus from 2008 to 2010, subnational expenditure has exceeded subnational 
revenue in every year since 2011. 
Figure 7: Synthetic control method for the NFA: effect on ratio subnational reve-
nue/subnational expenditure, 1996–2014 
 
Source: IMF (2017).   
Notes: Own calculations using the R package synth (Abadie et al. 2011). For information on the data and a 
detailed description of the synthetic case, see Table A 2 in the Appendix. SNG = Subnational government. 
Hence, even though the analysis of the impacts on revenue can only be indicative at this 
moment and further investigations are still needed, we can nevertheless state that since 
2008, the financial situation at regional level in Switzerland has been as severe and per-
sistently negative as at no other state level and in no federal state in the donor pool. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to analyse the vertical fiscal impacts of the Swiss federal 
reform 2008 – the NFA. Summarizing the findings, we find a slight increase of self-fi-
nanced SNG expenditure and a modest shift from earmarked to non-earmarked federal 
government grants. At the same time, however, revenue has not increased correspond-
ingly. This has imposed strong limitations on subnational fiscal autonomy and led to a 
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deterioration rather than an improvement of the fiscal situation of SNGs in federal Swit-
zerland. So far, research has focused on the positive aspects of the reform, especially the 
successful decision-making process and the capability of the Swiss federal system to 
reach a consensus on a major constitutional reform despite the numerous veto players. 
While this study does not question these findings, it urges caution when it comes to the 
substantial fiscal impacts of the reform. 
The study at hand allows two conclusions to be drawn. Both conclusions are preliminary, 
as a single case study does not allow to generalize findings beyond the case. Nevertheless, 
they point to relevant suggestions for further research, which will contribute to the under-
standing of institutional change in federal systems. 
First, the findings for indicator 1 and 2 indicate that the NFA has had a very limited effect. 
It can be argued that this result corresponds to what could realistically be expected from 
a reform in a federal country. Due to the high number of veto players in these countries, 
state reforms are often reduced to the lowest common denominator. In literature, a reform 
is often associated with a critical juncture that leads to profound changes of a political 
system (Bednar 2009; Benz 2013b; Benz and Colino 2011; Broschek 2013; Broschek et 
al. 2018). The findings of this study, however, are a strong argument for understanding 
federal reforms as something procedural that – to put it in the words of Behnke and Kropp 
(2016: 588) – “extend over a longer period of time and are marked by sequences”. Swit-
zerland is a particularly good example of this: Subnational fiscal autonomy was already 
at a comparatively high level before the reform (Dardanelli and Mueller 2019), which 
made it difficult to increase this level substantially in a context of many veto players. 
Hence, the results for Switzerland can most likely be transferred to countries with similar 
decentralized resource distributions. Further research is needed to show to what extent 
this conclusion holds true for federal countries with more centralized resources. A first 
suggestion is thus that we should consider federal reforms not as a single event eliminat-
ing all deficits at once, but rather as part of a longer process with multiple steps. 
Second, the findings for the third indicator – the mismatch between revenue and expendi-
ture – point to a conclusion that is relevant to federal countries in general, namely the 
divergent resilience of expenditure and revenue de/centralization. In general, one can ar-
gue that in federal countries tax systems are often established institutions with a certain 
path dependency that makes fundamental changes difficult in the context of many veto 
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players. This is particularly the case if an increase of subnational revenue should not be 
brought about by an increase of intergovernmental transfers, as this carries the risk of the 
so-called “flypaper effect”, namely an overspending at the subnational level (Hines and 
Thaler 1995). Expenditure, by contrast, can be changed more easily by the transfer of 
policy competences without having to change the foundations of the federal system. In 
the context of the NFA, the fundaments of the tax system indeed remained untouched and 
the volumes of intergovernmental grants did not increase. As a result, revenue could not 
keep up with the increase of expenditure. These divergent logics for expenditure and rev-
enue can have a direct impact on SNGs in federal countries. If expenditure exceeds reve-
nue over the long term, SNGs need to borrow, which allows a certain degree of autonomy 
from the federal government but makes them all the more dependent on the lender (Rod-
den 2002). Further research is needed to test these theses. Nonetheless, the study at hand 
is a strong argument for my second suggestion, namely understanding fiscal autonomy 
as a multi-dimensional concept with the need to distinguish between expenditure and rev-
enue and consider the relationship between the two. 
Beyond these two suggestions for further research, one has also to consider the limits of 
quantitative studies in connection with federal reforms. By looking at aggregated fiscal 
data, it cannot be concluded that an increase of subnational expenditure – even when 
financed mainly by own resources – equals an increase of political power at the subna-
tional level (Rodden et al. 2003; Rodden 2004; Stegarescu 2005). Generally, what is 
needed is what Broschek et al. (2018) call a “comparative-historical analysis”, i.e. con-
text-sensitive case-based comparisons over time which allow reconstructing the causali-
ties behind institutional dynamics. In cases where scholars focus on quantifiable effects, 
the synthetic control method and the here presented operationalization of fiscal autonomy 
can be useful due to the innovative combination of a case study with a quantification 
approach. Regardless of the method used, further investigations will contribute to a more 
systematic understanding of success factors and barriers of institutional restructuring in 
federal systems. These insights are of crucial importance if we want to increase the effec-
tiveness of political action in such systems. 
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Abstract 
This study analyses the effect of local authorities in the Swiss cantonal parliaments on the 
allocation of special school costs. The empirical findings show that a higher share of local 
authorities in the cantonal legislature leads to a higher share of special school costs borne 
by the cantonal authorities. The effect is stronger for mayors compared to all members of 
local governments. Hence, mayors have a strong connection with their home municipality 
and use the political power of the accumulation of mandates for shifting undesirable costs 
from the local up to the cantonal level. This specific finding does not depend on the over-
all national constitutional framework, as the introduction of the NFA (Neuer Finanzaus-
gleich) – in the course of which the federal state fully withdrew from financing special 
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How can local governments influence political outcomes at the higher state level? In the 
absence of second chambers, lobbying activities such as face-to-face contacts or the ex-
change of information are one strategy to influence the centre (Borck and Owings 2003; 
Sørensen 2003). However, in Switzerland we also observe a more formal and direct form 
of influence when considering mayors and other local councillors17 who sit in the cantonal 
parliaments. Known as “cumul des mandats” in France – where it is an inherent part of 
the political culture (Grémion 1976; Tarrow 1977; Dewoghélaëre et al. 2006; François 
and Navarro 2013b) – the phenomenon of multiple-mandate holders is also present in 
Switzerland. Members of local governments are present both in the federal parliament as 
well as in the parliamentary chambers in the cantons (Rühli 2012; Lüthi 2014: 185; 
Mueller 2015; Pilotti 2017). 
So far, the impact of these members of local governments has been analysed only super-
ficially. To date, there is no systematic comparison of the “cumul des mandats” across all 
26 cantons and their impact on political outcomes. This paper closes this research gap. 
More specifically, I focus on a particular case where power relations between the canton 
and the municipalities are at the core of the political debate. In the course of the reform 
of the fiscal equalisation and task allocation between the Confederation and the cantons 
(in the following referred to as NFA, short for “Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und 
der Aufgabenteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen”), the federal state fully withdrew 
from the financing of special schools (Sonderschulen). Before, the national disability in-
surance (Invalidenversicherung IV) had paid individual contributions per child and day 
at school. Given this complex governance structure as well as the new paradigm of inte-
grating special needs pupils into regular schools rather than segregating them, this federal 
contribution was not considered adequate anymore. As a result, the old system had to be 
replaced by a new one (Federal Finance Administration 2013: 38; Mueller and Vatter 
2016: 68). Two questions arise in this context: How do the cantons react when a policy 
                                                 
17 Local councillors comprise all members of local governments, including mayors. Hence, I will use the 
term “local councillors” when referring to all members of the local government with the mayors being a 
subgroup of them. 
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field suddenly becomes their exclusive responsibility? And, more interesting in the con-
text of this paper, how are the costs connected with these new competences then distrib-
uted between the cantonal and the local level? 
Compared to other policy fields, the “return on investment” of special school expendi-
tures is rather low. While investments in the school qualification of pupils with physical 
and/or cognitive deficits can promote the successful integration of these pupils into the 
labour market, recent statistics show that a high proportion of around 40 percent of pupils 
with a special curriculum still does not find vocational training after school (Federal Sta-
tistical Office 2016: 6). What is more, per-capita spending is significantly higher com-
pared to other investments in the educational sector, such as for example stipends.18 Given 
such high costs with uncertain benefits, it can be assumed that the costs related to special 
school pupils are unpopular among local governments. 
Looking at the data of the Federal Finance Administration (Eidgenössische Finanzver-
waltung), cantonal authorities come up for the majority of special school costs in most 
cantons. While the NFA has led to a further cost centralisation in almost all cantons, dif-
ferences between the cantons are huge – both before and after the federal reform of 2008. 
Can these differences be explained by the representation of mayors and other local coun-
cillors in the cantonal parliaments? Do they derive power from their mandate accumula-
tion for shifting the costs for special schools up to the higher state level (Horber-Papazian 
and Soguel 1996; Mueller et al. 2017)? In the literature, the accumulation of multiple 
mandates is discussed as one possible means for local governments to exert influence on 
political outcomes at the higher level (Meylan et al. 1972: 279ff.; Bogdanor 1988; Page 
1991: 60). By holding a seat in the cantonal parliament, members of local governments 
do not only benefit from their legislative power in the plenary session or in the parlia-
mentary committees, they also have a privileged status regarding informal contacts with 
civil servants and members of the cantonal government as well as public appearance in 
the media (Cappelletti 2014). 
                                                 
18 In 2014, cantons and municipalities spent almost 2 billion Swiss Francs for a total of 34’000 special 
school pupils. This equals to almost 60’000 Swiss Francs spent in one year for one pupil (own calculation 
based on Swiss Federal Finance Administration and Federal Statistical Office). 
3 Playing the vertical power game: The impact of local authorities in cantonal 
parliaments on the financing of special schools 
34 
 
In this paper, I use new data on the representation of members of local governments in 
cantonal parliaments from 2007 to 2014. While data on Swiss mayors in cantonal parlia-
ments has already been gathered in previous studies (Rühli 2012; Mueller 2014; Mueller 
2015), this paper will, for the first time, also consider the representation of other local 
councillors (i.e. members of local government in addition to the president of the local 
council/the mayor). In doing so, it contributes to both national and international literature 
on federalism, multi-level governance and local government studies. Firstly, the paper 
provides a systematic analysis of the effects of the “cumul des mandats” in Swiss feder-
alism. So far, studies focusing on multiple mandate holders have relied mainly on anec-
dotal evidence lacking a systematic and analytical approach. Secondly, the focus on one 
specific policy field reformed by the NFA allows for generating original empirical find-
ings on the impact of the reform on the cantonal level. Thirdly, by focusing on the pres-
ence of local authorities in the cantonal legislature as an explanatory factor, the paper 
goes beyond the Swiss case and provides valuable insights into the impact of local gov-
ernments on the arrangement of policies at the upper level of a decentralised polity. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section outlines the main features of the 
cantonalisation of special schools in the course of the NFA. The third section then ad-
dresses the theoretical background of mayors and other local councillors sitting in the 
cantonal parliament and discusses the possible effect of such multiple-mandate holders 
on political outcomes. In section 3.4, the research design is described, while section 3.5 
presents the empirical findings. The findings are discussed in section 3.6 before the paper 
ends with a conclusion and an outlook for further research. 
3.2 The cantonalisation of special schools in the course of the NFA reform 
The NFA was approved by a majority of 64 percent of the Swiss electorate on 28 Novem-
ber 2004. On 1 January 2008, it entered into force with totally 27 constitutional amend-
ments and more than 30 amendments to law (Braun 2008b: 87f.). The rearrangement was 
twofold: On the one hand, the NFA completely overhauled the fiscal equalisation system 
(Neuer Finanzausgleich) between the federal level and the cantons (vertical dimension) 
as well as among the cantons (horizontal dimension). On the other hand, the reform pro-
vided for an extensive re-allocation of powers in numerous policy fields (Neue Auf-
gabenteilung) (Broschek 2014). Amongst others, ten policy fields with formerly shared 
responsibilities were fully transferred to the cantons (Hänni 2011: 95f.). 
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The regulation and financing of special schools is one of these ten policy fields. The term 
“special schools” refers to pupils with physical and/or mental disabilities with special 
educational needs who have a special curriculum either in segregated or in regular 
schools.19 Until 2008, both the cantons and the federal state were responsible for financ-
ing these pupils (Federal Finance Administration 2013: 33). The Swiss disability insur-
ance paid individual contributions per child and day at school, the rest was borne by the 
cantons on the one hand, and (with the exception of a few cantons) by the municipalities 
on the other hand (Federal Finance Administration 2013: 33). With the NFA in effect 
from 1 January 2008 onwards, the federal state fully withdrew from financing this policy 
field. Special schools became a fully cantonalised policy with the need to find a new 
regulatory framework in all 26 cantons.20 This transfer of the policy into the cantonal 
educational system also has to be viewed in the context of a paradigm shift to integrate 
special needs pupils into regular classes whenever possible instead of segregating them 
(Hutterli and Kronenberg 2013). 
The transfer of tasks from the federal level to the cantons is accompanied by an intercan-
tonal concordat on the cooperation in the field of special needs education (Interkantonale 
Vereinbarung über die Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Sonderpädagogik). The concor-
dat aims at enhancing the cooperation between cantons by setting up common quality 
standards, a common terminology as well as a common evaluation procedure for the de-
termination of individual needs (Hutterli and Kronenberg 2013: 5). To date, 16 cantons 
have joined the concordat.21 
                                                 
19 http://www.szh.ch/themen/schule-und-integration/sonderschulen-oder-sonderklassen [accessed: 
22.12.2016]. The foundation Swiss Centre for Curative and Special Education (Stiftung Schweizer Zentrum 
für Heil- und Sonderpädagogik) further differentiates between special classes (integration of pupils with 
special educational needs in regular classes) and special schools (segregate classes). For reasons of sim-
plicity, I will refrain from making this distinction and refer to the term special schools only. 
20 According to § 197 Ziff. 2 of the federal constitution, the previous services of the disability insurance 
had to be ensured by the cantons at least until 1 January 2011 (Federal Finance Administration 2013: 33). 
After this transition phase, the cantons could establish own regulations on the condition that they elaborate 
a concept which informs about the guidelines, procedures, resource management and the institutional struc-
ture needed for the cantonal regulation of special schools (Federal Departement of Finance and Conference 
of Cantonal Governments 2007: 21). So far, 20 cantons have presented their concepts. For an overview of 
all the concepts and the legal basis connected to special schools, see http://www.edk.ch/dyn/12917.php 
[accessed: 27.03.2017]. 
21 See for updates: http://www.edk.ch/dyn/19096.php [accessed: 27.03.2017]. 
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A look at the financial statistics provides a first insight into how special school costs 
within a canton (i.e. excluding federal contributions in the pre-NFA phase) have been 
shared between the cantonal and local level so far. As Figure 8 shows, in 2006 and 2007 
the cantonal authorities bore only slightly more than half of all subnational (i.e. the sum 
of cantonal and local) costs concerning special schools.22 This changed significantly from 
2008 onwards. In 2008, the cantons on average accounted for 70 percent of cantonal and 
local costs; in 2011, the average share reached its peak with 77 percent. The last available 
data for 2014 report an average share of 72 percent. Hence, we can draw a first conclusion 
from the financial data: While expenditures for special schools within a canton have al-
ways been rather centralised than decentralised, the NFA – and with it the withdrawal of 
the disability insurance from financing – has further increased the centralisation of the 
inner-cantonal cost structure. Today, almost three out of four Swiss Francs spent for spe-
cial schools are spent on the cantonal level. 
Figure 8: Average share of the total of cantonal and local special school costs borne by 
the cantonal level from 2006 to 2014 (mean of all 26 cantons) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data of Federal Finance Administration. 
                                                 
22 The figures in this paragraph correspond to the mean cantonal cost share across all 26 cantons. Hence, 
the degree of centralisation in every canton contributes equally to the average value, which assures that the 
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Can these overall findings be corroborated throughout all cantons? Figure 9 ranks the 
cantons by their centralisation of special school expenditures in 2014. It becomes appar-
ent that the differences between the cantons are huge. In six cantons, the cantonal author-
ities come up for all the costs. In a further 14 cantons, the canton bears more than 50 
percent of the costs. In 6 cantons, the share of expenditures on the cantonal level is lower 
than 50 percent, thus indicating a decentralisation of most costs. 
What accounts for these huge differences between the cantons? This paper comes up with 
one possible explanation, namely the representation of mayors and other local councillors 
in cantonal parliaments. The following section presents the theoretical background behind 
this explanatory factor. 
Figure 9: Share of special school costs borne by the cantonal level in 2014 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data of Federal Finance Administration. 
3.3 The political power of local authorities in the cantonal parliaments 
It is an elementary feature of Swiss federalism that decentralised entities are involved in 
decision-making processes with the possibility to influence higher-level political deci-
sions (Horber-Papazian 2004; Linder 2012: 161ff.). This is not only true for the represen-
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within the cantons (Horber-Papazian and Jacot-Descombes 2014: 285ff.). While, accord-
ing to Ladner (2009), Swiss municipalities have difficulties “to place their concerns di-
rectly on the agenda of national politics” (Ladner 2009: 330), their influence on the can-
tonal agenda is considered to be stronger as municipalities enjoy a “traditionally strong 
position [...] within the cantons” (Ladner 2009: 339). However, the access of municipal-
ities to central decision-making differs between the cantons: Firstly, we find differences 
regarding institutional factors, e.g. the direct-democratic means available to municipali-
ties or their territorial overlap with electoral districts (Ladner 2009: 350; Mueller 2015: 
84ff.). Secondly, the political power of municipalities also differs when looking at polit-
ical actors and processes, where we find variance regarding the decentralisation of the 
party structure or the existence and strength of Local Government Associations (Mueller 
2015: 81ff.). 
Moreover, we can add a further strategy of interest representation at the central level, 
namely mayors and other local councillors who simultaneously hold a seat in the cantonal 
parliament (Mackenzie 1954). The accumulation of local and central mandates is a wide-
spread phenomenon in western democracies, with the French parliament as its archetype 
(Knapp 1991; Page 1991: 61f.; Dewoghélaëre et al. 2006; Navarro 2009; François and 
Navarro 2013b). Ever since the Third Republic in 1870, holding a local office was an 
important resource to become a representative in the national parliament (Dogan 1967: 
480f.; Best and Gaxie 2000: 110; François and Navarro 2013a: 19). Recent statistics for 
2012 show that more than 80 percent of the deputies in the national legislature in France 
simultaneously held a mandate in their municipality (Bach 2012: 24). The so-called “cu-
mul des mandats” therefore is a vital part of French political culture (Grémion 1976; Tar-
row 1977; Smyrl 2004: 207); and as such it is very relevant: On the individual level of 
the politician, it has a positive impact on electoral success, the influence on parliamentary 
decisions and the money received from one’s own party for election campaigns (Mény 
1992; François and Navarro 2013a; François and Foucault 2013; Ragouet and Phélippeau 
2013). Considering the whole political system, the “cumul des mandats” is said to impede 
the reform of local institutions and thus to favour the status quo in France (Le Lidec 2008). 
Even though research on the “cumul des mandats” is most advanced in France, the phe-
nomenon is also present in other European countries. According to the comparative anal-
ysis of 29 European countries by Navarro (2013), the accumulation of national and local 
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mandates is present in all countries apart from 10 – mainly ex-Soviet – states where it is 
prohibited by law. Next to France, the “cumul des mandats” is especially prominent in 
Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg, where the share of local mandate holders exceeds 50 
percent in all the three national parliaments (Navarro 2013: 126). 
Turning to Switzerland, a study recently conducted by Pilotti (2017, see also Pilotti et al. 
2010) shows that, in the year 2016, almost 13 percent of the members of the two parlia-
mentary chambers simultaneously held a seat in a municipal executive. From a longitu-
dinal perspective, this share has constantly been above ten percent throughout the whole 
20th century, while the accumulation of national and cantonal mandates (member of the 
cantonal government or parliament) has decreased considerably in the last decades (Pilotti 
2017: 267). 
When looking at cantonal parliaments, we find even higher shares in most cantons. In 
2014, in six cantonal parliaments at least every fourth person was a member of govern-
ment of a municipality.23 In Solothurn, Thurgovia, Appenzell Outer-Rhodes and St. Gall, 
the mayors are especially dominant with a share of more than 15 percent of all the can-
tonal parliamentarians. There are only four parliaments with no mayors, while other local 
councillors are present in all the cantonal legislatures (see Figure 10). These multiple 
mandate-holders are all democratically legitimised. In Switzerland, both members of the 
cantonal parliaments and of the local governments (including mayors) are elected by the 
citizens, either by ballot box votes or – in a small proportion of the municipalities – by 
the municipal assembly; Neuchâtel is the only canton where municipalities elect their 
executive either by popular vote or by the parliament (Ladner 2011: 8). 
So far, little attention has been paid to the “cumul des mandats” of mayors and other local 
councillors in cantonal legislatures. Empirical contributions can be found for the Canton 
of Vaud in 1950 (Meylan et al. 1972: 281) as well as for the Cantons of Fribourg, Valais, 
Neuchâtel, Jura and Geneva (Horber-Papazian 2004: 54). Recently, Rühli (2012) and 
                                                 
23 This paper only considers the representation of members of local governments in the cantonal parliament. 
The inclusion of further local authorities, such as the local parliament or members of school councils, is not 
possible, since in many cantons data on these other forms of the “cumul des mandats” either do not exist or 
are incomplete. Moreover, mayors and other local councillors are most involved and thus most sensitive 
for local politics (François and Navarro 2013b). Finally, the inclusion of members of municipal parliaments 
would distort the analysis, since in many municipalities the legislative body is the citizen assembly, i.e. 
there is no local parliament. 
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Mueller (2015) have collected data for 2011 and provide a systematic overview over all 
cantons; while the former relies on expert interviews, the latter has analysed the declara-
tion of interests published by the parliamentary services. Apart from these descriptive 
analyses, empirical studies about the consequences of the “cumul des mandats” in Swiss 
cantons are even rarer. Cappelletti (2014) finds evidence that local governments which 
are represented in the cantonal parliament receive larger per capita amounts of equalisa-
tion grants. The study, however, only includes 16 cantons and does not consider the effect 
of multiple-mandate holders on overall cantonal political outcomes. 
Figure 10: Share of mayors/local councillors in cantonal parliaments in 2014 (as % of 
total MPs) 
 
Notes: *= no data available for local councillors. For data sources see Appendix. 
From a theoretical point of view, different scholars argue that, the stronger local authori-
ties are represented in the central parliament, the better they can assert their interests at 
the higher state level. For Page (1991: 60), the accumulation of mandates is a suitable 
indicator to measure the influence of local authorities at the centre. Similarly, in the view 
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can be seen as an indicator of “representation and defence of municipal interests”. Bog-
danor (1988: 84) even argues that the unification between two political levels is better 
assured by multiple mandate holders than by the pure existence of a second chamber. 
These general considerations of the political power of the “cumul des mandats” help to 
theorise the influence of mayors and other local councillors on the allocation of special 
school costs. Members of local governments have an interest to keep local expenditures 
for special schools as low as possible for several reasons. Given the high costs for one 
special school pupil without a guaranteed payoff (in terms of successful integration in the 
labour market), expenditures in the field of special schools have a comparably low “return 
on investment”, unlike other expenditures such as scholarships for students or regional 
development programs. Furthermore, the benefits generated by special school expendi-
tures (e.g. reducing social costs due to labour market integration) are not necessarily lim-
ited to the entity where the investments originate from. Finally, the strategies for special 
needs education are outlined in the cantonal concepts elaborated in the aftermath of the 
NFA (Federal Finance Administration 2013: 36). Hence, an increase in financial partici-
pation is only weakly linked to an increase in local competences in the policy field.  
Given these considerations, it is reasonable to assume that mayors and other local coun-
cillors act as “revenue maximizers” for their municipality by using their legislative power 
to “shift” special school costs up to the cantonal level (Greve 2012: 189). Or, in the words 
of Horber-Papazian and Soguel (1996: 2, own translation): “every state level tries to trans-
fer costs to another entity whilst trying to keep as many decision-making rights as possi-
ble”. 
Influence can be exerted at different stages in the decision-making process. Firstly, mul-
tiple-mandate holders can use their privileged position in the pre-parliamentary phase. As 
members of the cantonal parliament, they regularly travel to the capital of the canton and 
move in spheres where they have direct contact with cantonal stakeholders (Kübler and 
Michel 2006). Their direct access to civil servants and members of the cantonal govern-
ment provides them with good lobbying opportunities. Without being a member of the 
cantonal legislature, this lobbying would be much more difficult. 
Secondly, parliamentarians can benefit most from their position if they are members of 
the committee responsible for proposals that particularly affect their interests (Cappelletti 
3 Playing the vertical power game: The impact of local authorities in cantonal 
parliaments on the financing of special schools 
42 
 
2014). In Switzerland, committee decisions predetermine political outcomes to a great 
deal, providing good opportunities for single parliamentarians to influence a bill (Vatter 
2016: 278). This also applies to local authorities: The higher the share of members of 
local governments in a cantonal parliament, the higher the probability that at least one of 
them also belongs to the committee responsible for the special school-financing proposi-
tion (Mueller 2015: 79). 
Thirdly, local authorities without direct access to the committee can influence the corre-
sponding bill in the parliamentary assembly by proposing an amendment of the commit-
tee’s proposition. At this stage, they can also form a coalition in order to coordinate col-
lective action and consolidate political power across party boundaries (Cappelletti 2014). 
In doing so, members of the coalition can advocate for their local interests in their own 
party fraction. As the phenomenon of multiple mandate holding is not restricted to par-
ticular parties, it can be expected that a “local coalition” increases local influence at the 
expense of partisan interests (Tavits 2009).  
Finally, a legislative mandate also involves privileges outside the boundaries of the polit-
ical-administrative system. Parliamentarians have better access to the media and can in-
fluence public opinion on specific issues more easily (Cappelletti 2014). These privileges 
become even more important in case of a referendum. In this case, easy access to public 
opinion is of utmost importance as the decision making process has left the parliamentar-
ian borders and has entered the direct democratic arena. 
In sum, being a member of the cantonal parliament entails a variety of advantages 
throughout different stages of the decision-making process. Thus, the following hypoth-
esis can be formulated regarding the influence of mayors and all local councillors respec-
tively on the inner-cantonal allocation of special school costs: The better the municipali-
ties are represented through mayors/local councillors in the cantonal parliament, the 
better they can shift the special school costs up to the cantonal level. 
I will now explain the research design to test the hypothesis before I present the empirical 
findings in Section 3.5.  
3 Playing the vertical power game: The impact of local authorities in cantonal 
parliaments on the financing of special schools 
43 
 
3.4 Research design 
The research design chosen for this study is a subnational comparison of the 26 Swiss 
cantons before and after the NFA became applicable. In doing so, the study takes profit 
of the federal system in Switzerland which provides an ideal “laboratory” for comparative 
research (Vatter 2002; Braun 2003). While the common constitutional framework of 
Swiss federalism keeps a variety of possible intervening variables constant, the different 
institutional organisations of the cantons provide for an interesting variance of variables, 
which helps to explain differences regarding the allocation of special school costs. I will 
first explain the operationalisation of my dependent and independent variables and then 
present my method. 
3.4.1 Operationalisation 
My dependent variable is the centralisation of special school expenditures in the 26 Swiss 
cantons.24 The data are provided by the Federal Finance Administration, which lists an-
nual expenditure figures for both the cantonal and the local level. For the measurement, I 
divide the total expenditures on the cantonal level by the total expenditures on the can-
tonal and local level. I multiply the results by 100 to arrive at the share of costs that is 
paid by the cantonal level. For the calculation, I consider inner-cantonal transfer payments 
within the policy field of special schools which are provided by the Federal Finance Ad-
ministration as well.25 The variable ranges from 0 to 100, 0 indicating full decentralisation 
and 100 full centralisation of the cost structure. 
My two key independent variables relate to the share of mayors and all local councillors 
(including mayors) respectively in the cantonal parliament. To calculate this variable, I 
divide the number of mayors as well as the number of all local councillors sitting in a 
cantonal parliament by the total number of seats in that parliament. Again, by multiplying 
the result by 100, I arrive at the percentage values. Mueller (2015) proposes a second 
operationalisation by dividing the number of local government members by the total num-
ber of local governments in a canton. However, what matters for the empirical analysis 
in this paper is not the outside representativeness of the multiple-mandate holders for all 
the local governments in a canton, but their political power inside the parliament. I thus 
                                                 
24 Due to missing data, not all 26 cantons can be included in the empirical analysis (see variable descrip-
tion in Table A 3 in the Appendix for more details). 
25 For the databases and the calculation of the dependent variable, see Table A 3 in the Appendix. 
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refrain from including this second approach. The data corresponds to my own collection 
of local political mandates of the parliamentarians in the 26 cantons.26 For the models in 
the analytical part of this paper, I will calculate two variables, with the first one including 
only the mayors and the second taking all the members of local governments (i.e. local 
councillors) into account. In order to model the causal influence of the variable in the best 
way, I will use the previous year’s figures. 
To assess the net influence of the NFA on the centralisation of expenditures, I will include 
a dummy variable for the presence/non-presence of the federal reform, respectively. The 
multiplication of this dummy with the key independent variables allows distinguishing 
between the influence of mayors/local councillors before and after the NFA. 
In order to prevent spurious findings, further control variables will be included into the 
models. A first group of variables entails further institutional and political factors that 
facilitate the exertion of local influence over cantonal political outcomes.27 A first index 
focuses on the strength of Local Government Associations. It will be measured by as-
sessing the existence of an official name, a functioning website, publicly available asso-
ciation statutes and the institutionalisation of meetings of Local Government Associa-
tions. In order to account for the influence of the electoral system, a second index captures 
the territoriality of the electoral system. Municipalities are most favoured by the electoral 
system if constituencies correspond to the municipalities. At the other extreme, the elec-
toral system is most centralised when the whole canton is a single constituency (as in 
Geneva and Ticino). Finally, a third index focuses on direct democratic means available 
for local governments. While in some cantons local governments can use both the initia-
tive and the referendum to voice their concerns on the cantonal level, neither instrument 
is available to local authorities in other cantons. The variable included in the analysis 
                                                 
26 For the collection of local mandates, I have relied on three groups of data sources: Lists of interest ties 
(based on self-declaration of parliamentarians), lists of elected local authorities in the municipalities 
(“Staatskalender”, municipal election results and lists directly provided by the cantonal administration) and 
own surveys among the municipalities. Lists of interest ties were only consulted when the quality of the 
lists (i.e. the completeness) was high. When comparing the cantons for which I had to rely on lists of interest 
ties with the rest of the cantons, I do not find indication for a systematic underestimation of the “cumul des 
mandats” in the former group of the cantons. For a detailed table with the figures and the data sources for 
all cantons, see Table A 4 in the Appendix. 
27 All three indices have been elaborated by Mueller (2015). For a detailed description of measurement, see 
Table A 3 in the Appendix. 
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accounts for the existence of such instruments as well as the institutional barriers to utilize 
them. 
It can be further expected that the inner-cantonal allocation of special school costs is – in 
the sense of a path-dependent effect – related to the overall decentralisation of resources 
within a canton. I will thus include a further variable measuring the overall decentralisa-
tion of resources in a canton relying on Mueller’s (2015) index of “policy decentralisa-
tion”. The index is based on the cantons’ fiscal decentralisation, but also takes the share 
of local administrative resources into account. The latter is especially important for the 
case at hand, considering the need for organising a new policy field within the existing 
administrative structure of a canton. In order to capture the hypothesized “path-depend-
ent” effect, I use the figures’ mean value from 1990 to 2006 for all 26 cantons. 
A further group of control variables takes into account possible policy-specific differ-
ences between the cantons. The number of pupils in special schools accounts for possible 
effects of the magnitude of the demand for this public service. Membership in the con-
cordat for special needs education controls for the possible effect that inter-cantonal co-
ordination obliges cantons to keep as many resources as possible at the centre. 
Finally, the political, structural and socio-cultural context of a canton will be included. 
Firstly, the share of parliamentary seats held by left-wing parties controls for possible 
effects of the party system in a canton. Secondly, the number of municipalities accounts 
for the fragmentation in a canton, which has proven to correlate negatively with centrali-
sation of overall expenditures in Swiss context (Schaltegger and Feld 2003). Thirdly, a 
dummy for German-speaking cantons will be included in order to control for possible 
effects of the political culture. Finally, the urbanisation of a canton, measured by the share 
of residents living in urban areas, will be included.28 
3.4.2 Method 
In order to test the formulated hypothesis, I will compare the centralisation of special 
school expenditures in the cantons at two points in time. Data for 2007 allow for assessing 
                                                 
28 A further possible structural control variable would be the population size of a canton. This variable, 
however, highly correlates with the number of special school pupils. Hence, for the purpose of this paper, 
the number of special school pupils will be included in the analysis instead of the total number of residents. 
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the level of centralisation shortly before the NFA entered into effect in 2008. The corre-
sponding data for 2014 are the last available data. The time span of seven years assures 
that the effects of the NFA can be assessed in the long run, instead of considering only 
short-term effects which might not have been consolidated yet. 
Given the hierarchical data structure with 26 cantons each containing two points in time 
(2007 and 2014), multilevel models with random intercepts for each canton are applied 
(Steenbergen and Bradford 2002).29 For the estimation of the parameters, I use a Bayesian 
approach which, given the data structure at hand, is preferable for two reasons. Firstly, 
the Bayesian approach does not assume data to be randomly sampled. Instead it treats 
data as a complete survey with the goal to find the model that best matches the given data 
structure (Jackman 2009: XXXIf.). This corresponds perfectly to the data used in this 
paper, which are exhaustive non-repeatable data for all the 26 cantons. Secondly, given 
the need to apply a hierarchical model, Monte Carlo experiments have shown that Bayes-
ian multilevel models perform better than equivalent frequentist models, especially when 
the number of level-2 units is small (Browne and Draper 2006; Stegmueller 2013). 
Bayesian estimation results yield the mean and standard deviation of the posterior distri-
bution, which can be interpreted as in a standard frequentist regression. The mean is the 
average effect of a parameter (i.e. independent variable) on the outcome (i.e. dependent 
variable); the standard deviation helps to assess the statistical reliability of the estimation 
results.30 
3.5 Empirical findings 
In order to test the effect of the independent variables on the outcome variable I proceed 
as follows. Firstly, I estimate a baseline model, which only includes the share of mayors 
                                                 
29 Actually, the data structure at hand is hierarchical in two ways: The years 2007 and 2014 are clustered 
within cantons and cantons are clustered within the two years. While the year-level is already captured by 
the NFA-dummy itself (0 for 2007 and 1 for 2014), random intercepts for the cantons are used to capture 
the canton-level. 
30 The Bayesian models have been estimated in R using the package MCMCglmm (Hadfield 2010). For the 
specification of priors I have used non-informative normal priors for the fixed effect parameters and inverse 
Wishart priors for the variance component. The convergence of the chains has been checked by extensive 
graphical inspections of the trajectories and the autocorrelations as well as by Geweke and Heidelberg 
diagnostics. The chains of all the models presented in this paper have mixed well and converged. The 
models were run for 400’000 iterations, with a burn-in of 200’000 and a thinning of 50. The change of the 
number of iterations and a slight change of the priors have not changed the results. More detailed infor-
mation on the model specifications and the different sensitivity tests can be obtained upon request. 
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and all local councillors respectively, the NFA-dummy, as well as the respective interac-
tion term. A second model examines whether the estimates of the baseline model are 
confirmed even if all the predictors are included. Finally, a third final model is estimated 
by only including those predictors of model 2 whose credible intervals indicate a clear 
direction of influence (i.e. did not include zero). 
Figure 11 presents the means of the parameters for the Bayesian estimations with the 
corresponding 90% and 95% credible intervals for the two final models. The results of 
the baseline and the full models are listed in Tables A 5 and A 6 in the Appendix.  
Figure 11: Explaining cantonal cost centralisation: Posterior distribution of final ran-
dom intercept models with mayors/local councillors in cantonal parliaments 
 
Notes: Mean as well as the 90% and 95% credible interval of posterior distribution. Bayesian estimation 
using MCMCglmm package in R (Hadfield 2010). For the baseline model and the full model (with all 
parameters, including those without a systematic effect), see Appendix. 
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Regarding the influence of mayors, the model estimations clearly show that a higher share 
of mayors in the cantonal parliaments leads to a higher centralisation of special school 
costs in a canton. For all the three models, the posterior mean is above zero with a 95% 
credible interval not containing zero. While in the baseline model the mean is 1.05, this 
value even increases when control variables are included. The final model yields a poste-
rior mean of 2.1, indicating more than a 2 percentage point increase of the cost centrali-
sation with a 1 percentage point increase of the share of mayors in the cantonal legislature. 
Looking at the NFA-dummy it becomes clear that the federal reform – even while con-
trolling for further control variables – has clearly increased the share of special school 
costs borne by the cantonal level. According to the final model, the NFA has led to a 16.4 
percentage point increase in the cost centralisation. 
When the share of mayors in cantonal parliaments is interacted with the presence/non-
presence of the NFA-reform, the magnitude of the effect for mayors increases slightly. 
The effect of 1 percent of mayors sitting in the parliament is 0.3 percentage points higher 
for the time when the NFA is in force compared to the situation before the federal reform. 
However, considering Figure 12, it becomes clear that the two credible intervals overlap 
largely. Hence, the positive effect of mayors on the cantonal cost centralisation is mainly 
an effect of its own and hardly depends on the federal reform. 
Accordingly, the more a canton decentralises all of its resources to the municipalities 
(expenditures, revenues, administrative resources), the less special school costs are cen-
tralised at the cantonal level. In addition, the number of pupils in special schools posi-
tively correlates with the centralisation of special school costs. The same applies for the 
membership in the inter-cantonal concordat: the horizontal coordination of a canton 
within the scope of the concordat for special needs education leads to an additional in-
crease of the cost structure by 4.7 percentage points. Furthermore, the number of munic-
ipalities positively correlates with the centralisation of the cost structure, which stands 
somewhat in contradiction to previous empirical findings about the influence of the inner-
cantonal fragmentation on overall expenditure (de)centralisation. Finally, the strength of 
left-wing parties seems to be linked to decentralisation instead of centralisation of the cost 
structure. This finding might be surprising at first, but could be explained by the left-wing 
support for a more integrative approach regarding special school pupils. A decentralisa-
tion of policy resources may be crucial in order to foster the integration of these pupils 
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into decentralised regular classes instead of segregating them in centralised special 
schools. 
Figure 12: Marginal effect of mayors/local councillors in cantonal parliaments with and 
without the NFA 
 
Notes: Mean as well as the 90% and 95% credible interval of posterior distribution. Bayesian estimation 
using MCMCglmm package in R (Hadfield 2010). 
No “centralising” effects can be found for the further political variables which are ex-
pected to facilitate local influence on cantonal policies. Neither the territoriality of the 
electoral system nor the availability of direct democratic instruments for local govern-
ments helps to explain the level of cost centralisation in a canton. Although we find a 
positive posterior mean for both parameters, none of them can be considered systemati-
cally positive when credible intervals are taken into account. Interestingly enough, a 
strong Local Government Association leads to a higher share of costs borne by the mu-
nicipalities. Hence, when looking at the different possible channels of influence for local 
authorities, the share of mayors in the parliament appears to be the only variable that is 
systematically positively linked with the centralisation of special school costs in a canton. 
Turning to the models for local councillors, the findings do not differ greatly from those 
for the mayors. All three models indicate a positive effect of the share of local councillors 
3 Playing the vertical power game: The impact of local authorities in cantonal 
parliaments on the financing of special schools 
50 
 
in the cantonal parliament on the centralisation of special school costs in a canton. How-
ever, the magnitude of the effect is lower when compared to the one for mayors. The 
baseline model reveals a 0.9 percentage point increase of the centralisation with a 1 per-
centage point increase of the share of local councillors. The effect slightly increases with 
the inclusion of control variables. According to the final model, centralisation increases 
by 1.1 percentage points for every additional percent of local councillors in the parlia-
ment. 
The NFA effect is also strong when local councillors are included. This time, the interac-
tion term with the share of local councillors is even negative, with a credible interval not 
including zero. Hence, the positive influence of local councillors on cost centralisation is 
mainly restricted to the period before the NFA. However, when looking at the magnitude 
of the effect, one has to put the relevance of this finding into perspective. The effect only 
decreases by 0.3 percentage points after the NFA compared to before. Hence, even though 
the credible interval of the interaction term indicates a high reliability of this effect, the 
relevance of this effect is highly restricted. 
3.6 Discussion 
How can we interpret these empirical results in the light of the formulated hypothesis? 
Generally, the findings confirm the expectation that a higher share of members of local 
governments in the cantonal legislature leads to a stronger centralisation of special school 
costs. Hence, local authorities use the political power of the “cumul des mandats” for 
shifting unwanted costs from the local up to the cantonal level. This effect is stronger for 
mayors than for other members of local governments. Therefore, it is especially the pres-
ident of the local council who seems to have a strong connection with his home munici-
pality and who takes a “brokering role” by transferring local interests to the centre (Tar-
row 1977; John 2001: 136). 
Interestingly, this effect is the only positive one that could be found within the group of 
political factors that are expected to facilitate the exertion of local influence on higher 
level political outcomes. A favourable institutional condition for local actors – such as 
constituencies that (almost) match the boundaries of municipalities and low barriers for 
local governments to use direct democratic instruments – did not prove to have an effect 
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on cost allocation. Hence, a purely institutional perspective is not expedient when as-
sessing the power relations between the centre and the municipalities. Institutions only 
provide a framework within which actors are needed for a policy change to occur. The 
existence and strength of Local Government Associations is even negatively connected 
to cost centralisation. It follows that the direct representation in the cantonal political-
administrative system proves to be much more efficient than any other efforts of lobbying 
and coordination outside these boundaries. 
Despite this general boosting effect of the “cumul des mandats” on cost centralisation, 
the NFA – in the course of which the federal state fully withdrew from financing special 
schools – did not lay out a new “battlefield” for local authorities to exert influence on cost 
reallocation. Even though the overall cost centralisation has markedly increased in most 
cantons, the presence of local government members in the legislature cannot explain the 
variance of this increase between the cantons. Rather, the influence of local authorities 
has already existed before the federal reform. This is entirely plausible, as quite possibly 
the centralisation rates had already been disputed before 2008. In many cantons, they 
fluctuated around the “magical” value of 50 percent, that is the threshold above which the 
cantonal level starts to come up for the majority of the costs. 
In sum, the empirical results of this study confirm the expectation in the literature that 
local interests are best represented with local representatives directly holding a seat in the 
higher-level parliament (Meylan et al. 1972: 279ff.; Bogdanor 1988: 84; Page 1991: 60). 
The hypothesis is thus confirmed. The results indicate a clear pattern of exertion of influ-
ence regarding the issue of cost allocation in a policy field. Local governments have no 
interests in coming up for costs in a policy field where expenditures are not directly linked 
to revenues. In the recent past, we have found several episodes that stand in line with this 
finding: In 2015, the cities of Zurich, Winterthur and Dietikon urged their canton to in-
crease its contribution for social assistance31; one year later, there was a dispute in the 
same canton between the two state levels regarding the responsibilities for the costs of 
placing children in homes32; and in the course of current austerity measures in the canton 
of Lucerne, the municipalities threatened to make use of the municipal referendum for 
                                                 
31 Schürer, A. (2015). “Jacqueline Fehr will die Gemeinden entlasten”. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 November 
2015. 
32 Hudec, J. (2016). “Kanton will Millionenkosten abwenden”. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 September 2016. 
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the first time ever.33 Hence, the findings are in line with previous experience stating that 
local governments want to maintain as many decisional capacities as possible whilst try-
ing to get rid of the provision of unattractive and/or costly public services (Horber-Papa-
zian and Soguel 1996; Mueller et al. 2017). 
3.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to analyse the impact of mayors and other local councillors 
elected to the cantonal parliament on the cost allocation within the policy field of special 
schools. In order to do so, the study has benefited from new data on the presence of local 
authorities in all 26 cantonal parliaments.  
The findings suggest that a higher presence of local government members in the cantonal 
parliament leads to a higher share of special school costs that is borne by the cantonal 
level. While the influence of all the members of local governments is rather limited in 
scope, mayors in cantonal parliaments have proven to be key actors when it comes to 
defending local interests in central decision-making. This finding has important implica-
tions both for Swiss federalism and beyond. 
Considering the Swiss federal system, the results suggest that one has to take into account 
the huge variance regarding the “cumul des mandats” in the cantons when assessing the 
power relations in a canton. The empirical findings of this study show that multiple man-
dates can be effectively used by local governments to maximize their revenue (Greve 
2012). This is in line with previous empirical analyses by Cappelletti (2014) and calls for 
more attention to be given to the effects of the “cumul des mandats” phenomenon. The 
degree of mandate accumulation in cantonal parliaments is not necessarily linked to in-
stitutional differences regarding local autonomy. Hence, the accumulation of mandates 
can be of crucial importance for local politics, even in cantons where institutional cen-
tralisation is comparatively high (such as in the French speaking cantons). 
The relevance of multiple-mandate holders is also high when taking into account the na-
tional level. Considering the involvement of the cantons in the national decision-making 
process, the literature has mainly focused on the vertical institutions of federalism, such 
                                                 
33 Aschwanden, E. (2016). “Gemeinden proben den Aufstand”. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 October 2016. 
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as the cantonal majority in constitutional referendums or the cantonal legislative referen-
dum (Linder 2012: 161ff.; Vatter 2016: 459ff.). This study suggests that the direct repre-
sentation of members of cantonal (and local) governments in the national parliament is a 
further – non-institutionalised – element of vertical influence in the Swiss federal system. 
The findings are relevant beyond the Swiss case with regard to the necessity to take actors 
and processes into account more strongly when assessing power relations between the 
centre and the periphery. This study has also shown that institutional factors expected to 
facilitate local politics (namely the electoral system and direct democratic means for local 
governments) are less important than the direct representation of lower-level authorities 
in the higher-level parliament. Hence, the current debate about power relations between 
centre and periphery and local government systems in general needs to consider the ac-
cumulation of local and central mandates as one further element of local politics (Pratch-
ett 2004; Wolman 2008; Ladner et al. 2016). 
The “cumul des mandats” can be a promising means for local authorities to exert influ-
ence on political decisions at the centre also in less or even non-federalised countries, 
where local and regional authorities find themselves in less favourable institutional set-
tings. Looking at the four European countries where the accumulation of local and central 
mandates is most present – Belgium, Finland, France and Luxembourg –, Belgium is the 
only state with a federalised state structure (Navarro 2013: 126). There is no a priori rea-
son to assume that the representation of local interests via the accumulation of mandates 
is only restricted to federal states. So far international research on the consequences of 
the “cumul the mandats” has focused mainly on the effects for the individual politician 
such as regarding electoral success or activity in the parliament (e.g. Blais 2006; François 
2006; Foucault 2006; Maddens et al. 2006; François and Navarro 2013b). The study at 
hand suggests that a more macro-oriented analysis of effects could yield interesting re-
sults beyond the case of Swiss federalism. 
Finally, the study also yields interesting results from a normative point of view. It can be 
questioned whether the accumulation of multiple mandates is rather fruitful or detrimental 
for a political system. While multiple-mandate holders are closely connected to citizens 
which allows the latter to bring their concerns into the parliamentarian system more eas-
ily, the “cumul des mandats” can also be criticized for harming the federal principle of 
“one region, one vote” as it puts some regions in a better position than others. Cappelletti 
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(2014) has already shown that municipalities with one or more executives in the cantonal 
parliament are better off when it comes to the regulation of equalisation grants. The same 
effects could also be relevant for other policy issues: For example, when a canton needs 
to decide where to build asylum homes or which infrastructure decisions to take (e.g. 
roadbuilding, leisure facilities). The findings of this study suggest to take the phenomenon 
of multiple mandates more seriously and to discuss its implications for the functioning of 
a democratic system. 
The study has taken a close look on the impact of the “cumul des mandats” in one specific 
policy field. While this approach benefits the internal validity of the findings, the empir-
ical results are limited in several ways that call for further research. Firstly, the analysis 
needs to be expanded to other policy fields in order to get a more generalizable under-
standing of the consequences of the “cumul des mandats”. There might be other policy 
fields where the takeover of policy-related costs is attractive for local governments, espe-
cially when they are connected to an increase of competences or when long-term “returns 
on investment” are expected. 
Secondly, the present study has looked at the “cumul des mandats” from a macro-per-
spective, which does not allow deriving conclusions about the causal mechanisms at the 
level of individual legislators. Given this well-known limitation in macro-quantitative 
comparative studies (e.g. when the influence of parties is assessed on political outcomes), 
further research following a more micro-based and qualitative approach could help to get 
a more in-depth understanding of the action “behind” the macro-effect found in this study. 
In fact, even though the study at hand finds evidence that the “culture” of mandate-accu-
mulation – as measurable on the macro-level – is positively linked to local influence over 
cantonal policies, the political outcomes at the macro-level are still the results of interac-
tions of individuals (i.e. the parliamentarians) in a given decision-making process. It 
would therefore be of particular interest to take a closer look at the political interests of 
single legislators, their strategies and actions in the decision-making process (e.g. in the 
parliamentary committees) as well as their ability to build local coalitions across party 
lines. 
Finally, the findings should encourage scholars to shed more light on multiple mandates 
from an international point of view as well. The accumulation of mandates is neither re-
stricted to the local and regional level, nor to federal countries. Further studies could thus 
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take an internationally comparative perspective by analysing the impact of local and re-
gional authorities in the national parliaments. Such an analysis would then allow for as-
sessing the impact of the “cumul des mandats” in different institutional settings. Is “the 
state capture from below” (Mueller et al. 2017) only limited to federalised and decentral-
ised states? Or does it prove to be an important channel of influence also for local gov-
ernments in centralised unitary states by compensating the otherwise rather limited local 
influence on higher-level political outcomes? 
It will be up to further research to attain a more in-depth understanding of the conse-
quences of the “cumul des mandats”. The present study provides strong arguments for 
considering multiple-mandate holders more seriously when addressing the capacity of 




   




4 State capture from below? The contradictory effects of de-
centralisation on public spending 
 
Abstract 
This study analyses the contradictory effects of decentralisation on public spending. We 
distinguish three dimensions of decentralisation and analyse their joint and separate ef-
fects on public spending in the Swiss cantons over 20 years. We find that overall decen-
tralisation has a strong, significant and negative effect on the size of the public sector, 
thus confirming the Leviathan hypothesis. The same holds for fiscal and institutional de-
centralisation. However, the extent to which political processes and actors are organised 
locally rather than centrally actually increases central and decreases local spending. This 
suggests that actors behave strategically when dealing with the centre by offloading the 
more costly policies. The wider implication of our study is that the balance between self-
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What explains why some governments spend more than others? Political science, and in 
particular the public policy literature, has long sought to answer this question. The en-
quiry points to the very heart of politics, given the key role of institutions for distributive, 
competitive and ideological processes such as policy making, elections and rivalling ideas 
on the role of the state in general (cf. Zubek and Goetz 2010). In short, political conflict 
often revolves around how much should be spent, when, and on what, to paraphrase Lass-
well (1936). Accordingly, ever since Schmidt’s (1993, 2000) exegesis of rivalling theo-
ries explaining public expenditure, we can distinguish between socio-economic, partisan, 
power resources and cultural-historical determinants, next to institutional approaches 
along the lines of Tsebelis’ (2000) veto-player theory. 
At the same time, and building on this last point about the role of institutions, various 
forms of vertical power sharing – regionalism, decentralisation, federalism, etc. – are 
widely believed to affect both the legitimacy and efficiency of policymaking (e.g. Bren-
nan and Buchanan 1980; Rodden 2006; Treisman 2007). Decentralisation in particular is 
argued to lead to lower deficits (Busch 1995; Baskaran 2012), lower public spending on 
education, healthcare, pensions or general welfare (Vatter and Rüefli 2003; Busemeyer 
2008), lower unemployment (Crepaz 1996), more satisfaction due to better tailored ser-
vice delivery (Oates 1972), lower inflation rates and higher economic growth (Castles 
1999; Lancaster and Hicks 2000). The most famous statement emanating from that liter-
ature is probably Brennan and Buchanan’s “Leviathan hypothesis”, according to which 
“[t]otal government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the 
greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized” (1980: 216; empha-
sis omitted). In other words, the “size of the public sector should vary inversely with fiscal 
decentralization” (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002: 16; also Rodden 2006: 5). 
However, “[s]urprisingly little thought has gone into defining and measuring decentrali-
zation and federalism in ways that facilitate empirical analysis” (Rodden 2006: 24) of 
exactly that connection. Either such measures are carefully designed – or at least skilfully 
combined – but only selected public policies are assessed (e.g. Biela et al. 2013), or output 
analyses rely on a simplified understanding of vertical state structures (e.g. Schmidt 1996; 
Lijphart 2012; cf. Braun 2000a: 2ff.) and an operationalisation of fiscal indicators only 
(e.g. Rodden 2003a). Among the notable exceptions are the studies by Schneider (2006) 




and O’Dwyer and Ziblatt (2006), who try to study the impact of different forms of decen-
tralisation on social policies and the quality of government, respectively, as well as Braun 
(2000b), who compares clusters of countries distinguished by the distribution, extent and 
sharing of political power.34 
But even these studies may speak of political power only to then measure its presence, 
type and distribution using revenue, expenditure, taxes and fiscal transfer data. As we 
shall argue below, this neglects both institutions as well as politics in a more narrow sense 
(actors and processes). 
Hence, following Rodden’s observation that “normative theories establishing decentrali-
zation’s promise seem to assume implicitly not only a wide range of local taxing and 
spending authority, but also some modicum of political federalism” (2006: 44; emphasis 
added), this study also includes legal and political indicators that more closely capture 
what is intended – namely, the extent to which political power is distributed vertically. 
We will provide a threefold conceptualisation and measurement of decentralisation and 
then analyse its impact on government size. More particularly, we shall distinguish be-
tween an institutional (polity), a functional (policy) and a political dimension (politics) of 
decentralisation and analyse whether, controlling for a number of other factors, decen-
tralisation and its three dimensions matter for public expenditure. Taking profit of the 
opportunity afforded by the Swiss federation as a “laboratory” of 26 subnational political 
systems (Vatter 2002; Braun 2003), we are able to compare different types and degrees 
of intracantonal decentralisation to assess their effect on cantonal, local and total (can-
tonal plus local) spending over 20 years (1990–2009). 
We proceed by first discussing the current state of the art in both the public policy and 
the territorial politics literature. The research design section presents our research design 
                                                 
34 A further difficulty is terminological (Rodden 2006: 24), with decentralisation either referring to a sub-
dimension of federalism (e.g. Watts 2008) or, alternatively, its synonym (e.g. Riker 1964). Although it 
would probably be more correct to speak of “non-centralisation” (Elazar 1987: 34), that term is not widely 
used. Hence, because the literature on fiscal federalism essentially deals with expenditure and revenue de-
centralisation (e.g. Rodden 2003a: 697), we will use this term even when referring to the political and 
institutional dimensions of the vertical division of power that others have labelled “cartel federalism” 
(Greve 2012: 4) or “shared rule” (Elazar 1987; Hooghe et al. 2010). 




before we explain government size using our own measures of decentralisation and sev-
eral controls, in the findings section. The discussion and conclusion section discusses our 
findings in light of the theoretical literature and concludes. 
4.2 Theory and hypotheses 
The extent, even if not necessarily the type, of public expenditure has traditionally been 
explained from either one of five perspectives: neo-institutionalism; modernisation; path 
dependency; power resources; and party competition (Schmidt 1993, 2000). As this study 
focusses on the effects of decentralisation, we first discuss theoretical arguments pertain-
ing to that causal mechanism in particular. In doing so we distinguish three different types 
of decentralisation: functional, political and institutional in a narrow sense. We then 
briefly discuss rivalling explanations – parties-in-government, hard budget constraints, 
direct democracy and noninstitutional factors – as currently found in the literature. 
4.2.1 The impact of decentralisation 
At its most general, the impact of decentralisation (our shorthand for vertical power shar-
ing) on government size is conceptualised as the effect of a specific set of “interpersonal, 
formal or informal rules and norms” (Schmidt 1993: 378; 2000: 28) on political action 
(cf. March and Olsen 1989; Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 2011). This effect is commonly 
hypothesised to operate through three causal mechanisms that all relate to different as-
pects of decentralisation: competition, local autonomy and veto-players. 
First, competition among lower-level units in terms of taxation, and service provision is 
thought to dampen the size of the overall state, as public entities would only raise and 
provide the absolute minimum of both to attract wealthy residents (Tiebout 1956: 418; 
Besley and Case 1995; Oates 1999: 1122; Alesina and Spolaore 2003: 137; Treisman 
2007: 58). Such is the famous “Leviathan hypothesis” (Brennan and Buchanan 1980: 
216), which rests on several assumptions, namely complete information, unhindered or at 
least not too costly a resident mobility, and individuals’ rational desires of neither wanting 
to pay for nor demand more than absolutely necessary (cf. Tiebout 1956: 419). 
Given that our subsequent empirical analysis uses the 26 Swiss cantons as a comparative 
template, confidence in the validity of these assumptions is higher than in a cross-national 
analysis (see also Monogan 2013; Wasserfallen 2014). The average Swiss canton has 




310,000 inhabitants and spans 1,600 km2 (Federal Statistical Office 2015); therefore, 
complete information and mobility are more likely. Also, moving in our case not only 
means staying in the same country, but also in the same canton, the level where several 
important powers are exercised (e.g. police, education, health and environment – thus 
there are no costs in terms of adjusting to new systems by staying within the same canton) 
as Switzerland is one of the most federal countries in the world (Linder 2012; Füglister 
and Wasserfallen 2014). Finally, the existence of fiscal equivalence in terms of a conver-
gence of decisionmakers, taxpayers and service recipients (Schaltegger and Feld 2003) 
further enhances the logic according to which “voting with the feet” (Tiebout 1956) in-
deed leads to service provision matching tax yield. 
As the Leviathan hypothesis is concerned primarily with overall government size, it only 
makes sense to test for the effect of this aspect of decentralisation on total public spend-
ing, which is both local and central spending combined (cf. Rodden 2003a: 709). Greve 
(2012: 7) equally underlines how this competitive logic of federalism would serve to “dis-
cipline governments” tout court. Hence, a first hypothesis reads as follows: 
H1: The more fiscally decentralised a Swiss canton, the lower its total public expenditure. 
A second argument why decentralisation would contribute to smaller governments is that 
much of the overall state activity is “hidden” at lower levels – that is, decided, financed 
and carried out by subsystem entities at their own discretion. But for decentralisation to 
lower “central decision costs” (Greve 2012: 6; emphasis added), local governments must 
have sufficient legal autonomy to actually deliver the required public services. This is an 
aspect that pertains not so much to competition or political influence but rather to “self-
rule” (Elazar 1987; Hooghe et al. 2010). 
That distinction between fiscal and legal autonomy (or between policy- and polity-decen-
tralisation, see below) is often overlooked but has been made before. Watts, for example, 
distinguishes between the “the scope of jurisdiction exercised by each level of govern-
ment, and the degree of autonomy or freedom from control by other levels of government 
with which a particular government performs the tasks assigned to it” (2008: 65f.; original 
emphasis). To determine the latter, he assesses the “formal allocation by the constitution 
of legislative powers to each level of government” as well as “the extent to which each 
field of jurisdiction is exclusively assigned to one level of government, concurrent or 




shared” (Watts 2008: 66). Rodden equally cautions that “it is difficult to know what to 
make of expenditure decentralization data without additional data on the regulatory 
framework for subnational finance” (2004: 484), such as what type of taxes can be raised 
or how much local discretion there is in determining the tax base (cf. Ebel and Yilmaz 
2002: 4f.). Such rules are usually fixed in the constitution, although political practice 
and/or legal adjudication thereof might change over time (Gibson 2004: 2; Greve 2012: 
8). The testable assumption arising from this is that, given local autonomy, a central gov-
ernment can afford to do less since lower-level entities will both provide a safeguard for 
assuring a minimal service provision as well as act as the first entry points for citizen 
demands. We thus hypothesise that: 
H2a: The more constitutionally decentralised a Swiss canton, the lower its central ex-
penditure. 
A corollary from this is that, through increased proximity of decisionmakers to service 
beneficiaries, also the monitoring and sanctioning abilities of taxpayers are strengthened; 
thus, not only central but also local governments will spend less – and total government 
size decreases as in H1. However, as Rodden (2003a: 701) speculates, it might well be 
that vested interests operate even better at the local level and/or that citizens are more 
demanding precisely because of better oversight abilities (cf. Oates 1985). In both sce-
narios, polity-decentralisation would lead to more local spending. Hence: 
H2b: The more constitutionally decentralised a Swiss canton, the higher its local expendi-
ture. 
Third, there is the already mentioned political aspect of de- or rather noncentralisation. 
The argument here is that the existence of noncentral loci of decision-making provides 
for a check on policy change and, through that, functions to curb excessive expenditure 
(Brennan and Buchanan 1980: 26ff.; Obinger 1998: 46; Good et al. 2012: 455). As veto-
players (Tsebelis 2000), local governments may block attempts by the centre to encroach 
upon their policy areas by centralising functions otherwise provided by them and/or 
through the acquisition of new powers (Schmidt 1998: 223; Braun 2000b: 50f.; Vatter 
and Freitag 2002: 59f.; Freitag and Vatter 2008: 275). Schmidt (1996: 177) also provides 
evidence that “countermajoritarian constraints […] have stopped or reversed the trend 
towards big government” (cf. also Samuels and Mainwaring 2004: 86ff.). But this means 




that, to have an effect on policymaking, decentralisation must not only capture expendi-
ture and revenue discretion (the policy dimension) or constitutional autonomy (the polity 
dimension), but also actual local political influence at higher levels (Braun 2000b: 36) – 
that is, the ability to block or initiate policy change. 
Most often this aspect of territorial politics is captured by the notion of “shared rule”, 
which measures the extent and way in which regions codetermine national decision-mak-
ing (cf. Rodden 2006: 38; Hooghe et al. 2010). However, we prefer the term “political 
decentralisation” because it better conveys both the nature of central-local relations (po-
litical) and the direction of influence (bottom-up) (cf. Riker 1964: 10). Thus, subnational 
governments codetermine central decision-making using different channels – for exam-
ple, through representatives in central political organs, such as elected senators or the 
appointed delegates of minister-presidents (Rodden 2003b: 165). Alternatively, in the ab-
sence of upper chambers, noncentral entities might also resort to bargaining directly with 
the federal government (Bird and Tassonyi 2003: 94), act through political parties (Riker 
1964: 137ff.) or both (Samuels and Mainwaring 2004: 88ff.). The point here is that the 
more powerful these territorial veto-players, the more successfully they can object to en-
larging the scope of public activity. Hence, a third hypothesis reads as follows: 
H3a: The more politically decentralised a Swiss canton, the lower its total expenditure. 
However, it may also happen that lower-level entities use their influence to shift public 
costs upwards and/or force the centre to take on new responsibilities, thus increasing the 
size of the central government. Rodden (2006: 5, 41) argues along similar lines when 
emphasising central-local bargaining dynamics and possible solutions to vertical coordi-
nation problems. Thus, “local governments, working on behalf of resident taxpayers, may 
shift the production costs of local services onto nonresidents through federally funded 
transfers” (Inman 2003: 36) that increase central spending. This very much resembles the 
so-called “flypaper effect” (Rodden 2006: 78; Freitag and Vatter 2008: 276) but in an 
opposite direction – that is, bottom-up instead of top-down. Specific examples involve 
the Brazilian governors “forc[ing] the central government to assume their debts”, in the 
early 1990s (Samuels and Mainwaring 2004: 106), or the positive effect of legislative 
overrepresentation on a state’s share in federal funds in Argentina and Mexico (Diaz-
Cayeros 2004: 315; Gibson et al. 2004: 181). 




In other words, giving noncentral politicians a direct say over central policymaking will 
enable them to have the most expensive policies centralised or, in more technical terms, 
to “externaliz[e] the costs to others, turning public revenue into a “common pool” that is 
overfished by provincial governments” (Rodden 2006: 6; cf. Freitag and Vatter 2008). 
Hence, our final hypothesis on the effect of decentralisation reads as follows: 
H3b: The more politically decentralised a Swiss canton, the higher its central expenditure. 
Details on how these three different dimensions of decentralisation are measured are pro-
vided in the Operationalisation section, below, and in the Appendix. Table 1 summarises 
our hypotheses. Note that, in principle, interactions between the three dimensions are very 
well imaginable too. For example, local governments might need to possess a minimum 
degree of constitutional self-rule for shared rule to be operating efficiently. However, the 
point of our three-dimensional measurement strategy is precisely to disentangle the mere 
availability of resources from the power to decide on their use (self-rule dimension: policy 
and polity) as well as from political influence at the centre (shared rule dimension: poli-
tics). But the point about possible interaction effects will be taken up in the concluding 
section. We next turn to rivalling explanations. 
Table 1: Expected impact of decentralisation on spending 
Decentralisation 
Government size 
Cantonal spending Local spending Total spending 
Policy (–) (+) – [H1] 
Polity – [H2a] + [H2b] ? 
Politics + [H3b] ? – [H3a] 
Notes: “+” = positive, “–“ = negative influence expected; secondary hypotheses in brackets; “?” = no rela-
tionship specified ex ante. 
4.2.2 Rivalling explanations 
There are several rivalling explanations that could explain government size better than 
decentralisation. The first is direct democracy: as an opportunity structure with relatively 
low entry costs, it offers a veto instrument of a particular kind – namely, one for societal 
groups sufficiently well organised to collect the required number of signatures to initiate 




or block policy change (Wagschal and Obinger 2000: 469; see also Wagschal 1997: 226). 
But as with political decentralisation above, opening up the space of political decisions 
to the nonelite (i.e. not necessarily elected politicians) and the nonpolitical (moral, eco-
nomic, etc.) elite could lead in both directions – that is less or more public intervention 
than would otherwise be the case (Freitag et al. 2003: 355; Linder 2012: 287). It all de-
pends on the purpose and strength of these organised interests (cf. Funk and Gathmann 
2011: 1258). However, because from the point of view of the people’s final decisions no 
strategic points are to be scored in direct-democratic votes, their vote will tend to be 
longer term than that of politicians who want to be reelected in a few years (cf. Eichen-
berger 1999). Moreover, direct democracy regularly practised makes for better informed 
citizens, raising the bar beyond which a majority of them are convinced that policy inno-
vation is needed (Eichenberger 1999: 268; Feld and Kirchgässner 2000; Kirchgässner 
2000). Finally, knowing the threat of a direct-democratic veto to exist, governments will 
become more cautious as regards the extent of change proposed, all the more so as the 
default option, the status quo, is always better known and thus inherently favoured by a 
generally risk-averse demos (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Funk and Gathmann 
2013). 
Another institutional variable is hard budget constraints. These refer to collectively bind-
ing rules on the extent of public expenditure growth and the associated risks of a bailout 
(Rodden et al. 2003: 4) and are thus institutions par excellence (Schmidt 1993: 379). Such 
constraints tie further spending to a corresponding surplus in generated revenue, a favour-
able debt-per-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio (e.g. Maastricht’s Growth and Stability 
Pact), and/or satisfactory economic performance in general. Switzerland and most of its 
cantons have chosen yet another way to ensure balanced budgets, using an instrument 
called “debt break” (Schuldenbremse), whereby the government is authorised to run def-
icits during recessions and to run surpluses during booms. Over the whole business cycle, 
however, it has to ensure that the budget is balanced. Thus, starting with a given level of 
debt, the debt should not have increased after the completion of a full cycle (Müller 2004: 
2). 
The debt break, in other words, represents a specific kind of self-imposed budget con-
straint (cf. Rodden et al. 2003: 23). The idea to apply this rule to Swiss policymaking 
dates back to 1919, when Canton St. Gall first introduced it into its legislation (Stalder 




and Röhrs 2005: 12; Kirchgässner 2010: 8). Over the 1990s and 2000s, several other 
cantons followed suit (BAK Basel 2012), but variations on the theme exist in terms of 
both the constraints imposed and the sanctions to be applied in case of rule violation 
(Stalder and Röhrs 2005: 3; BAK Basel 2012: 20ff.). Building on a substantive body of 
prior evidence relating debt breaks to lower budget deficits (Feld and Kirchgässner 2000, 
2008; Schaltegger 2002; Krogstrup and Wälti 2008; Chatagny 2013; Lüchinger and 
Schaltegger 2013; Yerly 2013; see also Burret and Feld 2014 for an overview), we would 
expect that stricter debt break rules lead to lower cantonal expenditures. 
Finally, we include the share of voters for cantonal government parties into our empirical 
analysis to account for collusion. According to Lijphart (2012), consensual decision-mak-
ing procedures encourage the magnitude of state intervention as minority interests have 
to be considered (Vatter and Freitag 2002: 58; Baskaran 2013). The more inclusive a 
policy-making process, the more distributive policies are pursued for which the cost bear-
ers are less obvious (Braun 2000a: 13; Schniewind et al. 2009). Thus, increased govern-
ment spending might simply be a reflection of a broad governing coalition. 
4.3 Research design 
The research design chosen for this study is a subnational comparison of Switzerland’s 
26 regional entities, the cantons, and the relations between cantonal (central) and munic-
ipal (local) governments. This kind of analysis, advised amongst others by Lijphart (1971: 
689ff.), King et al. (1994: 219) and Snyder (2001), assumes cantonal-local relations to be 
functionally equivalent to central-local relations. This has the advantage of strengthening 
some of the assumptions that have to be made (such as full information and resident mo-
bility; see above) and holding other variables (such as the overall constitutional frame-
work, defence spending or democratic stability) constant. Although the usefulness of this 
approach for fiscal matters has been proven by, amongst others, Wallis and Oates (1988), 
Schaltegger and Feld (2003) and Freitag and Vatter (2008), we discuss limitations to our 
research design in the concluding section. We next explain the operationalisation of our 
variables and then present our method. 
4.3.1 Operationalisation 
Our dependent variable is cantonal, local and total (cantonal + local) public expenditures, 
measured on a per capita basis to facilitate comparability. However, per capita spending 




has increased in all the 26 cantons between 1990 and 2009; thus, instead of estimating 
absolute levels of annual per capita spending for each canton we subtract the mean of all 
cantons’ per capita spending for each year. In other words, we estimate the deviation from 
the mean cantonal per capita public spending to control for time-dependent error terms 
(cf. Stadelmann-Steffen and Bühlmann 2008: 36f.).35 
Turning to our key independent variables, policy-decentralisation is measured using fis-
cal, personnel and administrative decentralisation within every Swiss canton, understood 
in turn as the extent to which local governments raise and administer public money (cf. 
Fiechter 2010; Rühli 2012). However, full centralisation in one area (e.g. tax-raising ca-
pacity) can easily be offset by decentralisation in another (e.g. personnel), which is to say 
that simply averaging their values would not render an accurate picture. In Goertz’s 
(2006: 115) terms, therefore, all three components are necessary, and together they are 
jointly sufficient conditions for a canton to be decentralised in its policy dimension. We 
therefore multiply general revenue decentralisation with administrative (the share of local 
from total public expenditures for administration only) and personnel decentralisation 
(the share of local staff and local staff salaries from their respective total numbers; cf. 
Treisman 2002: 13; Chhibber and Kollman 2004: 234).36  
Polity-decentralisation is defined by the extent of freedom guaranteed by cantonal con-
stitutions (Giacometti 1941) and expert perceptions of the actual realisation thereof (Lad-
ner et al. 2013). This takes into account possible discrepancies between “rules-in-form” 
and “rules-in-use” (Rothstein 1996; cf. Rodden 2004: 492). In practice, we average the 
standardised values of the Giacometti index (cantonal constitutions are either centralised, 
decentralised or balanced; Giacometti 1941) and the results of the local government sec-
retary surveys [Gemeindeschreiberbefragung (GSB)] of 1994, 2005 and 2009 (cf. Ladner 
et al. 2013).37 Averaging is possible because the two subdimensions are “substitutable” 
(Goertz 2006: 108). 
                                                 
35 We also specified multilevel models with year-fixed effects that do not demean the dependent variable 
in this way, which did not substantially alter our results (see also footnote 41). 
36 Data are from BADAC (2012). Cronbach’s α for fiscal, personnel and administrative decentralisation is 
0.813; if run with the four indicators individually, it is 0.880 (both times n = 26). We omit expenditure 
decentralisation to avoid endogeneity problems with our dependent variable, but our results do not change 
if this indicator is included. 
37 In these surveys, the secretaries of local governments, considered experts on everything local, were asked 
to rate the extent of local autonomy from 1 (no autonomy) to 10 (very high autonomy). n (GSB1994) = 




Finally, politics-decentralisation captures the degree to which political decision-making 
is decentralised (i.e. local) rather than centralised (i.e. cantonal). There are seven indica-
tors that are assessed here (cf. Mueller 2011, 2014, 2015): 
1. Cantonal political party organisation measures the local influence over candidate 
selection for cantonal parliamentary elections, from purely local discretion to can-
tonal delegate assemblies without any attachment to local politics. 
2. Regionalism assesses the degree to which regional assemblies and/or prefects ex-
ist in a canton – that is, whether there are additional noncentral loci situated be-
tween cantonal and local governments.38  
3. Territorial quotas take into account the fact that electoral competition for the can-
tonal executive and/or the legislative branch might be restricted using fixed quo-
tas, such as those for the Bernese Jura region (guaranteed one out of five govern-
ment seats). 
4. Electoral system organisation measures the territorial congruence between local 
governments and the electoral districts used for cantonal parliamentary elections. 
5. The direct representation of mayors in cantonal parliaments is assessed using the 
self-declarations of Members of Cantonal Parliaments. 
6. The organisational strength of local government organisations captures the ex-
istence, cohesiveness and public presence of Local Government Associations 
(LGAs). 
7. Finally, the existence of direct-democratic instruments for local governments 
measures the extent to which local governments qua municipalities can veto a 
cantonal bill and/or initiate cantonal constitutional change. 
All these indicators have in common the fact that they – at least potentially – bring local 
interests to bear on central decision-making (cf. Tarrow 1977; Page 1991; Rodden 2004; 
Stepan 2004). To arrive at a single measure of politics-decentralisation, we rely on the 
results of a factor analysis of these seven indicators that searches for a single factor only 
(see Table A 7, in the Appendix). A reliability test of policy-, polity- and politics-decen-
tralisation thus constructed reveals a sufficiently large commonality; therefore, to arrive 
at a single measure of overall decentralisation, we have calculated their arithmetic 
                                                 
1,549; n (GSB2005) = 2,003; n (GSB2009) = 1,317 (cf. also Appendix). Cronbach’s α for the four measures, 
“Giacometti Index”, “GSB1994”, “GSB2005” and “GSB2009”, is a high 0.885 (n = 26). 
38 Although it may seem counterintuitive at first sight to code the presence of prefects as an instance of 
decentralisation, in the Swiss context this makes sense as in many cantons prefects are elected locally, in 
their districts, and thus also function as bottom-up channels for influence. 




mean.39 The conceptual structure of decentralisation so defined is visualised in Figure 13, 
while summary statistics and an empirical distribution of the mean values across the 
whole period are presented in the Appendix. 
Figure 13: Conceptual structure of cantonal decentralisation 
 
To measure direct democracy, we use Stutzer’s (1999) index as updated by Schaub and 
Dlabac (2012). It is composed of the mean values of four dimensions, each coded from 1 
meaning few direct-democratic rights to 6 equalling extended direct-democratic rights. 
For debt breaks, we rely on Feld and Kirchgässner’s (2008) ordinal variable on the strict-
ness of cantonal debt breaks (0 equals no debt break, 3 indicates the strictest debt break). 
The strictest debt breaks tie expenditure directly to budget planning, foresee no excep-
tions, and provide for sanctions in case of nonobedience. For each of these elements miss-
ing, strictness is downgraded to 2 or 1, while 0 signifies the absence of a debt break alto-
gether. For the years from 1990 to 2005, we use the coding by Lüchinger and Schaltegger 
(2013: 789f., 804) and Stalder and Röhrs (2005: 28ff.), for 2006–2007 that by Chatagny 
                                                 
39 Cronbach’s α = 0.682 (three items); see also Table A 8. Alternatively, we have run a factor analysis, 
where it was specified that only one component should be extracted, but the results of all subsequent anal-
yses do not change if these factor scores are used in place of the much more intuitive and transparent ag-
gregate. 
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(2013: 34), and for 2008–2009 we have calculated the corresponding cantonal values our-
selves based on information from the Année Politique Suisse (2009). The resulting meas-
ure does not significantly correlate with any other indicator in our dataset. Finally, as an 
indicator of the size of the governing coalition we use the summed share of voters for 
parties in a cantonal government (cf. Vatter and Freitag 2002: 63; data source for our 
purposes: Federal Statistical Office 2015). 
As further control variables we shall use various socio-demographic, economic, cultural 
and structural indicators. To capture modernisation and market failure (Wagner 1958 
[1883]; Verner 1979), we assess urbanisation and unemployment (cf. Schmidt 2000: 23; 
Schaltegger 2001: 4; Kellermann 2007: 48). To measure those aspects of political culture 
potentially related to more demand for state intervention (Davis and Robinson 1999; 
Schmidt 2000: 30; Loughlin 2001), we assess the share of Catholics and German-speakers 
(Kriesi et al. 1996; Stadler 1996; von der Weid et al. 2002: 63ff.; Zürcher 2006; Linder 
et al. 2008). To assess party competition and power resources (Schmidt 1996, 2000: 
25ff.), we measure the strength of left-wing parties and trade unions (cf. Hibbs 1977; 
Schmidt 1996; Wagschal 2005: 38), because to (re)distribute across social strata is polit-
ically desirable for them and their electorate or members. To assess mobility and demo-
graphic structure, we measure the share of residents older than 65 years, the share of 
pupils in secondary education, the share of social benefit recipients and real median in-
come (cf. Funk and Gathmann 2011: 1260). Finally, to control for the impact of changing 
macroeconomic conditions (Schmidt 1996: 167), we measure the performance of a canton 
using total federal corporate tax yield per canton, divided by that canton’s population, for 
each year of our analysis.40 
For unemployment and urbanisation, the share of Catholics and French-speakers, the 
strength of left-wing parties in cantonal parliaments (rather than in cantonal governments, 
as it is the overall strength of parties and not so much the number of government seats 
that the theory highlights), socio-demographics and federal tax yield, we rely on data from 
                                                 
40 Unfortunately, cantonal GDP data are only available from 2008 onwards, and, for reasons of tax auton-
omy, cantonal income tax yield is not directly comparable, especially not if we want to capture economic 
conditions. Hence, in relying on federal tax yield, we assess the economic potential of a canton, thus loosely 
applying the official method used for fiscal equalisation across Switzerland since 2008. Data are available 
for legal entities and natural persons separately. However, for natural persons some data are missing for 
some cantons in some years. This is why we rely on the data for legal entities. However, our results do not 
change if we use the tax yield from natural persons instead. 




the Federal Statistical Office (2015). To measure the strength of trade unions, we rely 
once more on data by Schaub and Dlabac (2012) (cf. Vatter and Freitag 2002: 63), 
whereas income data are gathered from federal income tax statistics (Schaltegger and 
Gorgas 2011). Further details on each variable, its measurement, sources and summary 
statistics are listed in the Appendix. 
4.3.2 Method 
To test which of the aforementioned explanations and specifications best match the em-
pirical reality of the Swiss cantons as 26 unit-independent cases, we estimate time-series 
cross-sectional (TSCS) models as our units are canton-years. We have checked that our 
time series is stationary using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test. Models are 
estimated using the R package “panelAR”. The package estimates linear models on panel 
data structures in the presence of AR(1)-type autocorrelation that are addressed via a two-
step Prais-Winsten feasible generalised least squares procedure, allowing for common 
correlation coefficients across all panels (Kashin 2014), and panel-corrected standard er-
rors (PCSEs) that are robust to both heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
across panels. Such PCSEs allow for more valid significance estimations. Note that this 
method of estimating is rather conservative; hence, if significant correlations are ob-
tained, these can be accepted with even more confidence than if another method had been 
chosen.41 
4.4 Findings 
Table 2 displays the results of our nine TSCS models. For each dependent variable, we 
first include overall decentralisation and all controls (model 1), then the three dimensions 
of decentralisation and all controls (model 2), and finally, in model 3, the three dimen-
sions of decentralisation plus all control variables with a generalised variance-inflation 
factor (GVIF) below 5 in any of the first two models.42 The different number of cases 
                                                 
41 Alternatively, we have calculated nonnested multilevel models (cf. Gelman and Hill 2007: 244) and 
multilevel analyses with year-fixed effects. All of those broadly confirm our findings (detailed results avail-
able on request). 
42 The variance-inflation factor, or GVIF in the presence of variables with more than 1 degree of freedom 
(the debt break, in our case), measures the extent to which the impact of one variable (more particularly, 
the variance of its coefficient) is inflated because of multicollinearity. 




(487 instead of 520) is due to missing values for some variables (cf. Appendix). Addi-
tionally, to avoid “collider bias”, that is collinearity between the independent variables – 
which is expected, as each forms one dimension of the same overarching concept – Table 
A 11 provides for a step-by-step inclusion.43 
We can see that overall decentralisation (the mean of the standardised values of polity-, 
policy- and politics-decentralisation) has an effect on all three types of spending. What is 
more, this effect is strongly significant: the more a cantonal political system is decentral-
ised overall, the lower its total and central per capita expenditure, controlling for several 
other institutional, socio-economic, cultural and political variables. The effect of overall 
decentralisation on local expenditure, on the other hand, is significantly positive (see also 
Table A 11). However, as we turn to decentralisation’s three dimensions, the picture be-
comes more varied. 
For policy-decentralisation, a concept that most closely resembles the standard way de-
centralisation is measured to test the “Leviathan hypothesis”, the hypothesised negative 
effect on both total (model T3) and central (model C3) expenditures can indeed be shown 
to exist. In other words, as the revenue and administrative capacity of local governments 
increases, central government spending decreases to such an extent that this also leads to 
an overall decrease in spending. This finding withstands the inclusion of various controls 
and is robust to both outlier analyses (not shown) and a step-by-step inclusion to account 
for collinearity between the independent variables (Table A 11). As expected, policy-
decentralisation also has a positive effect on local spending (model L3). 
That pattern is almost the same for polity-decentralisation, which measures the degree of 
constitutional and perceived local autonomy. Such a type of decentralisation equally de-
creases central and total spending, but does not seem to affect local spending: the corre-
lation coefficient in model L3 is negative, yet fails to reach statistical significance (see 
also Table A 11). In other words, a locally perceived and constitutionally codified ability 
to deviate from cantonal standards has the expected (H2a) negative effect on central 
spending – local freedom in this sense breeds both central and overall efficiency. 
 
                                                 
43 We thank the anonymous reviewer of the Journal of Public Policy for this advice. 
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Table 2: Results of TSCS models 
  DV1: Cantonal spending, 1990–2009 DV2: Local spending, 1990–2009 DV2: Total spending, 1990–2009 
 Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model L1 Model L2 Model L3 Model T1 Model T2 Model T3 
Intercept 
-2634.95 -853.66 -2490.95 2651.70*** 1604.52** 386.95 -616.82 1005.48 -2132.76 
(-2734.4) (-2112.14) (-1726.89) (-715.65) (-653.74) (-583.22 -2699.49 (-2287.13) (-1971.1) 
Decentralisation 
-2283.73*** 
    
950.61*** 
    
-1347.56*** 
    
(-316.43) (-144.13) (-323.34) 






(-181.35) (-170.83) (-73.47) (-67.43) (-163.16) (-157.55) 






(-287.45) (-238.75) (-84.23) (-72.93) (-296.07) (-225.77) 
Politics-dimen-















(-231.13) (-197.84) (-117.81) (-116.77) (-232.97) (-256.06) 
Weak debt breakt-
1  
136.91 193.32 175.97 205.02* 290.23** 341.91*** 338.48 413.96 541.25** 
(-185.41) (-209.06) (-200.97) (-118.43) (-122.17) (-127.3) (-240.37) (-262.63) (-274.74) 
Moderate debt 
breakt-1 
-210.98 -153.04 -128.85 -39.84 -105.5 -188.05** -341.81 -247.32 -379.12* 
(-235.29) (-193.27) (-189.21) (-99.97) (-87.97) (-83.14) (-226.59) (-203.32) (-199.97) 
Strong debt 
breakt-1 
-68.71 -798.49** -677.75** -569.43*** -454.98*** -265.83* -664.11* -1174.17*** -1019.00*** 
(-258.19) (-352.91) (-319.56) (-176.04) (-147.01) (-140.65) (-344.45) (-371.8) (-317.31) 
Government coa-
lition 
-0.02 -4.34 -4.04 5.64** 7.69*** 7.32*** 5.18 2.99 3.06 
(-5.19) (-5.78) (-5.49) (-2.59) (-2.64) (-2.65) (-5.56) (-5.85) (-5.79) 
Urbanisation 
59.26*** 72.69*** 79.1*** -2.66 -7.38***   56.57*** 66.92*** 71.40*** 
(-20.88) (-15.23) (-14.94) (-3.48) (-2.86)  (-19.98) (-16.34) (-14.27) 
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Table 2: Results of TSCS models (continued) 
Unemployment 32.66* 37.87** 34.81** 0.58 -1.96 1.61 33.07* 36.47** 37.32** (-18.06) (-15.86) (-15.37) (-6.76) (-6.42) (-6.87) (-17.41) (-16.51) (-16.57) 
Catholic canton 
(dummy) 
508.13 63.75   -588.48*** -335.66*** -110.58 -61.7 -285.71 -385.46* (-442.96) (-295.9) (-150.91) (-123.15) (-109.08) (-429.32) (-325.36) (-206.81) 
German-speaking 
(dummy) 
1829.28*** 1507.79***   -552.08** -202.18   1087.06 1289.83*   (-691) (-559.52) (-273.35) (-253.91) (-666.78) (-665.01) 
Left-wing parties -3.08 -9.76   4.19 5.85 2.66 -0.43 -3.04   (-17.38) (-17.58) (-5.38) (-5.07) (-5.21) (-17.62) (-17.57) 
Trade unions 35.58* 27.22 11.69 0.96 4.35 7.37 33.94 30.84 19.1 (-20.82) (-18.41) (-18.04) (-8.62) (-7.16) (-7.15) (-21.73) (-20.16) (-18.48) 
Age 186.42** 70.28 89.72 -70.57** -29.31 -51.86** 127.15 45.91 31.28 (-80.92) (-58.41) (-60.38) (-27.83) (-21.59) (-24.5) (-86.55) (-72.75) (-74.86) 
Education -1003.8*** -444.57* -283.15 172.94* 38.31 -74.28 -793.08** -479.45* -232.78 (-277.65) (-258.72) (-251.46) (-100.67) (-84.03) (-75.67) (-280.96) (-267.21) (-253.31) 
Social benefits 212.86 169.23   -150.84* -112.89*   84.68 43.79   (-177.1) (-143.9) (-79.05) (-67.18) (-163.62) (-140.22) 
Median income -37.96* -4.06 -0.3 12.85 8.28 -0.23 -23.08 -0.45 2.99 (-19.83) (-20.73) (-18.91) (-8.76) (-7.91) (-7.91) (-21.44) (-22.35) (-20.76) 
Federal Tax Yield 0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0 0.01 0.01 0.13* 0.12* 0.14* (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.06) (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.07) 
R2 0.27 0.46 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.33 0.21 0.31 0.32 
Rho (0.91 (0.84 (0.86 (0.88 (0.82) (0.85) 0.9 0.86 0.84 
No. of observations 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 








The most interesting to highlight, however, are the results for politics-decentralisation – 
that is, the extent to which political processes and actors are organised locally rather than 
centrally. Here, the effect is positive and significant for cantonal spending. What is more, 
the effect of politics-decentralisation on local spending is negative – hence, we are quite 
possibly witnessing a deliberate shift of the most costly policies (health, welfare, educa-
tion) from the local to the cantonal level.44 A look at Table A 11 confirms that in seven 
out of eight cases, politics-decentralisation has a positive effect on cantonal and a negative 
effect on local spending (but a significant effect on total spending only in one out of four 
cases, when included with polity-decentralisation). 
What this means is that where mayors are directly represented in cantonal parliaments, 
where parties select their candidates for cantonal parliamentary elections at the very local 
level (in matching the constituencies), and where local governments qua local govern-
ments can make use of direct-democratic instruments to veto cantonal decisions, there the 
cantonal level can be brought to spend more rather than less. The interpretation of this 
finding would argue that this is so because local political actors are strategically interested 
in shifting costs “upwards”, to the cantonal level, so that their own polities appear to be 
in better fiscal shape than if they had to spend the money from their own budgets – and 
raise their own, local taxes correspondingly (Horber-Papazian and Soguel 1996). The re-
sult is a sort of state capture from below. 
In assessing the relative impact of each of the three dimensions, we can see from Table 3 
that in each column overall decentralisation has the biggest effect, that policy-decentral-
isation clearly tops the other two as regards central and local spending, and that politics-
decentralisation is almost as important as policy-decentralisation with regard to cantonal 
spending – but in the opposite direction, that is leading to more rather than less spending. 
Of the remaining significant effects, the strongest impact is that by polity-decentralisation 
on total spending and by politics-decentralisation on local spending, both in a negative 
direction. 
  
                                                 
44 This central finding is robust to the use of other models (see footnote 41) and to using absolute rather 
than mean-corrected values of spending (see footnote 35). 




Table 3: Relative impact of decentralisation on spending 
Decentralisation 
Government size 
Cantonal spending Local spending Total spending 
Overall decentralisation -0.515*** 0.582*** -0.347*** 
Policy -0.428*** 0.531*** -0.290*** 
Polity -0.169** -0.030 -0.197*** 
Politics 0.167*** -0.172*** 0.092 
Notes: Entries are the standardized Beta-coefficients from models 1 (for overall decentralisation) and 3 (for 
its three dimensions) of Table 2. *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
Turning to our control variables, the debt break has a strong curbing effect on all three 
types of spending, which is in line with previous findings (e.g. Vatter and Freitag 2007: 
365). Unemployment, urbanisation and federal corporate tax yield (our measure of eco-
nomic performance) all have positive and significant effects on both central and total 
spending.45  
Whether a canton has a catholic majority also matters for total spending, seemingly dis-
confirming Catholic-inspired statism (cf. Davis and Robinson 1999). Local spending, in 
turn, seems to be positively driven by consensual politics (Vatter 2014) and negatively 
by the age structure. Finally, all three types of spending are also driven by language, 
which, however, had to be excluded from model 3 because of collinearity problems. Only 
inconsistent effects can be discerned as regards education, left-wing parties and the 
strength of trade unions. 
4.5 Discussion and conclusion 
What explains why some governments spend more than others? This study has centred 
on decentralisation as a key institutional variable to understand why this is the case. Over-
all, we have been able to confirm the “Leviathan hypothesis” with new, original data at 
                                                 
45 In a broader sense, our empirical results thus seem to be in line with Wasserfallen’s (2014) findings that 
Swiss cantons compete more strongly with their competitors the closer a canton is located to an urban 
region with a comprehensive set of public goods on offer. 




the Swiss subnational level: where there is overall decentralisation, there is less govern-
ment, and this despite controlling for a number of other institutionalist as well as socio-
economic, cultural and partisan factors. The commonly hypothesised effects of unem-
ployment, urbanisation, income, demographics, political culture and direct democracy 
have also more or less been found in our data on 20 years of cantonal, local and total 
public expenditure. 
However, that overall picture becomes more complex – and interesting – once we look at 
different types of decentralisation. The availability and careful combination of fine-
grained fiscal, administrative, constitutional, electoral, direct-democratic, parliamentary, 
party-politics and survey data has enabled us to conceptualise and measure three different 
types of decentralisation. For each dimension, we hypothesised and found different ef-
fects: policy-decentralisation, that is the extent to which revenues and administrative staff 
are local rather than central, has the clearest negative effect on central and total public 
spending while boosting local spending. Polity-decentralisation, which pertains to consti-
tutional freedom and local perceptions thereof, also reduces the size of the central and 
total state sector. However, for politics-decentralisation, which captures the strength of 
local political influence at the central level, we have shown a positive relation to exist 
with central expenditures and a negative effect on local spending. 
The significance of these findings beyond the Swiss case is that decentralisation does not 
equal decentralisation. If the availability of tax-raising and administrative power is re-
ferred to (policy-decentralisation), a straightforward competition logic was shown to hap-
pen. The ensuing “race to the bottom” means that public services are provided at a level 
deemed optimal by both decisionmakers and consumers alike, as ideally these two over-
lap. If local autonomy refers to constitutionally guaranteed self-rule (polity-decentralisa-
tion), then that link is less straightforward, especially as regards local spending – a pos-
sible reason being that the same degree of local autonomy can be used for different pur-
poses depending on dynamics taking place within the local entities. Finally, if by decen-
tralisation we mean political aspects such as the extent to which political actors (parties, 
mayors) and processes (elections, direct democracy) function locally rather than centrally, 
more power at the lower level can mean more burdens placed on the higher level. In fact, 
the lower institutional echelons may try to delegate the provision of expensive and/or new 




public services to higher levels whilst maintaining all of their decisional capacities 
(Horber-Papazian and Soguel 1996). 
This last phenomenon is what we refer to as state capture from below. Its reasoning draws 
partly on Greve’s (2012) notion of “cartel federalism” and the observation that, were the 
component States to draw up the federal constitution and not individual citizens, they 
would try “not to discipline Leviathan but to empower government” (Greve’s 2012: 178). 
As “revenue maximizers” (Greve’s 2012: 189), subnational governments are interested 
in federal transfers as much as in broadening their own sources of income. Consistent 
with this is the observation that the Swiss Association of Cities has repeatedly called for 
a revision to the federal equalisation scheme introduced in 2008 to channel more funds to 
the urban regions as opposed to the countryside.46 What is more, to better lobby for their 
financial interests at both cantonal and national levels, cities even created a special Con-
ference of Urban Finance Ministers in August 2014.47 But local governments also func-
tion as a break to further expenditures, as when 19 municipalities in Canton Grisons chal-
lenged a reform of the intra-cantonal equalisation scheme that, as it eventually passed, 
increased central spending – as well as their own contributions.48 
For further research into both territorial politics and public finance, this signifies, first, 
that a more nuanced understanding (and measurement) of decentralisation is worth pur-
suing, as not all types of decentralisation lead to the same outcome. Overcoming the di-
vide between federalism and decentralisation studies is also necessary if all three dimen-
sions of collective decision-making – policy, polity and politics – are to be included: there 
is nothing, neither at the conceptual nor at the theoretical level, that would justify treating 
local-cantonal relations as prima facie different from regional-national or local-national 
relations. Nevertheless, although it is quite plausible to think that well-organised local or 
regional actors are able to block policy changes that burden them with excessive costs but 
are quite happy to support policies paid for by the central state alone, this finding would 
                                                 
46 Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 19 August 2010, p. 11, and of 25 January 2011, p. 11, as well as, most 
recently, the press release of the Association of Swiss Cities of 27 June 2014, http://staedteverb-
and.ch/cmsfiles/140627_mm_nfa-vn.pdf (accessed 12 May 2015). 
47 Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 23 August 2014, p. 12, and Art. 2(1) of the Conference’s bylaws, 
http://ksfd.ch/cmsfiles/statuten_ksfd_def.pdf (accessed 12 May 2015). 
48 Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 23 September 2014, p. 13, and of 29 September 2014, p. 9. A similar use of 
direct-democratic means by local governments can be observed in Zurich (2010 and 2015) and Solothurn 
(2004 and 2014), for example (cf. also Mueller 2014). 




of course have to be verified using more qualitative data, such as structured-focussed 
comparisons or process tracing, and in other contexts.  
A second point of reflection concerns possible interaction effects, which we have alluded 
to above. In fact, exercising influence at the central level may require a certain minimum 
degree of self-rule for actors to be taken seriously. In the same vein, local discretion over 
the level of public service delivery remains symbolic if most of the revenue stems from 
earmarked transfers. These mutual conditioning effects are somehow controlled for by 
our subnational research design: all Swiss municipalities can levy at least some taxes 
autonomously; all have some basic legal protection (Art. 50.1 of the Federal Constitu-
tion); and almost everywhere we find local party sections, mayors in cantonal parliaments 
and LGAs. Nevertheless, future studies ought to theorise and test possible interaction ef-
fects more explicitly. 
Hence, although Switzerland may be unique in the scope of autonomy accorded to both 
cantonal and local polities and its extremely noncentralised politics, this study has prof-
ited from this fact by comparing the 26 cantons as unit-independent political systems. 
And despite these limitations, the above cited evidence on Latin America, Canada, the 
US and Germany is broadly consistent with our conclusions that fiscal decentralisation 
hampers general government growth while political decentralisation favours increased 
central spending. We would expect these conclusions to apply to other federal political 
systems, too. There are, on the one hand, many regions within federal systems that simi-
larly accord their local governments autonomy and influence over public policy. The Ger-
man Länder, for example, are equally likely to fall prey to capture from below, as are the 
Swiss cantons. On the other hand, the mentioned “overfishing of the pool” (Rodden 2006: 
6) might also travel to the national and even European level, as when the Canadian prov-
inces bargain with Ottawa (Simeon 1972) or when regions open embassies in Brussels 
(Callanan and Tatham 2014) to influence “Who Gets What from Whom” (Schneider 
2006). It is, however, unlikely that local governments or even regions without any con-
stitutionally protected autonomy and/or a minimum level of fiscal autonomy are able to 
systematically exercise meaningful influence at higher levels. 
A further avenue for future research might also be to distinguish between the effects for 
spatial, nonspatial, identity and welfare policies (Braun 2000b; Wälti and Bullinger 
2000), rather than overall spending. Here, one could assume the absence of territorial 




effects for nonspatial polices, unless coupled with the defence of territorially concentrated 
minorities, and take into account the ideological orientation and socio-economic attrib-
utes of lower-level entities themselves. Also, the effects of politics-decentralisation 
should be strongest for distributive policies from which all lower entities eventually 
profit. Here again, a distinction of types of decentralisation might prove useful, for, once 
given (symbolic?) institutional autonomy, some lower-level entities might be quite happy 
to renounce fiscal capacity, whereas others might be more pressed for being able to raise 
money at the expense of constitutional guarantees, and a third group (e.g. cities) might be 
most inclined towards shifting costs upwards, regardless of both the politics of symbols 
and own-source income. To conclude, the wider implication of our study is that the bal-
ance between self-rule and shared rule has implications also for the size of the overall 
political system. Decentralisation, like many social science concepts, contains multiple 
dimensions. What our study has found is that political influence and local autonomy (both 
legal and fiscal) may have contradictory effects, with the former boosting but the latter 
reducing government spending. 
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The question of whether and how federalism influences a country’s welfare state has been 
a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly 
how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article 
examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of fed-
eral structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the ef-
fects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the syn-
thetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, 
the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolida-
tion of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of 
increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided 
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According to Paul Pierson (1996a: 472), “federalism matters tremendously for the devel-
opment of social policy”. Although extensive research has been done based on this as-
sumption, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal struc-
tures impact the welfare state (Castles 1999; Castles and Uhr 2007; Hayek 1976; Hicks 
and Swank 1992; Hicks and Misra 1993; Huber et al. 1993: 720ff.; Obinger et al. 2005; 
Mainwaring and Samuels 1999; Rodden and Eskeland 2003: 458ff.; Wilensky 1975). 
This lack of agreement is most clearly true regarding the “new politics” of the “silver 
age” in welfare state policy (Pierson 1996b), which has been characterised by welfare 
state restructuring and retrenchment rather than by further development. 
We argue that the main reason for these ambiguities is twofold. First, the relationship 
between federal structures and welfare states is theoretically complex, multiple (Obinger 
et al. 2005: 40) and possibly highly contextually dependent. In other words, we should 
carefully consider the various dimensions and constellations of federal structures with 
respect to the formulation of our theoretical expectations. Second, and related to the first 
point, in comparative empirical studies it is typically very challenging to capture the ac-
tual causal effect of federalism. Since federal structures are highly stable over time, it is 
difficult to grasp the effects of federalism even when using a comparative perspective that 
includes changes over time. Researchers investigating the effects of federalism largely 
have been restricted to purely cross-sectional or pooled time-series cross-sectional ap-
proaches, which suffer from well-known shortcomings regarding causal inference (Cas-
tles 1999; Cameron 1978; Hicks and Misra 1993; Hicks and Swank 1992; Huber et al. 
1993).  
This is the starting point of the present study, which adds to this controversy using an 
innovative methodological approach: the synthetic control method (SCM) (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al. 2010, 2015). This research design uses the strengths of 
a case study approach – namely that one particular case is studied in detail in its specific 
context, which enables us to be very specific about federal structures, their constellation 
and potential effects. At the same time, SCM allows us to go beyond a particular case by 
creating an artificial “twin case” (i.e., a counterfactual) and thus to make inferences re-
garding the effects of federalism on welfare spending. 
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This novel method is applied to one of the rare cases in which a substantial change in the 
federal structure within one country actually can be observed. More precisely, we analyse 
the effect of the Belgian federalisation of 1993, during which the country moved from a 
former unitary state to a federal state, and thereby largely increased subnational spending 
competences (Deschouwer 2012: 60ff.). In the Belgian institutional order, the year 1993 
constitutes a major break that offers ideal opportunities for investigating the causal effect 
of this reform on welfare state development. In the logic of a natural experiment (Dupuy 
and Van Ingelgom 2014: 198), the introduction of a federal state structure is considered 
to be an institutional treatment that can be expected to causally influence welfare state 
development. Hence, and more precisely, the present study asks whether the Belgian in-
stitutional reform of 1993, which imposed a federal state structure, has influenced the 
subsequent welfare state spending of the country. 
It must of course be mentioned that the 1993 reform did not come out of the blue, but 
rather was the result of earlier political developments and processes actually leading to-
wards federalisation of the country. While several researchers have maintained that po-
litical elites to a certain extent already behaved in a federal way before 1993 (Reuchamps 
and Onclin 2009; Swenden and Jans 2006), we argue, based on institutional reasoning 
(Hall and Taylor 1996), that only the institutional change of 1993 enabled actors to really 
act federally by bringing their preferences and the institutional context into accordance. 
In the present study, we conceptualise the welfare state using a disaggregated expenditure 
approach (Castles 2009) – that is, we focus on welfare state spending. Such a spending 
perspective fits most closely the theoretical arguments regarding the potential effect of 
federalism, which typically address the consequences of federal structures on spending, 
taxing and thus the size of the welfare state (Hicks and Misra 1993; Hicks and Swank 
1992; Huber et al. 1993; Obinger et al. 2005; Rodden and Eskeland 2003), rather than its 
quality or generosity (see, e.g., Scruggs 2007).49 More precisely, we focus on public and 
mandatory private social expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
important social policy areas, including cash benefits and benefits in kind (i.e., spending 
on old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labour market 
                                                 
49 In the following, we use the terms “welfare state spending”, “social spending”, “the size of the welfare 
state” and “public investment in the welfare state” interchangeably. 
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programmes, unemployment, housing, and other social policy areas). In contrast, we ex-
clude expenditure on education (and look at this spending category separately as a control 
case), since competences in this field shifted largely to the regions in the 1988 state reform 
(De Rynck and Dezeure 2006). 
The contribution of the present study goes beyond existing research in at least three re-
spects. First and substantially, our analyses provide new theoretical and empirical in-
sights into a quite unique case with respect to the fundamental changes that have evolved 
over time in the unitary/federal state structures of Belgium that may, however, also be 
relevant beyond the case under consideration. Second, the particular case and the novel 
methodological approach enables us to research the relationship between federalism and 
welfare state spending over time and in a specific cross-sectional perspective. Comparing 
Belgium with its artificial counterfactual eventually brings us closer to causal inference 
than any of the existing research in this field. Third, to our knowledge, SCM has never 
been applied to welfare state research. Therefore, the present study also provides more 
general information on whether this methodological approach may be a helpful tool in a 
research field that is particularly affected by problems of potential reversed causality and 
endogeneity (Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen 2014: 9). 
Our study is structured as follows. The next section examines the creation and develop-
ment of Belgium as a federal state, with a focus on the fourth state reform of 1993. The 
following section discusses the theoretical background explaining how federalism influ-
ences welfare state expenditures, which enables us to deduce expectations for the case of 
Belgium. Subsequently, the research design and, in particular, the applied method are 
discussed before presenting the empirical results. After presentation of the results, we 
discuss the findings more in-depth, particularly by focusing on the underlying mecha-
nisms. The article concludes with a summary of the main findings and their implications. 
5.2 Federalisation in Belgium 
Societal, cultural and political life in Belgium is strongly structured along the linguistic 
borders between Dutch-speaking Flanders in the north and the French-speaking Walloon 
region in the south of the country. The internal conflict between language regions has 
characterised recent Belgian history, and is considered the main reason for the country’s 
development from a unitary to a federal state (Popelier and Cantillon 2013: 628f.). In the 
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second half of the nineteenth century, the “Flemish Movement” (Vlaamse Beweging) in-
itially called for the recognition of bilingualism in unitary, francophone Belgium. Then, 
in the early 1960s, the claim for more regional autonomy was taken up by the Walloon 
south of the country, which was confronted by economic problems (Berge and Grasse 
2004: 82; Jans and Tombeur 2000: 143). According to Popelier and Cantillon (2013: 629), 
this “lack of social, economic and linguistic homogeneity was the impetus for the feder-
alization process”.50 
In 1970, the first of four state reforms was established. The crucial element of the consti-
tutional reform of 1970 was the creation of three language-based communities Dutch, 
French and German) as well as three regions (Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels) (Swenden 
and Jans 2006: 884ff.; Swenden et al. 2006: 865). This reform led to a very complex state 
structure with overlapping units that still exists today (Swenden 2002: 68ff.). While the 
ensuing second and third state reforms broadened subnational autonomy, Belgium be-
came a federal state only after the fourth constitutional reform of 1993 (Deschouwer 
2012: 43; Wasmeier 2009: 169; Woyke 2009: 452). 
This institutional change of the 1993 reform is reflected in Article 1 of the Constitution, 
which asserts that Belgium is a federal state composed of communities and regions. Ac-
cordingly, one important institutional element of the reform has been the representation 
of the subnational communities in the second parliamentary chamber, the Senate, which, 
however, at the same time, underwent a reduction of its competencies. In the context of 
the present study, two aspects of the federalism reform deserve particular attention:  
1. Substantial expansion of subnational spending autonomy: In 1993, the subna-
tional entities received further decision-making powers in several areas. In partic-
ular, the communities’ competencies with respect to social policy need to be men-
tioned, meaning that the Flemish-, French- and German-speaking communities 
now possess exclusive autonomy for health and family policy and other welfare 
state domains (Cantillon et al. 2006: 1035; Deschouwer 2012: 60ff.; Dupuy and 
Van Ingelgom 2014: 204ff.). By contrast, the social security system remains 
largely at the federal level (Baudewyns and Dandoy 2005; Cantillon et al. 2006: 
1036). 
                                                 
50 In contrast, a partition of Belgium has not been considered for mainly two reasons. First, Wallonia, due 
to its economic misery, is highly dependent on transfer payments from the Belgian state. Second, Brussels 
belongs to both linguistic communities, and neither wants to give up the capital city (Keating 1999: 81; 
Popelier and Cantillon 2013: 630f.). 
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2. A still centralised tax system: The decentralisation of competencies (spending) 
was not reflected in similar adaptations of the tax system, which remains national. 
Thus, after the reform of 1993, the subnational units in Belgium still remain 
largely dependent on the tax revenues of the central state (Deschouwer 2000: 
110).51 
As this section has illustrated, the federalism reform of 1993 did not come out of the blue; 
rather, it was the result of longstanding processes and tendencies towards federalisation 
that had their origins in the 1960s. However, with respect to our research question, it can 
be argued that the 1993 reform marked a turning point. The reform not only eventually 
changed the institutional structure of the country, but also particularly affected the allo-
cation of competences in the welfare state area. 
5.3 Theoretical background: How federalism influences welfare state expenditure 
The question of whether and how federalism influences the characteristics of a country’s 
welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. While most studies 
follow an institutional approach (Hall and Taylor 1996), two groups of literature can be 
distinguished that – using different theoretical arguments – support how federalism either 
limits or promotes welfare state expenditures. We discuss these perspectives taking into 
account the fact that the effect that federalism exerts on welfare state policy can be context 
and time dependent (Obinger et al. 2005: 44). In this vein, we also consider the difference 
between a potential federalism effect on the level of, as well as changes in, welfare state 
spending. In particular, the latter enables a distinction between the “old” and “new poli-
tics” of the welfare state (Pierson 1996b). 
5.3.1 First perspective: Federalism leads to lower welfare expenditures 
The most prominent view asserts that federalism exerts a negative influence on welfare 
state spending. According to the “public choice” literature, federal structures lead to com-
petition between constituent units, which in turn limits public spending in general and 
investment in the welfare state in particular (Hayek 1976; Obinger et al. 2005; Wilensky 
1975). Moreover, Tsebelis’ (2000) veto player theory leads to the same conclusion, alt-
hough it is based on a different argument. According to Tsebelis, the more veto players 
                                                 
51 Not until 2002 did the subnational tax autonomy increase to a certain extent (Deschouwer and Verdonck 
2003), and it only became one of the crucial elements of the most recent sixth state reform (Goossens and 
Cannoot 2015). 
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in a political system, the larger their ideological distance and the higher their internal 
coherence, the more difficult it is to change legislation. By sharing power between polit-
ical actors, federalism is one such veto point, and thus also limits welfare state spending 
(Obinger et al. 2005: 36). Empirically, this assumed negative relationship between feder-
alism and the size of the welfare state has found support in various macro-quantitative 
(Hicks and Misra 1993; Hicks and Swank 1992; Huber et al. 1993) and macro-qualitative 
(Kittel et al. 2000) studies. 
The “new politics” literature emphasises that in recent decades the main question has 
been how to retrench or restructure the welfare state, rather than further increasing public 
investments in this field. According to Pierson’s (1996b) famous argument, this process 
of retrenchment is thereby much more difficult and follows a different logic. In this con-
text, the argument has been made that federal state structures facilitate retrenchment since 
political accountability is distributed among different levels of government (Obinger et 
al. 2005: 39). This wider distribution of accountability makes decision making entangled 
and less transparent for citizens, and therefore provides central governments with oppor-
tunities to apply a strategy of blame avoidance (Weaver 1986). 
5.3.2 Second perspective: Federalism leads to higher welfare expenditure 
The second view argues that the specificities and the institutional context of federal ar-
rangements need to be considered. Although in political discourse federalism and decen-
tralisation often are used synonymously, from a political science perspective it makes 
sense to differentiate between the two concepts (Lijphart 1999). While federalism refers 
to the integration of subnational units into the decision-making process at the central level 
(i.e., the “right to decide”), decentralisation focuses on subnational competencies in the 
area of policy implementation (i.e., the “right to act”) (Braun 2000b: 29; Ehlert et al. 
2007: 244). 
When systematically analysing the effects of federal structures on welfare spending, the 
dimension of decentralisation should be taken into account as well. In this vein, Rodden 
and Eskeland’s (2003) contribution on fiscal decentralisation (i.e., the capacity of subna-
tional units to generate their own tax revenues) is enlightening. According to their crucial 
argument, federalism does not always hamper state activities; rather, a potential obstruc-
tion depends on the particular constellation of federalism and the subnational units’ tax 
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autonomy. In federal states in which subnational units have tax autonomy, fiscal compe-
tition between these units prevails, which, from an economic point of view, leads to fi-
nancial self-responsibility and eventually to less state intervention at the subnational level 
(Rodden and Eskeland 2003: 457ff.; see also Besley and Case 1995; Ehlert et al. 2007: 
247; Tiebout 1956: 418ff.). In contrast, in federal states that do not have a decentralised 
tax system the competitive situation does not occur. Conversely, subnational units can 
spend money within their areas of competence without considering the revenue side (i.e., 
how these policies are financed) (Rodden and Eskeland 2003: 457ff.). Hence, the specific 
combination of strong federalism (i.e., high subnational autonomy in political decision 
making) and rather low subnational fiscal autonomy (i.e., funding through transfers from 
the central level) increases spending behaviour at the subnational level (Rodden and Es-
keland 2003: 458). 
Some researchers of the “new politics of the welfare state” literature support the idea of 
a positive relationship between federalism and welfare spending. More precisely, in the 
context of welfare state retrenchment, federal structures impede welfare state cutbacks 
and restructuring. Referring to Tsebelis’ (2000) veto player approach, these researchers 
emphasise that the “ratchet effect” of federalism (Castles and Uhr 2007; Obinger et al. 
2005) hampers policy change in both directions: whereas in the golden age of the welfare 
state, federalism impeded the development of generous welfare services; in the silver age, 
the same institution has limited retrenchment. Hence, in recent decades, federal countries 
should have exhibited less welfare state retrenchment than unitary states. 
5.3.3 The case of Belgium: Theoretical expectations 
How can the theoretical accounts regarding the role of federalism on welfare spending 
now be applied to the case of Belgium? We argue that for the Belgium case, the expecta-
tion of a positive federalism effect on welfare spending seems more reasonable than as-
suming a negative impact. In fact, the Belgium situation after the 1993 reform corre-
sponds exactly to the situation described by Rodden and Eskeland (2003) when referring 
to a fostering federalism effect. After the 1993 reform, social policy has been character-
ised by shared and thus increasingly fragmentised powers between the federal state, re-
gions and communities (Cantillon et al. 2006: 1036). The only social policy area that 
remains entirely national is the social security system; thus, basic social programmes like 
health care insurance, unemployment insurance and the pension system are provided by 
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and financed at the national level. However, at the same time, the increased subnational 
spending autonomy has enabled the regions to create their own social programmes, which 
have not replaced but rather have supplemented existing policies at the central level (Bey-
ers and Bursens 2010; Cantillon et al. 2006: 1036). 
Thus, while the reform of 1993 transferred quite considerable autonomy to communities 
– most importantly spending autonomy – revenue autonomy has remained largely limited 
due to the continuation of the centrally organised tax system (Deschouwer 2012: 60ff.; 
2000: 110). The communities finance their welfare state expenditures through centrally 
levied taxes, and they do not have any tax- or finance-related competition. This constel-
lation provides incentives for subnational entities to spend on social policy and to use 
these programmes as a source of subnational legitimation and identity-building (Dupuy 
and Van Ingelgom 2014). Moreover, the incoherent division of power (De Rynck and 
Dezeure 2006: 1028) also more generally provides negative cost-saving incentives. In 
this context, monitoring the willingness of unemployed persons to work can be mentioned 
(Cantillon et al. 2006: 1050). While monitoring is a regional competence, the financial 
consequences of non-work are felt primarily at the federal level. Overall, it has been ar-
gued that the particular distribution of competences in the area of social policy has led to 
cost increases (Cantillon 2005). 
Previous research has suggested that increasing expenditure has been fuelled by divergent 
Flemish and Walloon views about how to organise the social security and tax systems. 
Flanders has been claiming further subnational autonomy in these areas, given that in 
recent decades substantial redistribution has occurred from the Flemish to the Walloon 
part of the country (Cantillon et al. 2006). By contrast, Wallonia sees the social security 
and tax systems as important elements holding the country together and does not support 
further federalisation in these areas (Béland and Lecours 2008: 268). In this case, the 
more institutional effects of federalism reform come into play: the veto point of the fran-
cophone part of the country – which to a certain extent already existed before 1993 due 
to the consociational practices of the federal government (De Rynck and Dezeure 2006: 
1031) – was strengthened after the fourth state reform as communities were given a veto 
point regarding the federal architecture of the state (Träger 2009: 58).This constellation 
has helped to impede further federalisation of social policy and taxation in Belgium, and 
thus a possibly more stringent allocation of powers (De Rynck and Dezeure 2006: 1031). 
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Moreover, in this context, we can make reference to the “new politics of the welfare state” 
(Pierson 1996b). Since the federal reform of 1993 occurred in the period called the “silver 
age” of welfare states, we would expect that the constellation of increased subnational 
spending autonomy with a still-national financing system and the French community’s 
veto power may have impeded the retrenchment and restructuring of welfare state spend-
ing. Therefore, following both Rodden and Eskeland (2003) and the “silver age” argu-
ment, we expect that the reform of 1993 increased, rather than decreased welfare state 
spending in Belgium. 
5.4 Research design 
This section describes how we empirically test the effect of federalisation on Belgian 
welfare state spending. Quantitative comparative welfare state research typically relies 
on regression-based methods to test the influence of some explanatory factors on welfare 
state spending (see, e.g., Boix 1997; Busemeyer 2007; Korpi and Palme 2003). However, 
while this approach is generally problematic with regards to causal inference, it is even 
less reliable in the context of our research interests, which focuses on one particular event: 
the Belgian federalisation of 1993 and its effect. Therefore, in the present study, we pro-
pose using SCM, which, to our knowledge, has not been applied in comparative welfare 
research, although it seems an excellent choice for investigating our case of interest. SCM 
offers a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches by focusing on one par-
ticular event, while at the same time enabling a quantification of the causal effects.  
The SCM method was developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. 
(2010, 2015) with the primary aim of estimating the causal effects of a “treatment” (e.g., 
historic events, political programmes, etc.) on a specific outcome.52 The crucial idea is 
that for the case under investigation (“treated unit”), a “synthetic treated unit” is created 
based on a pool of potential comparison units (“donor pool”) (Abadie et al. 2015: 497). 
Most importantly, these cases should exhibit similar characteristics regarding the crucial 
explanatory factors to the case under investigation before the treatment. In other words, 
we try to match as closely as possible a series of pre-intervention characteristics of the 
treated unit (i.e., Belgium) with the same variables for the units in the donor pool (Abadie 
                                                 
52 A detailed description of the model can be found in Abadie et al. (2010: 494ff.) and Abadie et al. (2015: 
497ff.). The estimations presented in this study have been done using R (package synth) (Abadie et al. 
2011). 
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et al. 2015: 497). These pre-intervention characteristics – including the pre-intervention 
values of the outcome variable and other determinants of the outcome – are used to min-
imise the difference in the outcome variable between the real and the synthetic case 
(“mean squared prediction error” [MSPE]) before the treatment (Abadie et al. 2011: 3ff.). 
If we are able to create a synthetic case based on these pre-intervention characteristics by 
which we can predict similar trajectories of the outcome variables over an extended pe-
riod of time prior to the intervention, a discrepancy in the outcome variable after the 
treatment can be interpreted as being produced by the treatment itself (Abadie et al. 2015: 
498). 
This approach can be applied easily to Belgium and its federalisation. By constructing a 
synthetic Belgium, we can estimate the causal effect of the treatment – namely the reform 
of 1993 – on the outcome, which is social spending. If the welfare state expenditure of 
the real and synthetic Belgium after 1993 diverge systematically, we can conclude that a 
federalism effect on the size of the welfare state exists. However, if both cases develop 
in the same vein after the reform, we would suggest that federalisation did not have an 
effect on Belgium’s welfare state spending. 
The time period under investigation comprises the years 1980 to 2009, which enables the 
present study, on the one hand, to access enough observations before and after 1993 to 
estimate a synthetic case in the pre-reform period, and, on the other hand, to analyse the 
long-term development of welfare spending after the reform.53 
With respect to the selection of countries for the donor pool, two points are important. 
First, the crucial criterion was that these countries did not at any time between 1980 and 
2010 have a federal state structure. Second, to increase the probability that a synthetic 
case can be constructed, countries in the donor pool should be rather similar to our case 
of interest with respect to other potential determinants of welfare state spending (Abadie 
et al. 2015: 500). Combining these two criteria, we focus on OECD countries and chose 
those cases that do not have, and never have had, a federal state structure. The selection 
of non-federal countries for the donor pool is based on the index by Huber et al. (2004) 
that rates states as “not a federal state”, “a weak federal state” or “a strong federal state”. 
                                                 
53 Note that the OECD database has been providing social expenditure data, including benefits in kind, only 
since 1980. Other models based on a different measurement that only covers cash benefits, which have 
been available since 1970, provide very similar results (see also the section on empirical results). 
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The following OECD countries belong to the first category for the whole period under 
investigation and therefore were used for the donor pool: Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Great Britain (Arm-
ingeon et al. 2014).54 Belgium was classified as a non-federal state until 1992, and since 
1993 it has been rated a “strong federal state”. Again, this rating difference reflects the 
high relevance and profoundness of this reform, and its suitability for the present analysis. 
The data for Belgium and the other 11 OECD countries used in the present study were 
from Armingeon et al. (2014) and the World Bank (2015). 
To measure the outcome variable, we use a disaggregated expenditure approach (Castles 
2009) – that is, total public and mandatory private social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP in important social policy areas. More specifically, and as previously discussed, we 
concentrate on social spending on old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, 
family, active labour market programmes, unemployment, housing and other social pol-
icy areas, including both cash benefits and benefits in kind (Armingeon et al. 2014; OECD 
2016). Moreover, as a control case, we analyse educational expenditure – that is, a welfare 
state area that differs from social expenditure not only regarding the timing of the most 
important state reform (1988 instead of 1993), but also regarding the constellation of fed-
eral competencies. Hence, we expect that in education spending, we should observe (a) 
no substantial effect of the year 1993 and (b) no fostering federalism effect. 
To create the synthetic case (i.e., to mathematically optimise the prediction of the pre-
reform trajectory based on the donor pool) we include not only the pre-reform outcome, 
but also further potential determinants of welfare state spending in the analysis. In choos-
ing these variables, we follow previous research (see Hicks and Misra 1993; Hicks and 
Swank 1992; Huber et al. 1993; Schmidt 2000) that found that welfare state spending 
correlated with the strength of leftist parties, union density, GDP per capita, the age struc-
ture in a country and the unemployment rate. Moreover, we integrate the strength of right-
wing parties to account for the rise of the right-wing radical Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams 
Belang) shortly before the 1993 federalism reform. By matching Belgium and its syn-
thetic case – based not only on pre-reform outcomes, but also on observed determinants 
                                                 
54 The following countries have been excluded due to missing values in the outcome variable: Iceland, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand and Portugal. On the other hand, missing data for the explanatory factors can 
be handled with the SCM, and therefore are not a reason to exclude countries. 
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of the outcome – we decrease the difference of the trajectories between real and synthetic 
Belgium before the reform.55 A more detailed description of the variables and their oper-
ationalisation can be found in the Appendix. 
5.5 Empirical results 
As Figure 14 illustrates, welfare spending as a percentage of GDP in Belgium always has 
exceeded the mean spending of the other OECD countries. Between 1980 and 1992, the 
share was, on average, 4.2 percentage points higher than in other non-federal countries. 
After the reform, this difference decreased to 2.6 percentage points higher, on average. 
Thus, this purely descriptive perspective leads to the conclusion that the development 
from a unitary to a federal country was associated with slightly less welfare spending. 
However, this conclusion is based on weak ground, since potential contextual factors that 
are exogenous to the federalisation, and in particular the overall trend to welfare state 
retrenchment and restructuring (Pierson 1996a), have not been considered. For this rea-
son, we proceed with the SCM, which is able to actually account for these factors. 
Figure 14: Welfare spending as a percentage of GDP, 1980–2009: Belgium and non-
federal OECD countries compared 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the R package synth (Abadie et al. 2011). 
                                                 
55 Note that our SCM focuses on the national level. Hence, we try to analyse the effect of the federalism 
reform on the national trajectory in welfare state spending. This also means that at this stage we cannot 
account for varying regional determinants of welfare state spending. However, we will come back to the 
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Appendix Tables A 14 and A 15 present the weighting of the OECD countries (i.e., their 
welfare spending trajectories and other pre-reform factors) used to create synthetic Bel-
gium. Three cases of the donor pool are relevant to the synthetic case: Ireland, the Neth-
erlands and Sweden. With respect to other pre-reform characteristics, the GDP and the 
strength of left parties most strongly contributed to the creation of synthetic Belgium. By 
contrast, the strength of right parties, which we integrated into our model to account for 
the sudden success of the right-wing radical Vlaams Blok in the November 1991 elections, 
was not relevant to the prediction of welfare spending in Belgium until the reform. 
Figure 15 presents the main results of our analysis. Between 1980 and 1992, Belgium and 
its synthetic twin exhibit almost identical welfare spending (Belgium: 25.4 per cent of 
GDP; synthetic Belgium: 25.3 per cent of GDP), while the value for the whole sample is 
significantly different at 21.2 per cent of GDP. If the annual values of Belgium and syn-
thetic Belgium are compared, they show that between 1980 and 1992 the difference is 
always less than 1 percentage point. Hence, based on mathematical optimisation, an al-
most identical twin was created that behaved very similar to the real Belgium before the 
1993 reform. However, after the reform, the real and synthetic Belgium vary in one cru-
cial aspect: the real Belgium, once a unitary state, is now a federal state. Thus, by looking 
at the development of social spending after 1993 we can compare federal Belgium with 
the synthetic case (i.e., under the condition that Belgium had not changed its political 
system). 
Figure 15 depicts these two developments. We can see from this graph that indeed the 
reform seems to have had an effect on the size of the welfare state: as mentioned previ-
ously, the social spending of the real and synthetic Belgium went hand in hand before the 
reform, but after 1993, the two curves diverge. Synthetic Belgium continues the decreas-
ing trend in social spending, whereas, in contrast, real Belgium exhibits stagnation but no 
longer continues the decrease in welfare spending after its reform to become a federal 
state. Two years after the reform of 1993, real Belgium showed a 1.4 percentage point 
higher social spending compared to its synthetic counterpart. In 2000, this difference in-
creased to about 4.4 percentage points; in 2008, the difference reached its maximum of 
4.9 percentage points. Hence, we can conclude that the reform to a federal country has 
increased, rather than decreased, social expenditures. Put differently, if Belgium had not 
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introduced federalism in 1993, it would have had a further decrease, rather than a consol-
idation, of social spending in the years after, and eventually a lower level of welfare 
spending. 
Figure 15: Synthetic control method for Belgium for the federalisation of 1993: Effect 
on welfare spending 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the R package synth (Abadie et al. 2011). 
To test the validity of the SCM, we used education expenditure as our control case. As 
discussed previously, in this area we did not expect the 1993 reform to have had a positive 
impact on the development of spending. On the one hand, education was already federal-
ised in 1988, and on the other hand, in this area we do not find a similar constellation of 
shared powers generating incentives for expansion. Further analyses presented in Appen-
dix Figure A 6 demonstrate that real and synthetic Belgium do not systematically vary 
after the reform of 1993, nor did the 1988 federal reform lead to a significant changing 
pattern in education expenditure. This result supports the conclusion that the increases in 
social spending are not just a general expenditure pattern apparent in various welfare state 
spending areas, but rather that the institutional change to a federal country in combination 
with a policy-specific constellation of competencies led to a relative increase in social 
spending. 
Abadie et al. (2015: 504ff.) have proposed a series of further placebo and robustness tests 
to validate SCM findings. One possibility for a placebo test is to change the treatment 
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for other or even numerous countries in the donor pool, we can conclude that the finding 
for Belgium is just a placebo effect. To exclude this possibility, a synthetic case is created 
for every other country from the donor pool, based on which the MSPE before and after 
1993 is calculated. A value of 1 means that the differences in outcome between a partic-
ular case and its synthetic twin are the same before and after the treatment. A larger num-
ber indicates that 1993 had a strong impact on social spending since the differences be-
tween the real and the synthetic case are systematically higher after the treatment than 
before. As Figure 16 demonstrates, the ratio of the MSPE after and before 1993 for Bel-
gium is by far the highest (57.8). For Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland, the numbers 
are 35.6, 22 and 13.8, respectively. Although this result implies that for these countries 
the periods before and after 1993 also differ to a certain extent, the value is obviously 
much smaller than for Belgium. The clear positive reform effect of 1993 for Belgium is 
thus corroborated by this placebo test. 
Figure 16: Synthetic control method for Belgium and OECD countries with event year 
1993 (welfare spending): Proportion of the MSPE after 1993 compared to the MSPE be-
fore 1993 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the R package synth (Abadie et al. 2011).  
Note: MSPE = Mean square predicted error. 
Another placebo test proposed by Abadie et al. (2015: 504ff.) is to shift the event year – 
in this case, the reform year. For the placebo test, we shifted the treatment to 1980, when 
the second state reform in Belgium occurred. For this purpose, we relied on a slightly 
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narrower measurement of social expenditures including only cash benefits, which, in con-
trast to our dependent variable, were available for a longer period of time (i.e., since 1970) 
(Armingeon et al. 2014).56 Appendix Figure A 7 illustrates the results of a SCM for which 
the treatment has been moved to 1980, thus creating a synthetic case for the period before 
1980 (Abadie et al. 2011: 14). Even though the developments in social expenditure for 
the real and synthetic Belgium already drift apart starting in the mid-1980s, the negative 
effect of the federalisation of 1993 is confirmed. In fact, the difference between the two 
cases is not only quite small during the 1980s (a maximum of 1.9 per cent), but synthetic 
Belgium exhibits even higher social expenditure during this time. In contrast, after 1993, 
we can again observe the same pattern as in our original analysis: the synthetic case sub-
stantially decreases its social spending. Again, this supports the view that what we meas-
ured in our SCM for Belgium is indeed the effect of the federalisation of 1993, whereas 
a placebo effect is very unlikely. 
Finally, the results of the SCM can be considered robust if the finding is not strongly 
contingent on single cases of the donor pool. Using the “leave one out method” (Abadie 
et al. 2015: 506) we repeated the SCM three times, each time excluding one of the three 
countries that contributed to the construction of synthetic Belgium (see Appendix Figure 
A 8). The exclusion of none of the countries changed the results considerably: If Ireland 
is excluded from the donor pool the method yields a slightly larger effect; if the SCM is 
done without Sweden the effect is slightly smaller. The results are most affected if the 
Netherlands is excluded from the synthetic case.57 Hence, the successful implementation 
of the SCM, as well as our findings, are to some extent dependent on the inclusion of the 
Netherlands in the donor pool. We conclude that this contingency with respect to the case 
of Netherlands does not change our initial conclusion that the federalisation of 1993 in 
Belgium had a positive effect on welfare spending. First, the other two countries from the 
OECD sample (Ireland and Sweden) still contribute more than a third to the construction 
of synthetic Belgium, so the Netherlands is not the sole determining factor. Second, it 
becomes clear from Appendix Figure A 8 that the prediction of Belgium’s welfare state 
expenditure before 1993 fails if the Dutch information is not included. Hence, this finding 
                                                 
56 The two variables highly correlate with a Pearson’s r of 0.83. 
57 In further analyses we also applied the “leave one out method” to those countries that did not contribute 
to the construction of synthetic Belgium. Again, the exclusion of none of the countries changed the results 
considerably. This also holds true for the quasi-federal decentralised states of Italy and Great Britain. 
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supports our argument that an event in 1993 caused these two countries to move apart 
from each other with respect to expenditure. Third, and most importantly, from the pla-
cebo tests it became clear that this event occurred in Belgium rather than in the Nether-
lands. In other words, the reform year of 1993 did not have a similar impact on the level 
of social spending in any other country in the donor pool. While it is true that we can 
observe considerable differences in Dutch social spending before and after 1993, the 
MSPE values show that the “effect” of 1993 is almost three times smaller than that for 
Belgium. Therefore, we conclude that the main part of the Belgium reform effect was not 
caused by changes within the countries of the donor pool. 
Summarising, the robustness tests support our previous conclusion that the federalisation 
of 1993 causally influenced welfare state spending in Belgium. While real Belgium (with 
federalisation) and its synthetic control (without federalisation) exhibited almost identical 
developments in welfare spending before 1993, the trajectories diverge significantly after 
the reform. A similar treatment effect could not be found for other years, policy areas or 
countries. Hence, this implies that it was actually the 1993 reform specifically that had an 
impact on Belgium’s welfare state spending. 
5.6 Discussion: What is driving the federalism effect? 
Our analyses so far have shown that 1993 was a turning point in Belgium’s welfare state 
spending, which can be traced back to the institutional changes that occurred at that time. 
Hence, we can confirm our initial expectation that the Belgium case supports the second 
theoretical perspective that suggests that federalism is causally related to higher welfare 
state spending. However, the statistical findings presented so far do not tell us much about 
what actually is driving this federalism effect. In the theoretical section of this study, we 
argued that the Belgian constellation of competencies has generated incentives for sub-
national governments to increase subnational social expenditures. In the following dis-
cussion, we want to substantiate this assumed mechanism by examining three crucial as-
pects in more detail. First, if the relative increase in welfare state spending is indeed 
caused by the specific constellation of competencies as argued above, we should observe 
an increase in subnational (but not necessarily in the federal government’s) social ex-
penditures after the reform. Second, the question arises as to whether Flanders and Wal-
lonia reacted to the new institutional conditions in a similar vein – that is, whether in the 
subnational units we find evidence that the new institutional setting was used to increase 
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regional investments in social policy. And third, a closer look at the sudden success of 
the right-wing radical Vlaams Blok in the 1991 elections is important so to exclude the 
possibility that it was actually the change in the political power constellation rather than 
the institutional change that caused the relative increase in welfare spending. 
Regarding the first aspect, it needs to be mentioned that subnational social spending data 
is not available over the whole period under investigation and also not available for single 
subnational units. However, the available data (see Appendix Figure A 9) suggests that 
subnational social expenditures have indeed increased since the 1993 reform. Whereas in 
1995 the federal government provided higher social expenditure than the communities 
and regions, the latter have caught up since then. Hence, this finding supports our theo-
retical argument that the difference between the real and synthetic Belgium after the re-
form is due to increases at the subnational level. 
Moreover, and regarding the second aspect, it can be shown that the Flemish community 
in particular has made use of the institutional opportunities. The Flemish strategy has led 
to new subnational social policy programmes in the areas of health care, tax relief and 
child allowances that do not replace, but rather supplement existing policies at the central 
level (Beyers and Bursens 2010). One of the most prominent examples is the Flemish 
care insurance system (Vlaamse zorgverzekering, VZ), which was enacted in 1999 and 
has been effective since 2011. Within Flanders, this programme provides non-medical 
services mainly targeted at elderly people. At the same time, at the federal level, the ex-
isting social assistance benefits for care for the elderly have also increased (Cantillon et 
al. 2006: 1036, 1051). Hence, the Flemish VZ has largely contributed to social policy 
divergence between Flanders and Wallonia (Béland and Lecours 2008: 270). In this vein, 
the Francophone side, emphasising the need for national social solidarity, considers re-
gional social policy to be a “breach in the federal Social Security” (Béland and Lecours 
2008: 272), and therefore did not push for the development of subnational social policy 
in the Francophone part of the country. 
The third aspect that deserves more attention is related to the 1991 election in which the 
far right-wing Vlaams Blok strongly increased its vote share. Although in our SCM we 
accounted for the increasing strength of right-wing parties in the pre-reform period, we 
cannot completely exclude the possibility that our estimation results are shaped by the 
sudden success of the Flemish Vlaams Blok, which, in terms of potential policy effect, 
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could have largely coincided with the 1993 reform. For this reason, it is important to shed 
light on the role of the Vlaams Blok and Flemish nationalism more generally for social 
policy and related expenditures, but also for federalisation (Béland and Lecours 2008: 
232ff.). Starting in the 1980s, Flemish nationalism increasingly tackled the issue of social 
policy. Social policy was made a target of political mobilisation, particularly by referring 
to inequalities between the Flemish and the Walloon regions in terms of paying and ben-
efiting from the welfare state. Flemish nationalism played an agenda-setting role by ar-
guing – based on several studies and statistics showing that the Walloon region was a net-
benefiter and the Flemish region a net payer to the national social insurance system – that 
the national level was not the appropriate one to handle social insurance programmes. 
More importantly, to politicise these issues, Flemish nationalists framed the statistics in 
a way to show that people in Wallonia willingly or due to their culture overused social 
insurance services (Béland and Lecours 2008: 239). However, Béland and Lecours (2008: 
237) have argued that while Flemish nationalism helped to make social policy an im-
portant issue on the policy agenda, the strong link to federalisation did not occur until the 
1990s. For example, the 1988 institutional reform still stipulated that social insurance was 
exclusively the jurisdiction of the national level, which was absolutely uncontested at the 
time. Not until the 1990s, inspired by the Vlaams Blok, did Flemish parties begin to sup-
port federalisation of the social insurance system. In this vein, the Flemish Christian Dem-
ocrats became the effective leaders of the movement towards federalisation of the social 
insurance system. Hence, while the nationalist movement and particularly the Vlaams 
Blok played an important role in putting social policy on the agenda and in politicising 
the issue in the context of federalisation, we cannot conclude that the rise of this far right 
party as such is related to higher welfare spending after the 1993 reform. However, this 
short discussion shows that social policy was used by Flemish parties to strengthen na-
tionalist arguments, which after the 1993 reform could be exploited to increase regional 
identity and legitimacy (Dupuy and Van Ingelgom 2014). This conclusion also is in ac-
cordance with Béland and Lecours’ (2008: 228) argument that the federalism reform stim-
ulated nationalism as a form of politics. Hence, given increased spending autonomy, the 
Flemish side now had an opportunity to emphasise distinctness at the policy level. 
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The starting point of the present study was the theoretical controversy over whether fed-
eralism has a fostering or rather limiting effect on welfare spending. Using the case of 
Belgium – one of the few countries that changed from a unitary to a federal state – we 
theoretically argued that the effect that federalism exerts on welfare state spending is con-
tingent on the specific constellation of federal powers. Moreover, we applied SCM, which 
has shown to be a helpful tool for investigating the causal effects of particular historic 
events (Abadie et al. 2010, 2015). 
Our analyses demonstrate that the federalisation of 1993 was a turning point in Belgium. 
After this year, which coincides with the institutional reform that made Belgium a federal 
state, social spending is clearly higher than in our synthetic comparable case. Put differ-
ently, based on our analyses, we conclude that if Belgium had not introduced the reform, 
the country would have faced a further decrease in welfare spending after the reform, 
rather than the observed stability. Going more deeply into the case, we were further able 
to show that the new constellation of competencies in the field of social policy provided 
subnational units with opportunities to use social policy as an instrument to strengthen 
subnational legitimation and identity building (Dupuy and Van Ingelgom 2014). This 
strategy – mainly used in Flanders and fuelled by Flemish nationalism – has led to new 
subnational social policy programmes in the areas of health care, tax relief and child al-
lowances, which, however, do not replace, but rather supplement existing policies at the 
central level (Beyers and Bursens 2010). 
Against the background of the extant literature, the Belgium case clearly supports the 
view that federalism effects on welfare state spending is context-specific and complex 
(Obinger et al. 2005: 44). In particular, the country and its welfare state development 
perfectly correspond to Rodden and Eskeland’s (2003) expectations. Given the expansion 
of subnational competencies within a still centrally organised tax system, subnational en-
tities can maximise their financial resources without the need to consider the national 
state budget. With respect to education policy, our control case – in which the distribution 
of powers is less entangled – does not reflect a similar pattern. At the same time, the veto 
player argument also has some support: federalisation has strengthened the veto position 
of the French-speaking part of the country, which has prevented a further federalisation, 
and therefore the potential disentanglement of the distribution of powers in social policy. 
5 How federalism influences welfare spending: Belgium federalism reform through the 
perspective of the synthetic control method 
101 
 
Of course, with respect to the substantial findings of the present study, some questions 
remain open for future research. First, the relationship between social spending in Bel-
gium and the Netherlands comes to the fore, and proved to be important for the creation 
of synthetic Belgium. Obviously, the two countries exhibited many similarities before 
1993 and took different directions regarding welfare state expenditures afterwards. Fur-
ther research, based on comparative case studies, for instance, should investigate how 
these different paths can be explained and whether the positive effect of the federalisation 
in Belgium can be validated. Second, the recent sixth state reform that, among other 
things, substantially increased subnational financial autonomy – and therefore possibly 
altered subnational opportunities and incentives – might be an interesting case for further 
research. In this context, Francophone parties have pointed repeatedly to substantial dis-
crepancies not only between the two main parts of the country, but also within Flanders 
(Béland and Lecours 2008: 244). Based on the results presented in this article, we can just 
speculate for the moment that the partial decentralisation of the tax system may hamper 
solidarity within Flanders and reverse the “race to the top” previously discussed. 
The results presented in our study provide theoretical insights beyond the Belgium case. 
First, we propose a reversed public choice argument: Federalism leads not necessarily to 
competition in terms of a “race to the bottom” of social policies, but possibly also to a 
competition for regional identity and legitimacy, which may involve a “race to the top”. 
Second, the results presented in our study imply that a pure veto player approach (Tsebelis 
2000), which suggests a universal and general relationship between federal institutions 
and state intervention, overlooks important contingencies. Against the background of the 
Belgium example, we can formulate at least two reasons why veto point “federalism” 
may not generally lessen welfare state expenditure. On the one hand, actors in a federal 
system can have different interests and do not always want to act as a veto player in a 
way to limit social policy. Instead, social policy might be a policy field in which it is 
attractive to distinguish oneself in the competition between subnational entities. On the 
other hand, this strategy is facilitated in an institutional constellation in which subnational 
entities have considerable spending autonomy but are not subject to subnational tax com-
petition.  
Finally, the present study provides methodological insights for future research. By using 
the SCM, we have applied a method that rarely has been used in comparative political 
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research, but that seems to be extremely helpful for diachronic comparisons using a quasi-
experimental approach. Since this method enables a simultaneous focus on a single case 
and a quantification of causal relationships, it has value for both qualitative and quantita-
tive research perspectives. Particularly with respect to comparative welfare research, in 
which we have quite a lot of comparative data over time, SCM may serve as an interesting 
alternative to traditional regression or case-study-based approaches (Kreif et al. 2016). 
Especially when the causal effects of crises, institutional changes, policy reforms and so 
on are analysed, the creation of synthetic cases may be promising. However, as the pre-
sented case study illustrates, the application of an SCM seems to be most enriching when 
the method is combined with in-depth qualitative analysis and discussion of the underly-
ing causal mechanisms. Further research should not only look for occasions where the 
use of this method is reasonable, but also how it can be further optimised for applications 





In this concluding chapter, I sum up the empirical studies presented in chapters 2 to 5 
(section 6.1), discuss their contributions to the literature (section 6.2 and 6.3) as well as 
their limitations (section 6.4), and provide an outlook for further research (section 6.5).  
6.1 Summary of the Findings 
This dissertation started from the overall research question of how the NFA has changed 
fiscal power relations in Switzerland and what can be learned from this reform for insti-
tutional design in federations in general. From chapter 2, we learn that the NFA indeed 
changed the fiscal relations between the federal government and the cantons, albeit to a 
limited extent. Applying a counterfactual logic, the findings showed that the share of sub-
national expenditure would not have increased if the federal reform had not been intro-
duced; irrespective of whether intergovernmental grants are taken into account or not. 
What is more, the conditionality of federal government grants decreased, leading to more 
leeway for the cantons in some policy areas. To the detriment of the cantons, however, 
there was only a change on the expenditure side, while revenue remained almost un-
changed. As a result, there is at least indicative evidence that the NFA is one of the factors 
that have contributed to the increasingly precarious budget situation at cantonal level in 
recent years.  
However, the fiscal autonomy of the cantons is not only influenced from above – i.e. from 
the federal government – but also from below – i.e. from the municipalities. Chapters 3 
and 4 both point to the phenomenon of “state capture from below”, i.e. the efforts of the 
municipalities to shift expenditure to the cantonal level. As can be seen in the empirical 
analysis in chapter 3, local authorities used the power of the “cumul des mandats” to shift 
undesired costs in the policy area of special schools from the communal to the cantonal 
level. In chapter 4, I find empirical support for this effect beyond individual policy areas. 
Using a times-series-cross-sectional approach, I found that the stronger local actors (e.g. 
local authorities, Local Government Associations) are, the higher the expenditure on the 
cantonal level is. Hence, “state capture from below” is not a phenomenon limited to the 




Chapter 5, finally, provides an analysis of the fiscal effects of the Belgian federalisation 
in 1993 on welfare policies. In contrast to the NFA, the Belgian reform had a strong im-
pact on the subnational share of expenditure. As such, Belgium is an interesting compar-
ative case that allows to make at least assumptions about context variables that explain 
the different outcomes of the two reforms. A plausible explanation is the de/centralisation 
of the tax system: Given that the financing of welfare was – at least at the time of the 
reform – assured by federal taxes, the subnational entities had no incentives to shift costs 
but rather to increase them. In the context of Flemish nationalism, with the nationalist 
party Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belong) being the winner of the 1991 election, the Flem-
ish community has made use of the institutional opportunities and increased subnational 
welfare spending in order to strengthen national arguments and emphasize distinctness at 
the policy level. The story is different for Switzerland. Due to the decentralised tax sys-
tem, the cantons are largely responsible for their own revenue and need to engage in tax 
competition. As a result, the cantons have only limited possibilities to increase expendi-
ture in the reformed policy areas. On the contrary, they might not even desire new ex-
penditure and instead try to shift it to another state level. 
The findings of the four empirical chapters can be linked to the analytical framework 
presented in the introduction (chapter 1). Figure 17 shows the analytical framework and 
adds the key findings of all chapters. First, there is indeed an effect of the NFA on sub-
national fiscal power, albeit rather negative (see horizontal arrow from the independent 
to the dependent variable). Second, the findings in chapters 3 and 4 show that this direct 
effect is moderated by the politics dimension, namely the strength of municipalities in a 
canton (see vertical arrow from below). Finally, the polity dimension is relevant too, given 
that institutional differences of the tax system are a plausible explanation for the different 
findings for Switzerland and Belgium (see vertical arrow from the top).  
Overall, the findings contribute to literature in several respects. On the one hand, there 
are contributions to the current debates about a NFA II, i.e. a follow-up reform of the 
NFA (see section 6.2). On the other hand, benefiting from the comparison of the Swiss 
and the Belgian reform, we can deduce further contributions to literature on federalism 





Figure 17: Analytical framework and key findings 
 
 
6.2 Contributions to the current debates about NFA II 
Generally, political science literature has praised the NFA as a model example of institu-
tional redesigning in a federal system. The arguments put forward are different: First, it 
can be seen as a success that a reform could be carried out in a system with so many veto 
players, especially when compared to other countries – such as Germany and Austria – 
where the number of veto players are smaller (Braun 2008b, 2009; Benz 2013a). Second, 
many scholars consider the reform content to be meaningful, especially given the princi-
ple of subsidiarity that has guided the whole reform process (Cappelletti et al. 2014; 
Wettstein 2002; Wasserfallen 2015). Without questioning these findings, this dissertation 
relativizes the positive reform assessment. Focusing on the re-organisation of the division 
of tasks, we find that vertical fiscal power relations were not profoundly changed by the 
reform. As such, the findings stand in some contrast to the previous narrative of a suc-
cessful and exemplary reform. 
It is important to state that the dissertation does not claim a full evaluation of the NFA. If 
we take into account the concepts of Behnke et al. (2011) who distinguish between “for-
mal” and “substantive” reform success, we should be cautious to take the findings at hand 
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the reformers to increase subnational fiscal resources, but rather to strengthen task disen-
tanglement, inter-cantonal cooperation, and vertical collaboration (in those areas where 
task disentanglement was not possible). There is no doubt that the reform was able to 
change the distribution of competences in certain policy areas (Federal Finance Admin-
istration 2013). Nevertheless, the study of fiscal data brings three findings at the fore. 
First, regarding the expenditure volume, the reform was limited to smaller policy areas 
with insignificant meaning for the general government budget. Second, it can be ques-
tioned whether subsidiarity – considered as an implicit objective by many stakeholders – 
was really strengthened, given that cantonal budgets have become more precarious since 
2008. Finally, the fact that municipalities “captured” the cantons “from below” shows 
that vertical power games took place in the aftermath of the reform, indicating that sub-
sidiarity was not necessarily the guiding principle. Hence, even though the reform – meas-
ured by its official objectives – cannot be called a failure, there are at least certain unin-
tended consequences that suggest a weakening rather than a strengthening of the cantons 
in the Swiss federation.  
Currently, there is a debate about a second reform – called NFA II – that goes beyond the 
reform in 2008 and addresses the different deficits detected so far.58 This dissertation 
points to two aspects that – so far – have not been in the mainstream of the discussions 
but should be taken into account. First, the re-organisation of policy tasks within a NFA 
II should not only consider the expenditure but also the revenue side. Obviously, an in-
crease of intergovernmental grants would be the easiest approach. This, however, would 
be at odds with the tradition of a decentralised tax system in Switzerland. Rather, it should 
be examined to what extent not only policy competences but also sources of revenue can 
be shifted to the subnational level in a future reform. Second, a NFA II should include all 
three levels of government, including the communal level. The federal government, the 
cantons, and the municipalities need to be equally involved in the reform process in order 
to reach an agreement on which policy areas should be disentangled and at what level 
they should be located. Of course, different cantonal solutions are also conceivable here. 
Such a tripartite approach during the reform process, however, can help to anticipate 
power games and defuse them before the reform enters into force. 
                                                 




6.3 Contributions on the literature on federal reforms 
The different findings for Switzerland and Belgium seem – at first sight – to stand in 
contrast to what we would expect from previous literature on federalism and federal re-
forms. For Switzerland, known to be one of the most decentralised federations in the 
world (Lijphart 2012), we only find incremental reform effects while the 1993 reform in 
Belgium – a former unitary state – had a meaningful effect not only from a constitutional 
but also from a fiscal point of view. Nevertheless, a closer look at the differences between 
the two cases allows for several explanations, some of which have already been discussed 
in the literature and others which point to aspects that have not yet been addressed. Table 
4 provides an overview over the key differences between Switzerland and Belgium along 
the three dimensions policy (dependent variable), polity, and politics (moderating varia-
bles). In the following sections, I will discuss the three dimensions in detail and lay out 
the contribution to the literature of each of them.  
Table 4: Key differences between Switzerland and Belgium regarding the reform, pol-
icy-, polity-, and politics-dimension 




NFA: Shift of competences 
(task disentanglement) in indi-
vidual policy areas 
Federalisation with an exten-
sive shift of welfare policies to 
the subnational level 
Policy dimension  
(dependent variable) 
Limited fiscal effects; increas-
ing mismatch of expenditure 
and revenue on cantonal level 
Large increase of the share of 
subnational expenditure for 
welfare policies  
Polity dimension Decentralised tax system with 
a low relevance of intergov-
ernmental grants 
Centralised tax system with a 
high relevance of intergovern-
mental grants 
Politics dimension Allocation of acquired compe-
tences is left to the subnational 
units: Cantons and municipal-
ities  
 cost-shifting between can-
tons and municipalities 
Clear allocation of acquired 
competences to the communi-
ties (Dutch, French, German);  
 
 cost-attracting with Vlaams 
Blok as driver 
 
6.3.1 Policy dimension 
The policy dimension refers to the fiscal outcomes of the two reforms, which is the de-




the Swiss and the Belgian reform allow us to deduce contributions to the theoretical, em-
pirical, and methodological discussions on research on federal reforms.  
A first contribution relates to the scope of reform outcomes. Looking at the quantitative 
studies in chapters 2 to 5, it is conspicuous how different the fiscal impact of a reform can 
be. So far, the literature has conceptualised reforms as the opposite of incremental change. 
While incremental changes are seen as the result of daily business where existing rules 
are re-interpreted without altering them, reforms are seen as critical junctures that set out 
existing paths and allow for fundamental changes (Benz and Colino 2011: 389; Broschek 
2014: 97). The Belgian case teaches us that the latter can indeed be the case (although 
one has to consider that the 1993 reform was preceded by several reforms that paved the 
way for Belgium to become a federal state). The Swiss case, in turn, questions this con-
ceptual separation. Rather, the NFA itself seems to be an expression of incremental 
change. Considering federal states, the NFA might not be an exception. Given the many 
veto players in federations compared to unitary states, small-step reforms are more likely 
to be the rule than the exception. It follows from this that the dichotomy of “incremental 
change vs. reform” is rather misleading for the theoretical discussion and that the empir-
ical analysis of federal dynamics should focus on longer periods of time and not only on 
individual institutional changes. 
Beyond the scope of reform outcomes, the policy dimension points to a second, method-
ological contribution to the literature. Generally, the findings confirm the dominant per-
spective in political economy literature about the shortcomings of expenditure data to 
assess fiscal power (Stegarescu 2005). However, a key finding of this dissertation is that 
maximizing expenditure is often not even the objective: If revenue remains constant, new 
expenditure is more likely to be avoided as much as possible. For scholars of fiscal fed-
eralism, this serves even more as an argument for being cautious with expenditure data. 
If subnational power is to be assessed, the share of expenditure on general government 
expenditure can be a misleading indicator. This dissertation, in addition, advices scholars 
to take actors’ cost-shifting strategies more into account and to ask whether an increase 




6.3.2 Polity dimension 
Within the polity dimension, the focus is on the different institutional backgrounds of the 
two countries. As already explained above, the Belgian tax system – at least in the begin-
ning of the 1990s – was strongly centralised, while the Swiss cantons had – and still have 
– extensive tax power. For the Swiss case, this means that the cantons find themselves in 
horizontal tax competition and can only make limited use of federal government grants. 
In Belgium in 1993, on the contrary, subnational revenue mainly consisted of intergov-
ernmental grants. These institutional differences had a direct impact on the reform out-
comes. While the central state in Belgium was able to effectively “steer” the shift of ex-
penditure, there was less leeway in Switzerland where a central steering would have been 
at odds with the tradition of cantonal tax autonomy. Two conclusions follow from this 
cross-comparison: First, steering capacity seems to be higher in centralised tax systems 
since the federal government has direct access to the vertical distributions of resources. 
Second, while subnational units in centralised tax systems have an incentive to attract 
expenditure, subnational units in decentralised tax systems try to shift expenditure if they 
cannot increase own source revenue correspondingly. 
The latter conclusion is not new and has already been discussed in political economy 
literature as the so-called “flypaper effect”: In centralised tax system, there is an inherent 
tendency of subnational units to increase expenditure since they do not need to finance it 
with own revenue (Hines and Thaler 1995). The question of steering capacity, however, 
has been less discussed in literature so far. At first sight, it seems a paradox that subna-
tional expenditure has increased more in (formerly unitary) Belgium than in Switzerland. 
However, the present findings reveal that the decrease of the “flypaper effect” (by reduc-
ing intergovernmental grants to a minimum) also decreases a systems’ reform capacity. 
In other words, there is a trade-off between minimizing the “flypaper effect” and maxim-
izing the reform capacity of a federal system.  
It is important to note that decentralisation might not always be the primary objective of 
reforms in centralised tax systems. Belgium is a typical example of a "holding-together" 
federation, where decentralisation has served to prevent the country from falling apart 
(Popelier and Cantillon 2013: 628f.). However, irrelevant of the direction of the reform, 




6.3.3 Politics dimension 
Regarding the politics dimension, a key difference between Switzerland and Belgium is 
the actor structure. The Swiss federation consists of a classical three-layered structure 
with the federal government, the cantons, and the municipalities. Belgium, in contrast, 
has two layers with a subnational layer consisting of two entities – the language-based 
communities and the regions. On the surface, the Swiss reform has only re-organised the 
relationship between the federal government and the cantons. A closer look, however, 
reveals that the municipalities are affected as well, since they play a role in the canton-
alised policies, be it in the implementation or the financing. Hence, power games were at 
stake not only between the federal government and the cantons, but also between the 
cantons and the municipalities. In Belgium, on the contrary, the welfare competences 
were clearly assigned to the communities. The increase of communal expenditure in the 
welfare area was thus not disputed by the regions and no subnational power game took 
place. Hence, while vertical power games are nothing new to the federalism literature, 
this dissertation points to important findings on how and under what circumstances ver-
tical power games take place. In concrete terms, it shows that subnational power games 
are more likely the more the questions of financing and implementation are left to the 
subnational governments.  
6.4 Limitations 
In spite of these important contributions, four main limitations of this dissertation need to 
be addressed. First, given that the findings of this dissertation are based on a comparison 
of two cases, their generalisation is obviously limited. On the one hand, both countries 
entail distinctive characteristics that cannot be fully controlled for in empirical analyses. 
On the other hand, it needs to be considered that the assessment of the effect of one reform 
was assessed in light of the effect of the other reform and vice versa. If the Swiss reform 
were to be compared with other reforms – e.g. the mostly unsuccessful reforms in Ger-
many or Austria (Behnke 2010; Behnke et al. 2011) – the findings for the NFA would 
probably appear in a different light.  
Second, as already mentioned for the NFA in section 6.2, the dissertation provides only 
a partial picture of all the effects of the reforms. Narrowing down the perspective on 
expenditure and revenue data allowed for a systematic analysis of the overall distribution 




well. Regarding the NFA, the dissertation has largely ignored effects linked to the re-
organisation of fiscal equalisation, a part of the reform that was as important as the re-
organisation of policy tasks. Furthermore, it could be criticised that the operationalisation 
chosen in this dissertation always leads to a “zero-sum-game”, meaning that an increase 
of the share of resources of one state level automatically leads to a decrease at another 
level. A key objective, however, was to strengthen the principle of task disentanglement, 
which – theoretically – should result in a strengthening of all state levels alike. This 
strengthening, however, cannot be examined through fiscal data but has to be assessed 
with other data and approaches.  
Third, there are some shortcomings linked to the chosen quantitative approach. Even 
though the different types of revenue have been distinguished as accurately as possible, 
quantitative data do not fully illustrate the real power of governments in a specific policy 
area. Even if expenditure for a policy area are financed by own sources, the scope of 
possibilities within this policy area can be limited by national or even international law. 
Additional qualitative studies would be needed to identify the real room of manoeuvre of 
subnational governments in individual policy areas.  
Finally, and connected to the third point, the dissertation took a global perspective on 
aggregate data which made it difficult to reveal causal mechanisms on a micro level. This 
is especially true for the politics dimension, namely the strategy of subnational actors. 
The “state capture from below” found in chapters 3 and 4 is based on correlations. The 
quantitative findings do not allow for a profound understanding of the micro-foundations 
of this phenomenon.  
6.5 Further Research 
Having outlined the contributions of the findings as well as their limitations, we can now 
formulate ideas for future research. Broadly, we can distinguish between three avenues 
of research. A first avenue focuses on the two reforms and identifies research gaps for 
each of them. A second avenue can be used for a “zooming in” in order to deepen certain 
findings and to further examine the micro-foundation of certain effects. Finally, a third 
avenue encompasses the “zooming out”, i.e. the adaption of the analytical framework to 
other federal (or non-federal) states. I will present all three avenues in more detail in the 




6.5.1 Research Avenue I: Research Gaps for the Two Reforms 
In my dissertation, I have focused on fiscal outcomes for both the NFA and the federal 
reform in Belgium. Obviously, there are other outcomes that should be considered in or-
der to comprehensively assess the success of the reform. As outlined above, the prelimi-
nary objectives of the NFA were the disentanglement of policy tasks, the strengthening 
of inter-cantonal cooperation, and the improvement of vertical cooperation in policy areas 
where joint tasks persist. The two latter goals are tackled by two research projects: In her 
dissertation, Laetitia Mathys carried out an in-depth analysis of the convention pro-
grammes between the federal state and the cantons (Mathys 2015, 2016). Alexander 
Arens is currently analysing the impact of the NFA on the horizontal dimension, i.e. the 
participation of cantons in so-called inter-cantonal concordats and the associated effects 
on the inner-cantonal power structure between the executive and legislative branches 
(Arens et al. 2017). What is yet missing – apart from some rather rudimentary evaluations 
of the federal government itself (Federal Finance Administration 2013) – is a profound 
analysis of the achieved task disentanglement, i.e. of those policy areas that have been 
fully assigned to either the federal or the cantonal level. As the example of special schools 
has shown, a cantonalisation of a policy area does not necessarily mean that the cantons 
carry the sole responsibility. It would be interesting to examine how the principle of task 
disentanglement has been implemented in other cantonalised policies and what mecha-
nisms are at stake. What is more, it is not assured that a cantonalisation of a task auto-
matically excludes any influence from the federal state. Here, it is relevant to distinguish 
between reform ratification and reform outcome in order to assess not only the “formal” 
but also the “substantive” success of the NFA (Behnke et al. 2011).  
Beyond this further research directly linked to the official objectives of the reform, one 
could think of other – more hidden – effects that are worth examining. It could be hypoth-
esised that the NFA has had a positive impact beyond government budgets, e.g. on more 
cultural aspects. It should not be underestimated that the reform also had an agenda-set-
ting function: Federalism has been at the top of the political agenda for several years. This 
may have raised the awareness of federalism to a degree that cannot be adequately repre-




Considering the federalisation of Belgium, the dissertation at hand can be used as a start-
ing point for further research in various ways: Given the fact that the increase of expendi-
ture on the subnational level was mainly brought about by an increase of federal govern-
ment grants, we could question whether subnational autonomy has increased correspond-
ingly. Chapter 5 examined expenditure statistics without taking into account their condi-
tionality. A closer look at the decision-making processes for this expenditure would help 
to assess whether the shift of expenditure to the communities equals a shift of decisional 
power. In addition, the question also arises for the Belgium case as to what effect the 
federalism reform (or the federalism reforms respectively) has had on the political culture 
in the country. Does federalisation only manifest itself in a shift of resources to the sub-
national level, or do we also observe an internalisation of the principle of federalism in 
the citizens' mind-set? The latter question is not new to scholars on Belgium federalism 
(see for example Billiet et al. 2006). This dissertation may encourage scholars to deepen 
this analysis and to study the interdependence of policy and cultural changes that occur 
in the context of federalisation.  
6.5.2 Research Avenue II: Zooming In 
Section 6.5.1 listed inputs for future research that go beyond the variables examined in 
this dissertation. In the remaining two sections, I provide ideas for future research that 
aim at deepening and validating the findings of the dissertation. A first strategy is to zoom 
in, i.e. to look at individual policy areas, actors etc. in more detail. Especially the findings 
connected to the politics dimension of the analytical framework – i.e. the “state capture 
from below” in general and the power of the “cumul des mandats” in particular – call for 
further research that uncovers the causal mechanisms behind these effects. Taking the 
findings in chapter 3 as a starting point, further research could help to identify the micro-
foundations of how local authorities influence cantonal policies. Such studies would con-
tribute to the findings at hand both in terms of validation and qualitative deepening: Do 
we find examples of mayors or local councillors sitting in the parliament who exert their 
influence on cantonal policies? How does this influence take place? What are the prereq-
uisites in order to use the “cumul des mandats” as a resource in the decision-making 
process (e.g. parliamentary committees, partisan membership)? Do cross-party coalitions 




Beyond these further questions on the phenomenon of the “cumul des mandats”, chapter 
4 provides inputs for a micro-based investigation of the “state capture from below”, 
namely the phenomenon of cost-shifting of the decentralised level. The operationalisation 
of politics-decentralisation in the Swiss cantons consisted of different indicators, among 
others the strength of Local Government Associations or the question of how the electoral 
system benefits the municipalities (Mueller 2015). A separation of the index would help 
to reveal the real drivers behind this state capture. One approach would be to separate 
between actor-related variables (local authorities in cantonal parliaments, Local Govern-
ment Associations) and variables related to the institutional context, namely the electoral 
system or direct democratic instruments for municipalities. Such a differentiated analyti-
cal framework can help us better understand the mechanisms of how municipalities exert 
their influence on the cantonal level, which variables are most relevant, and which inter-
dependences between variables occur. All in all, the deepening of the findings of chapter 
3 (“cumul des mandats”) and 4 (“state capture from below”) will help us to understand 
when, in which policy areas, and under what circumstances cost-shifting takes place in 
federal Switzerland. 
Finally, a zooming-in would be enlightening for the Belgian case as well. The findings in 
chapter 5 indicate that the mechanisms linked to the reform in 1993 are a model example 
for the “flypaper effect”. What is more, it has been shown that regional parties can play a 
crucial role herein. By connecting this concept from political economy literature with the 
federalism and partisan literature on Belgium, scholars could use this empirical case in 
order to better comprehend the micro-foundation of this effect. 
6.5.3 Research Avenue III: Zooming out 
Instead of zooming in, a zooming-out strategy could be enlightening as well for several 
reasons. First, we know from comparative federalism literature that federalism does not 
equal federalism as institutional contexts may vary to a large degree. In this dissertation, 
the focus was on the decentralisation of the tax system as a relevant context variable for 
the effect of a reform. However, other institutional features could be relevant in other 
federations. Rational choice institutionalists may focus on the power game: In what re-
spect does a power game take place already in the decision-making phase of reforms and 
how does political power depend on a country’s institutional framework? If we consider 




maximize power and how does this coordination manifest itself? Historical institutional-
ists, in turn, could focus more on the relevance of historical paths, e.g. the difference 
between coming-together and holding-together federations, as well as the question of 
whether federal reforms can be seen as critical junctures or not. For both questions, the 
findings in this dissertation provide no final answers. Considering the first question, the 
empirical studies of the dissertation suggest that holding-together federations have more 
reform capacity due to the central state, which is still relatively strong. However, does 
this interpretation hold true throughout larger samples of federations? Regarding the 
question of whether reforms are critical junctures, Switzerland and Belgium provide two 
completely different answers. While the NFA should rather be seen as an incremental 
change with further reforms that have yet to come, the federalisation in Belgium meant a 
fundamental change of political life. It seems obvious that black and white answers are 
wrong.  Further research is needed to better disentangle fundamental from incremental 
change and to work out under which circumstances each of them are more likely to occur.  
Finally, the analysis of state reforms and their effects does not necessarily have to be 
limited to federal states. Reforms that aim at changing the vertical power-sharing can be 
found in unitary states as well. However, it is likely that there are significant differences 
between the two. A first hypothesis could be that reform capacity in unitary states is larger 
due to the accumulation of power at the centre and the low number of veto players. Sec-
ond, we could hypothesize that the outcome of reforms is different: Following Lijphart 
(2012: 177) who conceptualised both a constitutional and a fiscal dimension of vertical 
power-sharing, the hypothesis would be that reforms are used to align the second dimen-
sion with the first dimension. In other words, and speaking in terms of historical paths: In 
a federal state, reforms aim at decentralizing fiscal resources in order to (re-)assure the 
principle of subsidiarity while in unitary states, the goal is rather to centralize power in 
order to increase efficiency and decision-making capacity at the central level. Both hy-
pothesis have yet to be tested in empirical analyses. The analytical framework used in this 
dissertation can help to tackle these questions and to contribute to a better understanding 
of institutional change in both federal and unitary states. Such an understanding would 
have relevance beyond academia, given the conclusion of the dissertation that constitu-
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8.1 Appendix Chapter 2 
Table A 1: Policy areas reformed by the NFA 
Federal tasks:  
1. Defence 
2. Highways 
3. Personal services (AHV) 
4. Personal services (IV) 
5. Support for organisations for the 
disabled with nation-wide activ-
ity  
6. Agricultural consultancy agen-
cies 
7. Animal breeding 
 Joint tasks: 
1. Additional social benefits 
2. Higher education grants 
3. Traffic within agglomerations 
4. Main roads 
5. Penitentiary system 
6. Land surveying 
7. Individual subsidies for the health 
care insurance 
8. Regional traffic 
9. Improvement of agricultural struc-
tures 
10. Noise protection along local and 
cantonal roads 
11. Protection of culturally/historically 
important buildings/monuments 
12. Nature and wildlife protection 
13. Flood protection 
14. Water protection 
15. Forest maintenance 
16. Hunting oversight 
17. Fishing oversight 
Cantonal tasks: 
1. Support for housing, working 
and day care facilities for inva-
lids 
2. Special schools 
3. Support for regional and local 
activities of organisations for the 
less abled 
4. Educational grants up until sec-
ondary school 
5. Traffic control outside agglom-
erations 
6. Support for educational facilities 
for social workers 
7. Recreation and sport 
8. Airfields 
9. Improvement of housing condi-
tions in mountain areas 
10. Cantonal agricultural advice 
 Horizontal cooperation: 
1. Execution of criminal penalties and 
measures 
2. School education in matters speci-
fied in Art. 62 para. 4 Cst (harmoni-
sation of primary school education) 
3. Cantonal institutions of higher edu-
cation 
4. Cultural institutions of supra-re-
gional importance 
5. Waste management 
6. Land surveying 
7. Urban transport 
8. Advanced medical science and spe-
cialist clinics 
9. Institutions for the rehabilitation and 
care of invalids 
Source: Vatter (2018: 191), based on Federal Council (2001, 2004).  
Notes: The list corresponds to the final reform decision, as documented in the federal voting booklet in 
support for the vote of November 11, 2004. The list does not correspond to the one in the Federal Council 















Decentralization of SNG expenditure (Figure 5, upper graph) 
Outcome: Expenditure decentralization 52.4  52.4 42.7 
Synthetic Switzerland is a composition of:  
Austria (weight = 0.094),  
Belgium (.104),  
Canada (.563),  
Germany (.108),  
and the United States (.131).    
Decentralization of self-financed SNG expenditure (Figure 5, lower graph) 
Outcome: Expenditure decentralization 43.9 43.9 29.8 
Synthetic Switzerland is a composition of:  
Austria (weight = .067),  
Belgium (.073),  
Canada (.640),  
Germany (.105),  
and the United States (.114).    
ratio subnational revenue/subnational expenditure (Figure 7) 
Outcome: Ratio subn. rev. / subn. exp. 1.03 1.02 0.97 
Synthetic Switzerland is a composition of:  
Austria (weight = .957),  
Belgium (.028),  
Canada (.013),  
Germany (.002).    
Source: IMF (2017).   





Figure A 1: Synthetic control method for the NFA: robustness checks for effect on decentralization of SNG expenditure, 1996–2014 
 
Source: IMF (2017).   




Figure A 2: Synthetic control method for the NFA: robustness checks for effect on decentralization of self-financed SNG expenditure, 1996–
2014 
 
Source: IMF (2017).   




Figure A 3: Synthetic control method for the NFA: robustness checks for effect on ratio subnational revenue/subnational expenditure, 1996–
2014 
 
Source: IMF (2017).   




Figure A 4: (Mis)match between revenue and expenditure for SNGs and federal govern-
ment (after intergovernmental transfers), 1996–2014 
 
























































































8.2 Appendix Chapter 3 
Table A 3: Variable description 





Own calculations based on four databases provided by 
the Federal Finance Administration: 1. Cantonal ex-
penditures for special schools including transfer pay-
ments to the municipalities; 2. Local expenditures for 
special schools including transfer payments to the 
canton; 3. Transfer payments from the cantonal to the 
local level within the policy field of special schools; 
4. Transfer payments from the local to the cantonal 
level within the policy field of special schools. For 
both the cantonal and local expenditures vertical 
transfer payments are considered: In order to get the 
effective amount of expenditures for both levels I sub-
tract the transfer payments received from the other 
state level from the expenditures (which include the 
transfer payment to the other state level). For exam-
ple, if the statistics in a canton reveal a) cantonal ex-
penditures including transfer payments (to the local 
level) of 1.2 million Swiss Francs and b) local transfer 
payments to the cantonal level of 100’000 Swiss 
Francs, the effective amount of expenditures for the 
cantonal level is 1.1 million Swiss Francs. After hav-
ing done the same calculation for the local level, the 
centralisation equals the share of the cantonal expend-
itures on the total expenditures (cantonal + local) in 







mayors in the 
cantonal par-
liament 
Total previous year’s number of presidents of political 
municipalities in the cantonal parliament divided by 
the total number of seats in the parliament, multiplied 
by 100. Missing values for the cantons of Fribourg, 
Vaud, Valais and Jura for the year 2006: mean values 
for the years 2010-2014 used instead. For the cantonal 
data sources see table A 4 in the Appendix. 
See  





Table A 3: Variable description (continued) 




Total previous year’s number of members of gov-
ernments of political municipalities in the cantonal 
parliament divided by the total number of seats in 
the parliament, multiplied by 100. Missing values 
for the cantons of Berne, Fribourg, Vaud and Va-
lais for the year 2006: mean values for the years 
2010-2014 used instead. No data available for the 
cantons of Grisons and Jura. For the cantonal data 
sources see table A 4 in the Appendix. 
See  
Table A 4 
NFA Dummy variable indicating whether the NFA re-
form is in force; 0 = NFA is not in force (year 






Index based on Mueller (2015) including the fol-
lowing indicators: 1) degree of institutionalisation, 
2) a functioning website indicating a permanent 
and professional structure, 3) public availability of 
the Local Government Associations’ statutes (legal 
personality), 4) existence of a special group in the 
cantonal parliament to represent and lobby for lo-
cal interests. The scores for the four indexes are 
added to the total score for the strength of Local 





Index based on Mueller (2015) measuring the can-
tonal electoral decentralisation. 0 = the whole can-
tonal territory is just one constituency (no territo-
rial representation of municipalities); 1 = use of 
special electoral districts (at least some territorial 
dimension to parliamentary elections); 2 = use of 
administrative districts (territorial distinctiveness 
with certain sense of regional identity); 3 = use of 
historic regions and fragmented administrative dis-













Index based on Mueller (2015) measuring the ex-
istence of the communal initiative and referendum 
in a canton as well as the barriers to call them. In-
dex ranges from 1 (low direct-democratic decen-





Index based on Mueller (2015) measuring the local 
share of public expenditures, public revenues, ad-
ministrative expenditures, public staff and salaries 
for public staff. The index equals the mean of the 
z-standardised values of the five indicators. For all 
indicators, mean values for the time range from 










Dummy variable indicating the membership in the 
concordat for special needs education (Sonderpä-
dagogikkonkordat) in the previous year. 0 = no 








Own calculations based on the share of seats in the 
cantonal parliament of the following parties: So-
cial-Democratic Party, Green Party, Labour Party 
[formerly Communist Party], other small left-wing 













Dummy variable indicating whether canton has 1 = 
majority that is German-speaking, 0 = otherwise 
Federal Sta-
tistical Office 
Urbanisation Percentage of urban population Federal Sta-
tistical Office 





Table A 4: Number of mayors/local councillors in the cantonal parliaments in 2006 and 



























































































































































ZH 9 26 180 12 28 180 Staatskalender 
BE 13 32* 160 15 34 160 List of interest ties 
LU 8 20 120 10 21 120 List of interest ties 
UR 1 7 64 0 3 64 Staatskalender 
SZ 1 6 100 1 5 100 List of local auth. 
OW 0 3 55 0 5 55 Own survey 
NW 1 4 60 1 2 60 Staatskalender 
GL 7 14 80 9 18 60 List of local auth. 
ZG 0 3 80 1 3 80 Staatskalender 
FR 16* 33* 110 16 34 110 List of interest ties 
SO 8 16 100 17 27 100 List of interest ties 
BS 1 5 130 0 3 100 Own survey 
BL 2 12 90 3 13 90 Local elect. results. 
SH 7 11 80 1 10 60 Staatskalender 
AR 9 15 65 10 16 65 Staatskalender 
AI 6 17 49 2 15 49 Staatskalender 
SG 15 36 180 18 36 120 List of local auth. 
GR 15 n.a. 120 17 n.a. 120 List of mayors 
AG 11 26 140 19 36 140 List of interest ties 
TG 20 25 130 22 29 130 List of interest ties 
TI 8 18 90 8 21 90 Local elect. results. 
VD 27* 36* 180 22 30 150 List of interest ties 
VS 9* 41* 130 10 41 130 List of interest ties 
NE 3 15 115 2 17 115 List of interest ties 
GE 4 5 100 4 8 100 List of local auth. 
JU 3* n.a. 60 3 n.a. 60 List of local auth. 





Table A 5: Explaining cantonal cost centralisation: posterior distribution of baseline, 
full and final random intercept models with mayors 




Baseline model    
Intercept 47.48 37.92 57.55 
Share of mayors in parliament 1.05 0.77 1.33 
NFA 15.20 14.23 16.17 
Share of mayors in parliament * NFA -0.03 -0.15 0.08 
N = 49    
    
    
Full model 
Intercept 84.94 -15.73 187.32 
Share of mayors in parliament 2.15 1.81 2.48 
NFA 16.38 14.48 18.35 
Strength of Local Government Associations -22.25 -45.94 0.14 
Territorial electoral system 2.50 -18.61 22.73 
Direct democratic instruments for local governments 1.19 -12.24 14.18 
Overall decentralisation -24.97 -52.46 2.91 
Special school pupils (in 1’000) 12.11 11.19 13.02 
Member special school concordat 4.68 2.73 6.54 
Left-wing parties -1.45 -1.72 -1.17 
Number of municipalities 0.26 0.23 0.29 
German language -13.72 -76.99 48.56 
Urbanisation 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Share of mayors in parliament * NFA 0.33 0.20 0.47 
N = 49    
    
    
Final model 
Intercept 84.21 41.10 127.42 
Share of mayors in parliament 2.14 1.81 2.48 
NFA 16.38 14.48 18.25 
Strength of Local Government Associations -22.42 -38.26 -6.70 
Overall decentralisation -28.75 -47.43 -9.03 
Special school pupils (in 1’000) 12.09 11.18 12.99 
Member special school concordat 4.68 2.79 6.54 
Left-wing parties -1.45 -1.73 -1.18 
Number of municipalities 0.26 0.22 0.29 
Share of mayors in parliament * NFA 0.33 0.20 0.48 
N = 49    
    





Table A 6: Explaining cantonal cost centralisation: posterior distribution of baseline, 
full and final random intercept models with local councillors 




Baseline model    
Intercept 40.79 30.24 51.52 
Share of local councillors in parliament 0.89 0.72 1.07 
NFA 24.29 22.97 25.61 
Share of local councillors in parliament * NFA -0.45 -0.53 -0.38 
N = 45    
    
    
Full model 
Intercept -35.46 -135.66 63.55 
Share of local councillors in parliament 1.49 1.31 1.67 
NFA 36.59 34.88 38.37 
Strength of Local Government Associations -19.82 -43.01 3.18 
Territorial electoral system 11.73 -9.06 32.99 
Direct democratic instruments for local governments -0.72 -15.45 14.53 
Overall decentralisation -15.64 -44.96 12.84 
Special school pupils (in 1’000) 10.71 9.85 11.61 
Member special school concordat -9.95 -11.59 -8.37 
Left-wing parties 2.91 2.68 3.15 
Number of municipalities 0.03 -0.01 0.08 
German language -15.22 -81.67 49.14 
Urbanisation -0.01 -0.02 0.00 
Share of local councillors in parliament * NFA -0.30 -0.38 -0.21 
N = 45    
    
    
Final model 
Intercept 21.71 -10.76 54.7 
Share of local councillors in parliament 1.11 0.93 1.3 
NFA 34.48 32.24 36.61 
Strength of Local Government Associations -13.19 -25.15 -1.5 
Special school pupils (in 1'000) 9.33 8.43 10.22 
Member special school concordat -6.67 -8.69 -4.65 
Left-wing parties 1.04 0.73 1.35 
Share of local councillors in parl. * NFA -0.42 -0.51 -0.34 
N = 45    
    






8.3 Appendix Chapter 4 
Figure A 5: Empirical distribution of cantonal decentralisation dimensions  
 





Table A 7: Two factor analyses for politics-decentralisation 
Measure 
Three-Components Solution Single-Component 
Solution 1 2 3 
LG constituencies 0.794 0.293 -0.281 0.832 
Regionalism 0.727 -0.081 0.195 0.371 
Strength of LGAs -0.640 -0.085 0.574 -0.709 
Direct democracy -0.116 0.818 -0.069 0.457 
Mayor MCPs 0.159 0.750 -0.204 0.654 
Party decentralisation 0.493 0.619 0.120 0.677 
Territorial quotas 0.054 -0.107 0.884 -0.366 
Notes: Principal component analysis, rotation using the Varimax Kaiser Normalisation method (converged 
in five iterations). Bartlett’s test of sphericity: χ2 = 39.793 (p <0.01). LG = Local Government; LGAs = 
Local Government Associations; MCP = Member of Cantonal Parliament. 
 
Table A 8: Factor analysis for overall decentralisation 
Indicators 
Components 
1 2 3 
fiscal decentralisation (2005/2008) -.085 .936 -.092 
personnel decentralisation (2008) .407 .792 .079 
administrative decentralisation (1997–2003) -.213 .863 .012 
Giacometti-index .747 .298 .353 
perceived local autonomy (1994, 2005, and 2009) .885 .173 -.069 
regionalism index (2011) .478 .003 -.102 
types of territorial quotas (2011) -.080 .219 -.551 
party decentralisation (2011) .507 .614 .292 
constituency index .824 -.084 .274 
Mayor MCPs (2011) .249 .168 .696 
strength of LG Associations (2011) -.768 .331 -.258 
direct-democratic decentralisation (2011) -.095 .127 .827 
Notes: Principal component analysis, rotation using the Varimax Kaiser Normalisation method (converged 





Table A 9: Variable description 
Variable Operationalisation Data source 
Expenditure Own calculations based on absolute capital ex-
penditures divided by the permanent resident 
population, less the annual mean of all cantons 
that year. Data for cantonal, local and total 




fice for Statistics  
Decentrali-
sation 
Own calculations for the Policy-, Polity- and Pol-
itics-dimension: 
Policy-Dimension: Local governments’ share of 
the public money raised and administered within 
a canton (on annual basis).  
Polity-Dimension: Index of Giacometti (1941, for 
1990 to 2009) and local government secretary 
survey results (Gemeindeschreiberbefragung, 
GSB) of 1994 (for 1990 to 1999), 2005 (for 2000 
to 2005) and 2009 (for 2006 to 2009).  
Politics-Dimension: Index including cantonal po-
litical party organisation, regionalism, territorial 
quotas, electoral system organisation, direct rep-
resentation of mayors in cantonal parliaments, 
the organisational strength of local government 
organisations, and the existence of direct-demo-
cratic instruments for local governments (cf. 
Mueller 2011, 2014, and 2015). 
For all dimensions we calculated z-standardised 
values. The mean of those three values equals the 




















Table A 9: Variable description (continued) 
Direct de-
mocracy 
Index of Stutzer (1999) with mean values from 
1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2009 for the following 
four dimensions: the right to launch a legislative 
initiative, the right to launch a constitutional ini-
tiative, the right to veto a legislative initiative, 
and the right to veto a financial decision. Scale: 1 
= few direct-democratic rights, 6 = extended di-
rect-democratic rights. The overall index equals 
the mean of the values for the four dimensions. 
Schaub and 
Dlabac (2012)  
Debt break Index of Feld and Kirchgässner (2008). Scale: 0 
= no debt break, 1 = weak debt break, 2 = moder-










Own calculations based on the vote share of the 
parties in government. For cantons Uri, Grau-
bünden and Appenzell-Ausserrhoden, we rely on 
the percentage of seats in parliament, as data to 
the vote share are unavailable. Appenzell-Inner-
rhoden is excluded because it has too peculiar a 
system.  
Federal Office 








Unemployment rate State Secretariat 
for Economic Af-
fairs and Federal 
Office for Statis-
tics 
Catholic Indicates whether canton has 1 = majority that is 






Table A 9: Variable description (continued) 
German-
speaking  
Indicates whether canton has 1 = majority that is 





Own calculations based on the share of seats in 
the cantonal parliament of the following parties: 
Social-Democratic Party, Green party, Labour 
Party [formerly Communist Party], other small 
left parties. No data are available for the canton 
of Appenzell-Innerrhoden from 1990 to 2009 
and for the canton of Appenzell-Ausserrhoden 
from 1999 to 2002.  
Federal Office 




Trade unions Share of members of trade unions of the work-
ing population.  
Schaub and 
Dlabac (2012) 




Education Share of people in secondary education; data are 
available for the time period from 1999 to 2009, 
for the other years mean values were used. No 
data are available for the canton of Appenzell-





Share of people receiving social benefits; data 
are available for the time period from 2005 to 










Total annual tax yield from federal corporate 
taxation by canton, divided by a canton’s per-







Table A 10: Summary statistics 
Variable Min. Max. Mean SD 
Cantonal per capita expenditure (mean-corrected) -4123 17290 0 3074.38 
Local per capita expenditure (mean-corrected) -3456 3285 0 1168.74 
Total per capita expenditure (mean-corrected) -4073 13830 0 2746.8 
Overall Decentralisation -1.83 1.24 0 0.71 
Policy-Dimension -1.81 2.44 0 0.98 
Polity-Dimension -1.96 1.57 0 0.88 
Politics-Dimension -1.88 2.35 0 0.98 
Direct democracy 1.74 5.76 4.26 1.17 
Debt break 0 3 0.57 1 
Government coalition 50.6 100 79.97 10.12 
Urbanisation 0 89.27 24.49 19.49 
Unemployment 0.03 7.81 2.79 1.7 
Catholic canton (dummy) 0 1 0.42 0.49 
German-speaking (dummy) 0 1 0.73 0.44 
Left-wing parties 6.15 53.08 26.07 11.6 
Trade unions 0.83 34.55 9.2 6.35 
Age 11.57 22.72 16.22 2.09 
Education 1.38 4.26 2.69 0.63 
Social benefits 0.8 7.1 2.51 1.43 
Median income 43.2 64.67 52.95 4.11 










Cantonal spending Local spending Total spending 
Overall Decentralisation  Negative Positive Negative 
Policy-Decentralisation Policy (-) Policy (+) Policy (-) 
Polity-Decentralisation Polity (-) n.s. Polity (-) 
Politics-Decentralisation Politics (+) Politics (-) n.s. 
Policy- + Polity-Dec. Policy (-), Polity (-) Policy (+),  
Polity (-) 
Policy (-),  
Polity (-) 
Policy- + Politics-Dec. Policy (-) Policy (+),  
Politics (-) 
Policy (-) 
Polity- + Politics-Dec. Polity (-),  
Politics (+) 
Politics (-) Polity (-),  
Politics (+) 
Policy- + Polity- + Politics-
Decentralisation 
Policy (-),  
Polity (-),  
Politics (+) 
Policy (+),  
Politics (-) 
Policy (-),  
Polity (-) 
Notes: Each cell represents one model to explain mean-corrected public spending between 1990 and 2009, 
all of which were estimated using the same procedure as for models 3 in Table 2 – that is, including all 
control variables with generalised variance-inflation factor <5. All effects are significant, with “ − ” = 





Table A 12: Results of time-series cross-sectional models including generalised variance-inflation factor (GVIF) values 
 




8.4 Appendix Chapter 5 
Table A 13: Variable description 
Variable  Operationalisation Source 
Welfare spending  Public and mandatory and voluntary private 
social expenditure regarding old age, survi-
vors, incapacity-related benefits, health, fam-
ily, active labour market programmes, unem-
ployment, housing and other social policy ar-
eas (cash benefits and benefits in kind)  
Armingeon et al. 
(2014); OECD 
(2016) 
Federalism Index by Huber et al. (2004): 0 = Not a fed-
eral state; 1 =Weak federal state; 2 = 
Strongly federal state 
Armingeon et al. 
(2014)  
Strength of left par-
ties  
Aggregated vote share of all left parties in 
the national parliament.  
Armingeon et al. 
(2014)  
Strength of right 
parties 
Aggregated vote share of all right parties in 
the national parliament. 
Armingeon et al. 
(2014) 
Union strength Union density: Proportion of union members   Armingeon et al. 
(2014)  




Proportion of the population aged 65 years 
and over  
Armingeon et al. 
(2014)  







Table A 14: Weight factors for the formation of synthetic Belgium (welfare spending) 
Country Weight Country Weight 
Denmark 0 Italy 0 
Finland  0  Japan 0 
France 0  Netherlands 0.644 
Greece 0  Norway 0 
Great Britain 0  Sweden 0.19 
Ireland 0.165    
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the R package synth (Abadie et al. 2011). 
 
Table A 15: Variable weight factors for the formation of synthetic Belgium (welfare 
spending) 
Variable Weight 
Welfare spending in % of GDP 0.898 
Strength of left parties  0.020 
Strength of right parties 0.000 
Union strength 0.000 
GDP  0.064 
Demographic structure 0.009 
Unemployment 0.009 










Source: Authors’ own calculations using the R package synth (Abadie et al. 2011).  
Notes: The short-term decrease of real Belgium in the mid-1990s can be seen against the background of a 
double austerity norm in place until the end of 1998, which let expenditures in percentage of GDP drop, 


































































Figure A 7: Synthetic control method for Belgium with event year 1980 
 
Note: Authors’ own calculations using the R package synth (Abadie et al. 2011). 
 
 
Figure A 8: Synthetic control method for Belgium and event year 1993 (on welfare spend-
ing): leave one out. 
 




























































SCM with full donor pool
SCM excluding Ireland from donor pool
SCM excluding the Netherlands from donor pool




Figure A 9: Social expenditures of the federal governments and communities/regions 
compared 
 
Source: National Bank of Belgium: online statistics (www.stat.nbb.be/?lang=en).  
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